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Abstract
Usage of mobile services is growing rapidly. Most Internet-based services targeted for
PC based browsers now have mobile counterparts. These mobile counterparts often are
enhanced when they use user’s location as one of the inputs. Even some PC-based services
such as point of interest Search, Mapping, Airline tickets, and software download mirrors
now use user’s location in order to enhance their services. Location-based services are
exactly these, that take the user’s location as an input and enhance the experience based
on that. With increased use of these services comes the increased risk to location privacy.
The location is considered an attribute that user’s hold as important to their privacy.
Compromise of one’s location, in other words, loss of location privacy can have several
detrimental e ects on the user ranging from trivial annoyance to unreasonable persecution.
More and more companies in the Internet economy rely exclusively on the huge data
sets they collect about users. The more detailed and accurate the data a company has about
its users, the more valuable the company is considered. No wonder that these companies are
often the same companies that o er these services for free. This gives them an opportunity
to collect more accurate location information. Research community in the location privacy
protection area had to reciprocate by modeling an adversary that could be the service
provider itself. To further drive this point, we show that a well-equipped service provider
can infer user’s location even if the location information is not directly available by using
other information he collects about the user.
There is no dearth of proposals of several protocols and algorithms that protect loca-
tion privacy. A lot of these earlier proposals require a trusted third party to play as an
intermediary between the service provider and the user. These protocols use anonymization
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and/or obfuscation techniques to protect user’s identity and/or location. This requirement
of trusted third parties comes with its own complications and risks and makes these pro-
posals impractical in real life scenarios. Thus it is preferable that protocols do not require
a trusted third party.
We look at existing proposals in the area of private information retrieval. We present
a brief survey of several proposals in the literature and implement two representative algo-
rithms. We run experiments using di erent sizes of databases to ascertain their practicabil-
ity and performance features. We show that private information retrieval based protocols
still have long ways to go before they become practical enough for local search applications.
We propose location privacy preserving mechanisms that take advantage of the pro-
cessing power of modern mobile devices and provide configurable levels of location privacy.
We propose these techniques both in the single query scenario and multiple query scenario.
In single query scenario, the user issues a query to the server and obtains the answer. In
the multiple query scenario, the user keeps sending queries as she moves about in the area
of interest. We show that the multiple query scenario increases the accuracy of adver-
sary’s determination of user’s location, and hence improvements are needed to cope with
this situation. So, we propose an extension of the single query scenario that addresses this
riskier multiple query scenario, still maintaining the practicability and acceptable perfor-
mance when implemented on a modern mobile device. Later we propose a technique based
on di erential privacy that is inspired by di erential privacy in statistical databases. All
three mechanisms proposed by us are implemented in realistic hardware or simulators, run
against simulated but real life data and their characteristics ascertained to show that they
are practical and ready for adaptation.
This dissertation study the privacy issues for location-based services in mobile environ-
ment and proposes a set of new techniques that eliminate the need for a trusted third party
by implementing e cient algorithms on modern mobile hardware.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy or the right to be left alone in the realm of computer science can be understood
as a personal preference of how much of information an individual wants others to have
access to. In general, there is no direct quantitative measurement for privacy and it can
be di erent from one person to another and varies based on many factors such as culture,
circumstance, financial gain, services being consumed or the entity trying to access the
information.
Recent evolution in mobile phones and communication technologies has lead to a sig-
nificant increase in the number of subscribers to mobile networks. It is estimated that there
will be 6.1 billion smartphone users across the world by 2020, which represents 70% of the
global population at that time [24]. Further, the development of mobile data technologies
allow many mobile users to access the Internet via their mobile devices and leads to very
attractive and useful applications. Examples of these applications include mobile enter-
tainment, locating nearby points of interest, updating friends and family of one’s location,
tourist guidance, language translation etc. Improvements both in the quantity and qual-
ity of publicly available data lead to significant improvements to the capabilities of these
mobile applications. For example, a user can not only search for nearby restaurants but
put additional criteria such as availability of specific food (e.g. gluten free) or having a
higher than threshold user review rating. While there are multiple categories of mobile
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applications available, the category of applications that is most interesting to the privacy
research community falls under Location Based Services (LBS).
An LBS is a service provided to a mobile user, typically using a mobile application, that
has at least two entities involved, a server and a client. It works like any other client/server
architecture where the client initiates the transaction by placing a service request, and the
server responds to that request. What di erentiates LBS from other mobile services is the
fact that the location of the user is one of the inputs to the service request. While some
service providers and devices support the concept of “push” services that allow the server
to push relevant service messages to the mobile phone, they can be considered a special case
of the client/server transaction, as one could consider the installation and registration of
the application with the service provider represents the initial service request by the client.
In LBSs the transactions between the user terminal and the service provider are usually
carried over mobile networks. For the service provider to provide a useful service to the user,
the location of the user needs to be known by the server. It can be obtained either by using
the Global Positioning System (GPS) which is supported today by most of the smartphones
and tablets. Other approaches such as WiFi/cell tower triangulation are possible. A set of
di erent location sensing techniques has been explored by Hightower and Borriello in [84].
If the service provider was not able to manipulate all the location data that is required to
accomplish the service, then the service provider will obtain that data from the Geographic
Information System (GIS). A GIS database is a separate entity that is designed to store
and process geographic data.
LBSs are used in a wide variety of applications that includes locating an object such
as grocery store or locating people such as finding a friend on a social network. It may also
include some business applications such as advertising coupons or deals to clients, or billing
them for a service dynamically based on their current location. A new application of LBSs
is mobile location based gaming such as a Geocaching1 hunting game, where the player tries
to locate a hidden container in an interesting location based on the GPS coordinates.
1www.geocaching.com
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Location-based services are very useful and so are consumed by many mobile users. One
of the query parameters, namely, the user’s current location, is of immense importance to
the privacy research community. The current or the past location of the user is considered
private information. Moreover, it is generally thought that the more accurate the location
of a user traced by an unauthorized entity, the bigger breach it is of user’s privacy. On the
other hand, the more accurate the user location supplied to the service provider, the more
useful response the service provider can give. A considerable amount of research, including
the current dissertation, deals with the fine balancing required between these two conflicting
aspects.
People consider their geographic location to be private information. They do not want
unauthorized entities to know where they are or where they have been. Breach of location
privacy could present several serious problems to the user. Moreover, precise location
information of consumers has proven to be a profitable asset in this day of personalized
marketing. This has caused several breaches, escalations of privileges and very service
provider leaning privacy policies such as longer retention intervals of user’s location data.
Because of the financial gains, there is added motivation on the part of service providers
to be able to obtain and use precise user location information. On the other hand, the
users, equipped with their smartphone, want and sometimes need, to consume location-
based services. So, techniques are needed to preserve the location privacy of the user even
when the attacker happens to be the service provider itself while allowing the user to still
consume location-based services without considerable degradation of quality.
1.1 Mobile Local Search
One area of interest for the privacy research community within the LBS space is mobile
local search. While in several LBSs like navigation systems, friend finders, social networking
apps etc., the mobile local search is arguably the most widely used system where the semi-
trusted service provider can gain considerable knowledge based on both the location and
query string used as part of the query. A typical search transaction starts with a user
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Figure 1.1: Typical mobile local search architecture.
looking for a certain object (often called Point Of Interest or POI). The user sends a query
to the service provider with a keyword that defines the type of required POIs in addition
to the location information that refers to her current geographical position. With proper
permissions, the location data can be directly obtained by the application from an on-board
positioning device. The LBS provider receives this query and the geographic position of
the user and returns a list of POIs that match the query, sorted based on some criteria.
If the service provider already maintains a database of the requested type of POIs, then
it can answer the query immediately; otherwise, the server must request this information
from GIS.
The most common architecture for mobile local search prevalent today is depicted in
Figure 1.1. It is a simple client/server architecture where the client is a mobile application
that directly communicates with the server. When it comes to location privacy of the user
in this architecture, it is totally based on the privacy policy as published by the Location
Based Service Provider (LSP). In other words, the LSP is trusted completely: the LSP will
only use the location information in accordance with published privacy policy. Of course,
there are many issues even if the LSP is trusted, as the privacy policies themselves can
be long and complicated that few users really understand them. A detailed discussion of
policy-based privacy mechanism is presented later in Chapter 2.
When the service provider is completely trusted, then the location privacy problem
with respect to mobile local search becomes a privacy policy research issue. Assuming
that mechanisms from information security research area are already implemented that
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Figure 1.2: A TTP-based location privacy architecture.
encrypt the communications between the client and the server and prevent attackers from
eavesdropping, the problem becomes trivial. But, what would be the case if the LSP is
semi-trusted instead of completely trusted? The challenge is to come up with a solution
that provides the user all the advantages of mobile local search, without compromising her
location privacy even in the case of a semi-trusted LSP.
An often proposed solution in the literature for this problem is to find a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) that could act as a mediator between the user and the LSP. As shown in Figure
1.2, the TTP runs some anonymization algorithm that prevents the LSP from learning the
exact location information of the user. Instead of direct communication with the LSP, the
user now will send her query to the TTP which anonymizes this query (usually with other
queries from di erent users) and sends it to the LSP, which searches its database and replies
back the found answer. The LSP can answer the anonymized query but should not learn any
information about the user who issued the query. Normally, this answer includes additional
mixed data, and it is the TTP’s job to split out this data and return the correct answer to
each user. Numerous problems come with this solution will be discussed in Section 2.3.
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1.2 Impacts of Location Privacy Breaches
Violation of location privacy are considered serious in many privacy conscious societies.
Research shows several potential impacts of location privacy breach, especially on the user’s
front. Some of these impacts are listed and described below.
A feeling of being violated. One could imagine that a feeling of being violated is
the primary impact of a location privacy breach. But this impact happens only on the
user discovering that her location privacy is breached. This feeling is common among all
privacy breaches. A discovery of location privacy breach or even the perception by the
user of an LBS can have further secondary impacts such as loss of trust, reduced usage of
location-based services, implementation of privacy enhancing mechanisms, retaliation, and
legal actions.
Personal safety. With a lot of vulnerable persons such as activists, victims of various
social crimes, potential victims and children using Internet increasingly, their personal safety
could be in jeopardy if their location privacy is breached and their location is revealed to
powerful attackers. One could imagine that this risk increases if the fact about the location
breach is unknown to the user.
Escalation to further privacy breaches. A powerful attacker may have even worse
goals (e.g. personal physical attack, burglary, arrest etc.) and figuring out the location of
the victim could be the first step in such an attack. In other words, a breach of location
privacy can be escalated by a motivated attacker to facilitate further more serious attacks.
Unreasonable prosecution. With the Internet and mobile technologies being used in
various social causes by the activists, particularly in restrictive societies, a breach of location
privacy of these activists could lead to their identification (or worse could implicate an
innocent person) and could subject to greater scrutiny or even prosecution.
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Uninvited marketing. Intrusive solicitations and uninvited marketing arguably is the
most prevalent impact of location privacy breaches. The intentional or unintentional rev-
elation of location leads to more targeted marketing by various entities. In most practical
scenarios, the marketing entities or marketing facilitators are themselves providers of LBSs
making this risk very prevalent.
Breach of privacy of others. This is particularly true in the case where the attackers
are antagonistic administrations whose intention is to identify and locate the entire group
of activists. A breach of location privacy of one victim could reveal the locations of close
associates, co-workers, and friends even if those third parties are non-users of LBS.
Loss of trust. When the users discover or perceive the breach of location privacy, even
unintentional (e.g. the service provider itself being victim of a hacking attack), it results
in loss of trust on service providers causing reduced utilization of useful services and in-
crease in overall costs, as the victims usually overcome this by implementing various privacy
preserving mechanisms.
Loss of revenue. Loss of trust in service providers generally results in reduced utilization
that could result in major losses in revenue to service providers. The mere perception of
loss of privacy by users, not a full knowledge of a breach, is enough to cause loss of trust and
loss of revenue. It results in service providers spending resources to portray a perception
of trust. One example is the amount of time and money spent by major LBS providers on
public relationship campaigns.
Changes in behavior. Privacy of a person includes behavioral aspects, especially sen-
sitive ones such as religious practices and political activities. The privacy breach of the
user’s location can be escalated to the breach of privacy of these aspects; the breach of pri-
vacy can lead to changes in behavior. The changes could range from towing the party line,
implementation of privacy preserving techniques, reduced use of LBSs or even disloyalty.
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Societal impact. Breach of privacy and loss of trust indirectly a ects the ability for
individuals to communicate and share sensitive information with each other without any
concerns of being monitored by other people or organizations. In the long run, this can
have major impacts on the society as a whole and could cause regressive societies.
Technical Impacts. Loss of trust for LBSs not only have financial costs. It also impacts
the e ciency of the systems. For example, Parris and Henderson [131] run a simulation of
two real-world datasets and show that users’ privacy concerns can significantly downgrade
routing performance in the opportunistic networks. Their results show that message delivery
ratio can be reduced to zero. From the users’ perspective, implementation of additional
measures to preserve privacy often result in loss of Quality of Service (QoS), which results
from an increase in bandwidth costs and processing resources.
1.3 Location Privacy Attacks
LBSs are very useful and are being used by more and more mobile users today [28].
Along with their adoption and increased utilization comes increased risk to location privacy.
In the previous section, several possible impacts of location privacy breach are discussed that
ranged from benign risks such as intrusive marketing to serious ones such as unreasonable
prosecution or bodily harm. Privacy protection techniques can be appreciated and their
e cacy can be judged better if one has an understanding of di erent attack techniques that
a capable and smart attacker could use. In this section, the broad categories of location
privacy attacks in the literature are discussed. The corresponding preservation techniques
proposed will be discussed in Chapter 2.
1.3.1 Identity inference
Perhaps the most obvious location privacy protection technique is to replace the actual
identifier of the user with an alias identifier or pseudonym. Since certain locations such as
the o ce or home can be strongly related to the user, an attacker could easily identify the
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user by linking the pseudonym to these locations. This kind of attack was demonstrated
by Beresford and Stajano [15] and the results show that all users in the tested database
can be identified correctly. The algorithm is run in two steps: (1) given a pseudonym,
observe where that pseudonym spends most of the time and (2) given a location, see which
pseudonym spends more time than any other in that location.
In many situations where the attacker is a third party that can observe the communica-
tions happening between clients of LBS and the server, it is often possible for the attacker
to determine the location of the query origination and sometimes even the contents of the
query. In an identity inference attack, the attacker, who is assumed to have access to the
location the query originated from, tries to infer the identity of the user that originated the
query. The attacker who is also assumed to have access to publicly available databases and
some background information, like the work location of the victim, could try to combine
this information with observations of the communications between the user and LSP to
guess the identity of the user. Once a user is identified, more powerful attacks are possi-
ble as the attacker now can associate any observed pseudonym or a quasi-identifier such
as a phone ID or electronic serial number to the actual identity of the user during future
observations. Quasi-identifiers are attributes of a database record that are non-identifying
by themselves, but can be used to uniquely identify individuals when used in combination.
The attacker could exploit quasi-identifiers to escalate the attacks or to identify other users
of the system; for example, by simply ruling out already identified users. Re-identification
of the Massachusetts Governor, William Weld’s health records was done based on gender,
postal code and date of birth [73, 149]. Later research showed that individuals can be
identified using di erent pseudo-identifiers such as web search history [13], social network
structure [119], movie rating content or even familial structures [74].
A more powerful attack is presented by Gruteser and Hoh in [76] that uses Reid’s
algorithm of multiple-tracking hypothesis [132]. They demonstrated their attack by tracking
three anonymous users over extended periods of time using sample GPS location data. The
sampled locations can be linked to the identity of each individual by building separate
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path for each user. A simplified version of Reid’s algorithm is used to repeatedly generates
hypotheses for the new locations of the users and adjust this information with new location
samples. The results show that the algorithm may be confused between users temporarily,
especially if the paths are crossing, but eventually for a long run it can recover and correctly
sample the users. Krumm [97] runs an experiment over a sample of 172 volunteers. The
author shows that given GPS locations, the home for each user is identified with a median
error of about 60 meters. About 5% of users could be identified by name using free Web-
based services. While using a commercial reverse geocoder, the accuracy raises to 13%.
De Montjoye et al. [40] shows that 95% of individuals can be uniquely identified using just
four spatiotemporal points. This is done by analyzing data collected for fifteen months
from a half million mobile users. By analyzing more than 30 billion call records, Zang
and Bolot [166] tried to find the top N records of users. They set up an experiment that
determined the user’s location at di erent granularity level such as sector, city, county,
whole state, etc. They concluded that 50% of users can be identified by using their top 3
locations determined by analyzing their call records to the granularity of a sector. Using
the same top 3 locations, 10% and up to 50% of users’ locations can be determined to the
city level and 1% and up to 5% to the county level.
1.3.2 Predicting user’s location of interest
To identify user’s places of interest, Marmasse and Schmandt [111] propose the “com-
Motion” software which uses GPS to determine the user’s location and track her movement.
This software links the movement traces to the important places for the user by gradually
learning the locations visited by her on a regular basis. The place is identified by circular
region around a point within which the GPS appears and disappears. A similar work by
Ashbrook and Starner [9] cluster the location data collected from GPS and use a Markov
model to learn useful information from this data, such as prediction of the next place the
user is going to visit and the presence of other people at the same location as the user.
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Kang et al. [91] used a time-based clustering algorithm for coordinate traces of the user
to recognize the important places for her, while Hariharan and Toyama [79] consider both
time and location to build a hierarchy from the location data histories. The hierarchy is
represented as “stays” and “destinations”. The destination is a cluster of stays while the
stay is defined as the place where the user had spent some time. Instead of mapping GPS
location coordinates, “BeaconPrint” algorithm by Hightower et al. [85] identifies important
places for the user by collecting WiFi and GSM base stations visited frequently by the user.
Montoliu and Gatica-Perez [117] developed a smartphone application to obtain the
user’s location by integrating di erent sensors of the phone. Similar to Hariharan and
Toyama [79], the authors use time and location-based clustering to identify significant places.
“CrowdSense@Place” algorithm by Chon et al. [30] monitors everyday user’s places by
opportunistically collecting images and audio clips from a smartphone. The collected image
and audio data is classified in the processing stage and linked to location marks obtained
by the GPS/WiFi sensors. Several approaches recently are proposed by researchers for
predicting the next destination of the user (e.g. [31, 39, 99, 138, 151]), making not just the
current location vulnerable to the attacks, but the future locations of the user as a target
for several attacks.
Sometimes quasi-identifiers can be used to infer the location data. Dewri et al. [14,
43] implemented an attack that shows how driving habits data such as speed and time
collected by auto-insurance companies to assess accident risk can be manipulated to infer
the destination of the trip. We discuss this attack in more detail later in Chapter 3 as an
example of how a semi-trusted service provider can use other data to predict the user’s
location.
1.4 Contribution
In this dissertation, we begin by arguing why the requirement of a TTP is not a prac-
tical solution and how it can be eliminated by taking advantage of the power of modern
smart devices. We propose a TTP free two-round trip generic architecture upon which
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Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms (LPPM) can be implemented. Proceeding from
that architecture we, therefore:
• present a kd-tree e cient POI ranking process that considers both location and promi-
nence2 information of the POIs in contrast to existing LPPMs which use only the
location,
• explore the practicability of implementing cryptography-based methods, namely PIR
techniques, as an LPPM and show that none of the available techniques are practical
enough,
• present a novel LPPM for single queries that enable location and prominence based
ranking of POIs, and implement it entirely on a mobile device to demonstrate feasi-
bility,
• show how there is a higher risk of privacy loss in the multiple query scenario, and
propose an improved LPPM to handle this scenario,
• present and implement an alternative LPPM that uses di erential privacy whose pri-
vacy guarantees can be mathematically ascertained.
The proposed LPPMs in this dissertation are implemented to show that they are all
practical to be run entirely on a mobile device without compromising too much of the QoS.
We analyze our results and, where appropriate, compare them with some representative
algorithms to show that our contribution makes significant improvements to location privacy
in the context of mobile local search with minimal communication and computation costs.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation addresses the privacy issues encountered by the users of LBS during
POI searches. As explained above, location privacy is important and loss of privacy has
real consequences to the users. There is a lot of progress in terms of protecting privacy
2More discussion about POI ranking process and the prominence value in Section 4.1
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against third parties. But during these days where richer user profiles are monetized, the
service providers themselves have an incentive to both track and store location data of the
users as accurately as possible. So there is a need for techniques that not only avoid third
parties but also protect user’s privacy against semi-trusted service providers. This disserta-
tion investigates existing techniques, studies their practicability after implementation and
proposes a few practical techniques.
In the next chapter, we survey the existing research in LBS privacy and present a view of
the progression of these techniques. In Chapter 3, we show that protecting location privacy
does not stop at protecting just the location coordinates. We show that a clever semi-trusted
provider can use quasi-identifiers to infer the location of the user pretty closely. In Chapter
4, we propose an architecture for third party free protocols. We present nomenclature that
will be used in rest of the dissertation as other techniques are explained. In Chapter 5,
we delve into Private Information Retrieval , a set of cryptography-based techniques and
investigate them as a potential solution for our third party free architecture. Chapters 6
through 8, present heuristics-based techniques. In chapter 6, we propose a third party free
technique that can be implemented on a smart mobile device that achieves user desired
privacy level in the single query scenario. We extend this technique in Chapter 7 to address
the same issue in the multiple query scenario where the user moves around while issuing
queries. In Chapter 8, we propose an improved technique based on di erential privacy as a
measure for a guaranteed privacy level.
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Chapter 2
Location Privacy Mechanisms
In this chapter, we present existing privacy protection mechanisms in the form of a
quick survey of existing literature. We can broadly categorize the privacy protection mech-
anisms that are in practice or proposed in the literature based on policy, anonymization,
obfuscation, cryptography or a combination of these. While policy-based techniques require
the user to trust the service provider, the other techniques o er various degrees of privacy
even from the service provider. We discuss these issues in detail below.
2.1 Policy Based Protection
Policy-based privacy protection is arguably still the most prevalent in practice today.
It gains importance as the focus of privacy protection shifts from protection against a
third party eavesdropper to protection against a curious service provider itself. Currently,
most LBS consumers have no choice but to trust the service provider and assume that the
service provider adheres to the protections promised in the privacy policy. The policy-based
controls are deployed into two di erent ways: a policy that regulates the access for various
entities to private data and a policy that details how private information will be used and
sets an expectation (promise) of privacy to the user.
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2.1.1 Access control policy
Access control policy is a commonly practiced technique in organizations to ensure the
security of their information systems. Role-based access control is proposed by Sandhu et
al. [136, 137] as a large-scale access authorization model for database systems. Walking
in the same steps, di erent research e orts attempted to use access control policies in
order to protect the privacy of individuals. Agrawal et al. [2] proposed the concept of the
Hippocratic database system as an architecture to regulate the privacy of database records.
This architecture consists of two metadata tables. The first table consists of privacy policy
attributes. External recipients and retention period are described for each attribute in
the table. User authorizations are listed in the second table. Byun and Li [22] suggested a
“purpose” based model of access management to handle advanced data management systems
e.g. those based on XML. The purpose describes the reason(s) for accessing data that is
organized in hierarchical relationships. Basically, a user is allowed to access the data item
if the purpose of the request matches the intended purpose of that object.
On the other hand, Lalana and Hal [89] think that pure access restriction systems based
only on information access are outdated and inadequate for addressing the privacy issues
in recent technologies. As an example, the authors considered an access control policy
that guards sensitive information such as SSN for an individual from being published.
However, various researches showed that user identity can be recovered with a high degree
of accuracy from auxiliary information available in public databases including government
sources [61,118,120].
Access control policy, while plays a role in privacy preservation, cannot be the only
measure. This is because access control controls the access to private information, among
other things, to unauthorized entities but if the protection is needed from a service provider
itself, these measures fail completely. Similarly, if third parties are involved in enhancing
privacy, these third parties often need to have access to user’s private information and are
often given access. Any breach of security at the third parties will completely nullify if
access control policy is the only protection available. In other words, access control policy
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is totally ine ective, if the entity that is given access is not completely trusted. Hence there
is a need to look at other mechanisms that are more e ective.
2.1.2 Privacy policy
Policy-based privacy preservation is arguably the most prevalent form of privacy pro-
tection mechanism today. Most LSPs and providers that collect location data publish an
extensive privacy policy that tries to spell out exactly what private information is collected
and how the data is used. These service providers collected and continue to collect huge
volumes of data about their users, causing the advent of “big data” which essentially means,
application of machine learning techniques to huge data sets of information about users to
predict future behavior. Because of this, these service providers are able to monetize the
private information of the users they have collected. So, most of these LSPs give away their
service for free or very cheap, but make it a condition that the users of the LBS agree to
the privacy policies that essentially give permission to them to collect and monetize private
information of their users including their location data.
In the privacy policy-based preservation mechanism, within the system, there are two
issues that are in play. One, the users trust the LSP to adhere to the policy they have
published, which includes in most cases, a restriction that the data needs to be anonymized
before being sold to third parties. Second, there is a trust placed on the LSPs by the users,
that the LSPs implement proven, strong enough security and access mechanisms in place
that prevents powerful attackers from forcibly obtaining the private information. Another
expectation from the LSPs by the users is to assume that the third parties that do get the
private information are properly scrutinized and adhere to privacy policies that are at least
as strong as that of the LSP. Thus, one can imagine that if a benign or malicious breach of
any of these di erent expectations placed on the LSPs is broken, the privacy of the user is
completely breached.
There are however some external checks and balances that seem to push LSPs to strive
hard to preserve the trust placed in them. First, a loss of trust by the users in the LSP’s
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ability or willingness to preserve private information means loss or decrease of the LBSs
provided by those LSPs. This means that they can collect less private data, which translates
to a loss of revenue. The other way, a check is placed on the system because of activist
and vigilant groups that scrutinize the privacy policies of major LSPs. Any change in the
privacy policy that gives additional advantages to the LSPs at the cost of privacy of the
users immediately becomes popular news and because of extensive usage of these services
by large populations, they are often discussed and protection mechanisms published and
implemented right away. LSPs on the other hand, often provide ways for their users to
configure some of their privacy settings including tracking and use of location data so that
they can set them to suit their comfort level. Any changes to this reconfigurability including
new/additional ways to configure privacy at nuanced levels are again well published as far
as popular LSPs are concerned. Essentially, user awareness of the privacy policy, being
educated about what private data is used and learning how to tune the data collection
and usage of their private information seems to be the major privacy protection measures
available to the user in the case of policy-based privacy.
2.2 Anonymization
An early attempt to maintain the privacy of location data proposed by Beresford and
Stajano [15]. They used pseudonyms during the communication transaction instead of the
true identifier of the user so that even if an attacker was able to capture the communication
between the user and LBS, the true identifier of the user is not directly revealed. But, long
term utilization of the same pseudonym for the same user can make her location vulnerable
to historical tracking attacks. To overcome this problem, the authors recommend that the
pseudonym should be changed periodically. Thus, the attacker’s opportunity for tracking
the user and accumulating enough movement history to infer her identity will be reduced.
The authors presented the concept of mix-zones to develop their method of updating the
pseudonym of the user. A mix-zone is defined as a spatial region where the location of the
user is not revealed to the applications. If the identities of the users are changed randomly
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(mixed) when users entered the mix-zone, then the application cannot distinguish them
when they exit from that zone. An anonymity set is the group of users that are in the mix-
zone in a given time period. An obvious measurement for location privacy in this context is
the size of the anonymity set. The authors in that work assume the size of the anonymity
set as a preference parameter that can be selected by the user to maintain her minimum
level of privacy.
2.2.1 k-anonymity
Even when using a pseudonym instead of the actual identifier of the user, LBSs will
disclose the position of the user at a certain point of time. In fact, the correlation of these
two attributes reveals very sensitive information about the user. By collecting the location
information of the user over a long enough period of time, the attacker can eventually,
recover the true identity of the user. For example, a study by Golle and Partridge [74]
shows that location traces for a pseudonym can be linked to the home/work address of an
individual.
Alternatively, the user can hide her actual query in an anonymity set of dummy queries
with incorrect location tags [94]. Yiu et al. [164] propose a framework, called “SpaceTwist”,
based on k nearest neighbor queries. The process starts with a location di erent from
the user’s actual location, then incrementally retrieve nearest neighbor locations until an
accurate query result is reported. Gruteser and Grunwald [75] borrowed the concept of
k-anonymity [134, 135] from privacy protection in the relational database and utilized it
for protecting the privacy of locations in a typical POI search application. According
to Samarati and Sweeney [135], k-anonymity in relational databases can be achieved by
partitioning the records of the intended table into a set of groups based on the values of
certain fields of that table, called quasi-identifiers (QI). Next, the exact values of the QI are
replaced by more generalized values, e.g., numeric fields can be generalized to a range of
values. A table satisfies k-anonymity if each group in that table includes at least k records.
A quasi-identifier is an attribute that an attacker may use to determine the individual
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instead of the user identifier. It has been found that 87% of the population in the United
States could be identified based on their Zip code, gender, and date of birth [150]. Since
the QI can be accessed from publicly available data, most privacy protection architectures
consider these identifiers as a background knowledge of the attacker.
For location privacy, k-anonymity is satisfied if the location of the user that is inferred
from the sent query is indistinguishable from at least k ≠ 1 other users. The k users
form the anonymity set. k-anonymity ensures that an attacker, without other background
knowledge, cannot guess the real location of the user with probability greater than 1k . For
a better understanding of this concept, we will use a simple example for illustration.
Example. Consider the location data for six users as shown in Figure 2.1a. Each record
in the table consists of the following fields.
• The user identifier (ID) which uniquely identifies each individual user.
• The exact two-dimensional location data of the user that is formed by x-coordinate
and y-coordinate fields.
user identifier x≠coordinate y≠coordinate
1 7 4
2 2 2
3 5 6
4 7 2
5 4 3
6 8 5
(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: Location data for Example 2.2.1
Figure 2.1b shows the location for each user in a two-dimensional coordinate map. The
attacker is assumed to know the contents of the query issued by the user or can guess it
with a high level of confidence. In most realistic LBS scenarios, the location information of
a user can be used by the adversary as a QI to infer the identity of the user. The privacy
protection algorithm used in this example promises to preserve k-anonymity for each user
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with k = 3 . In order to protect the location privacy, the algorithm will cloak the location
data of the user before sharing it with other entities.
Let us suppose that the user u1 is looking for the nearest night club from her location.
Instead of sending the exact location data of u1 along with the query, the anonymization
algorithm determines the nearest two users to u1, group them together in one generalized
region and send the geolocation data of this region to the intended LSP. The generalization
operation, shown in Figure 2.2, which groups exact location points into a region is referred
to as spatial cloaking. This region is shown by the shaded square in Figure 2.1b.
user identifier x≠coordinate y≠coordinate
1 7≠ 8 2≠ 5
4 7≠ 8 2≠ 5
6 7≠ 8 2≠ 5
Figure 2.2: Location generalization for clocked region in Example 2.2.1
When an attacker observes the query and the cloaked region that contains u1, without
any other knowledge, the identity of u1 is protected since all users in the cloaked region are
indistinguishable from each other when looking at the query. From the attacker’s point of
view, the probability that the query was issued by u1 is 13 . Thus k-anonymity achieved its
goal and the privacy of user u1 is protected.
Gruteser and Grunwald [75] suggested a quad-trees to build the cloaked region; this
region could be any shape and it could be created by using any technique as long as it
contains k users. The cloaking is performed at a TTP site. Several research based on
the k-anonymity concept to satisfy location privacy used di erent techniques to build the
cloaked region [80, 112, 115, 116]. Cloaking regions can be created with features such as
a limited number of still objects [12] or a threshold level of entropy is maintained in the
queries originating from that region [106]. Privacy level can be configured by using the
popularity of public regions [161]. However, Marconi et al. [109] show that this method
is futile if the attacker can track generated regions over time. An entropy-based dummy
location selection algorithm with the objective of making the selected locations spread as
far as possible is proposed by Niu et al. [122,123].
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Instead of requiring a TTP, Chow et al. [34] propose a peer-to-peer (P2P) algorithm
to construct the cloaked region without involving a third party. They propose a P2P
network of users that achieve k-anonymity together by forming groups. Before sending a
request to the LSP, the mobile client creates a group of at least k≠ 1 other users. Initially,
the requesting mobile client propagates a special message called, FORM_GROUP, with
hop sequence number of one. Any neighbor device that can detect this message will send
the acknowledgment to the originator device. If the originator receives k ≠ 1 responses
or more, then the k-anonymity requirement is satisfied and the client creates a cloaked
region (the area that includes these devices) and uses it as part of the request. If no
su cient number of neighbors responded, the originator sends another request with hop
number incremented. This request is forwarded by any receiver to their neighbors after
decrementing the hop number. All the responses go back to the originator. This hierarchical
group expansion continues till at least k ≠ 1 responses are received. They also eliminate
one of the main disadvantages of k-anonymous algorithms, i.e., if k users are concentrated
in a small identifiable region such a restaurant, the precise location is revealed. They do
this by proposing a minimum area for the cloaked region. Shokri et al. [142] proposed a
collaborative peer-to-peer model where mobile devices keep their previous search results to
answer queries of their peers, thus no location data revealed to LSP. However, this approach
is impractical in the sense that it requires two interfaces on each mobile device, one that
communicates with the service provider and one that communicates with the peers. Another
aspect of this proposal that makes it impractical is its need for a critical number of users
that sign up for the system to have k ≠ 1 other users being available during query times.
In fact, this problem is common among most k-anonymity based approaches.
Based on the number of users logged on Wi-Fi access points, Ahamed et al [4] proposed
a probabilistic approach for building the k-anonymity set. The number of users located
in the region of an access point in a certain period of time is predicted from the historic
data of the logged on users. Each Wi-Fi access point represents a landmark on the map.
The spatial locality around the landmark is defined as the dominance space. The proposed
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architecture requires an additional entity called Dominance Space Mapper (DSM) which
has a database for location information of all access points on the map. The DSM is the
operational component that can calculate the dominance space for each access point and
estimate the number of users under it at specific time periods. Both user and LSP must
subscribe with DSM to get an updated list of the access points and their dominance spaces.
2.2.2 Major problems with anonymization
As the attacker combines the observations with other background knowledge, k-anonymity
starts breaking down. However, other anonymization models try to overcome this problem.
The history of pseudonym user requests of a particular service could be used to link lo-
cation information of the individual and act as a quasi-identifier. The notion of historical
k-anonymity is introduced by Bettini et al. [16] to assess the risk of disclosure of sensitive
personal information based on location data.
Sensitive attributes Machanavajjhala et al. [108] observed that some attributes are
private to the individual and must be kept secret to protect the privacy, these attributes
are called sensitive attributes. Consider the same dataset from Figure 2.1 with one more
attribute “Age”. This attribute is sensitive to all users in the database. The association
between users and the age should be kept secret. For the cloaked region shown in Figure
2.1b, assume that the attacker can associate age attributes to the individuals in the dataset
shown in Figure 2.3. Although the exact locations of the users are anonymized, the attacker
can tell with high confidence that u1 has issued the query “night club”, because it is usually
people in that age group that are generally interested in night clubs. To avoid this problem,
Machanavajjhala et al. [108] proposed a new measure called l-diversity. A group of records
created by the anonymization algorithm satisfies l-diversity if it contains at least l well-
represented values for the sensitive attributes, i.e., the probability that an individual in this
group can be linked to a sensitive attribute value is at most 1l . The group in Figure 2.3
satisfies 1-diversity for the query “night club”. Li et al. [105] argue that l-diversity does not
work in the cases of skewed distributions. If the attacker can classify the users into groups of
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homogeneous sensitive attribute values, he could infer the value of the sensitive attribute. So
they proposed t-closeness to maintain same distribution of sensitive attributes for the entire
dataset. To improve the diversity of the anonymized dataset, a di erent grouping strategy
that considers such sensitive values could be used. Inheriting from both k-anonymity and
l-diversity, Wong et al. [156] proposed (–, k)-anonymity to protect the location privacy.
To satisfy (–, k)-anonymity, a data table must satisfy k-anonymity and the frequency of
sensitive values for each group in the table must be –k. Multiple other suggestions are
available to prevent sensitive attributes association [45,69,133,140].
user identifier x≠coordinate y≠coordinate age
1 7≠ 8 2≠ 5 27
4 7≠ 8 2≠ 5 77
6 7≠ 8 2≠ 5 81
Figure 2.3: Cloaked dataset with sensitive attribute
Outliers From pure LBS perspective, k-anonymity tends to fail when there are outliers
[90]. Consider Figure 2.4 . If the attacker knows the location of users u1, u2, u3, u4 and
Figure 2.4: Outliers problem with k-anonymity
also that k = 3, then observes that a query comes from the region marked by the larger
rectangle, R1, the attacker can figure out that the query must have come from u1. This
is because, if the query came from anyone else, the smaller rectangle, R2, will be observed
in the query. To solve this problem, Chow and Mokbel [33] defined a new property called,
k-sharing-region. This property requires that the cloaked region must be shared by at
least k-users, i.e., at least k-users included in that region only. In the example of Figure
2.4, if the privacy algorithm chooses the region R2 for the users u2, u3, and u4 then the
region R1 cannot be chosen for the users u1, u2, u4 and the algorithm must find another two
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users sharing the same region with the user u1. Kalnis et al. [90] discuss the importance
of the reciprocity property and show how the quad-tree based algorithms for k-anonymity
(discussed in Section 2.2.1) fail in the case of outliers. To maintain reciprocity, the cloaking
algorithm must return the same cloaking region for all the queries made by any user in that
region [70].
Cloak region size Even without assuming background knowledge for the attacker, k-
anonymity still may fail to protect the location information of the user in some skewed
distribution cases. For example, if k = 3 and all three users are using LBSs while sitting
in a small room. The narrow region returned by the algorithm is granular enough for the
attacker to locate the users. So, most of the location privacy algorithms guarantee that
the size of a cloaked region is greater than some threshold area in addition to k-anonymity
property.
Clearly, the above solutions add more restrictions on the privacy algorithm to determine
the cloaked region and hence increases the chance of not satisfying the query, which degrades
down the QoS. Finally, it has to be noted that, most of the problems common to k-anonymity
based approaches also apply to techniques based on the anonymity sets if they consider the
minimum size of the anonymity set as the main privacy parameter.
2.3 Obfuscation
Location obfuscation is a technique used in LBS to protect the location privacy of the
user by degrading the quality of information about her location in order to avoid revealing
the exact spatial location. Duckham and Kulik developed a formal model for spatial obfus-
cation and privacy [48]. They define obfuscation as: “introducing imperfection as the result
of the deliberate degradation of spatial information quality.” They refer to three types of
imperfection: inaccuracy, imprecision, and vagueness. Inaccuracy is a situation in which
the provided information is not true; imprecision occurs when the provided information is
not specific; vagueness is the lack of definite boundary. For example, the position of the
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user shown in the map in Figure 2.5 can be obfuscated by giving an imprecise location data,
such as saying that the user is located in the campus of the University of Denver, or an
inaccurate position such as the intersection of Evans Ave and S University Blvd, or a vague
location such as near to Daniels College of Business.
Figure 2.5: Spatial obfuscation types: ¸u is the user’s location, the entire map represents
imprecision obfuscation, ¸1 represents inaccuracy obfuscation, and ¸2 vagueness obfuscation.
The straightforward approach for implementing this technique is by creating a closed
region around the client’s location and send it to the service provider instead of revealing
the exact location information in order to obtain a specific LBS [7,29,48,160]. The service
provider returns the candidate result based on the given region. Obviously, this approach
puts the onus on the client to determine and send a large enough region as part of the query
to the LBS and to process the large dataset containing information about the large region
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coming back from the LBS as a response. With both processing power on mobile devices
at that time and communication bandwidth being precious, this straightforward approach
needs to be improved. This had led to several existing approaches that use TTP that does
the obfuscation on behalf of the users and processes the bigger datasets obtained as part
of the response from LBS for obfuscated region queries. In fact, these approaches impose a
change to the current working structure of the LBSs. Additionally, in practice, it is di cult
in real life scenarios to obtain a trusted third party and even then, get enough critical mass
of users that trust the same TTP. Further, TTP has the major disadvantage of creating a
bottleneck for data transmission and also become a single point of failure both in terms of
utility and privacy. A breach of security on the TTP often results in total loss of privacy
of all users utilizing that TTP.
There were several attempts to eliminate the use of TTP. For example, Yiu et al. [165]
proposed the “SpaceTwist” algorithm to o er location privacy for n nearest neighboring
POIs without requiring a TTP anonymizer. The client sends a fake location information
called anchor to the server. The SpaceTwist on the server returns POIs to the client in
ascending order based on their distances from the received anchor. The client iteratively
processes the received POIs based on the actual location of the user until the nearest n-
neighbor POIs are collected. For the same purpose of avoiding the TTP, Kim [95] proposed
a framework based on Voronoi diagrams [1, 11, 101] to obfuscate the location of the user.
Similar to Yiu et al. [165], the service of finding the best set of POIs for the user has
been reduced to the problem of finding the nearest neighbor object and ignore any other
possible user’s preferences for the POI. Another approach is the coordinate transformation
by Gutscher [78, 152] where the mobile client applies a geometric transformation function
over the user’s location and then sends it to the LSP. For example, in range query, after
receiving transformed coordinates of the query area, the LSP selects all POIs located in
that area and sends them to the mobile client. The client then applies inverse transforms
to the locations of the returned objects. The main disadvantages of this approach were
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observed by Gutscher [78]: (1) additional processing complexity needed for transformation,
and (2) it provides a relatively “weak” protection.
Hashem et al. [82] adopted obfuscation approach in order to answer a query of group
nearest location of a meeting place. For example, consider a group of users who wants to
meet in a restaurant where the total travel distance is minimized for all group members.
The privacy of the user is protected by sending an obfuscated region to the LSP instead
of the exact position in such a way that the results returned by the LSP will include the
actual nearest neighbors of the user. The set of candidate answers is passed to each user
individually in a random order to modify it. The actual answer is broadcast after all users
modify the set of candidate answers. If the attacker already has a background knowledge
about the targeted map he may be able to reduce the size of the obfuscated area by using
this background knowledge.
Based on the geographic context of the map, Damiani et al. [37,38] proposed an obfus-
cation technique in which any POI on the map is abstracted as a feature of a specific type.
The privacy profile of the user describes the sensitivity level for each type. The cloaked
region covers both sensitive and non-sensitive areas. This is done in such a way that the
probability of associating the user to a sensitive feature is below a configured threshold.
Ardagna et al. [8] characterized the probabilistic requirements for a general model of geo-
graphic aware obfuscation mechanisms.
The literature discussed so far is based on giving imprecise information to the service
provider in order to obfuscate the location information of the user. An alternative type
of location information imperfection is when the user presents an inaccurate or a false
position to other parties in a communication system. Using a Bayesian network model An
et al. [5] shows how the user can choose the “right” false position, i.e., the position that
seems reasonable to the attacker. The natural extension of this work is when the user
needs to navigate a path from some source location to a destination. If the attacker can
successfully trace some of the requested paths by the user, then the attacker may have a
good chance of finding out the identity of the user and some of her activities based on the
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collected source and destination locations (see Section 1.3.2 & Chapter 3). To solve this
problem, Krumm [98] proposes generating extra false trips that are indistinguishable from
the true one to confuse the attacker that is trying to trace. Towards the same purpose, Lee
et al. [103] suggested adding extra fake sources and destinations to path queries.
Most proposals that use obfuscation techniques, model an attacker and discuss various
ways the attacker can gain more knowledge even in the case of obfuscation. Duckham et
al. [50] model a geographic environment of road networks as a weighted graph where the user
can move between adjacent nodes along the edges. The weight of the edge represents the
distance along that edge. The authors presented in that work a formal model for di erent
possible strategies for an attacker to enhance his knowledge about the user’s location given
an obfuscated location information over time.
Although they require some changes, most existing privacy preserving algorithms for
LBSs are designed based on the mobile telecommunications infrastructure, e.g., base sta-
tions or cell towers and mobile phones in large geographical areas. Consequently, these
algorithms cannot be applied to an ad-hoc environment such as mobile P2P networks,
where a user can only communicate with other peers through P2P multi-hop routing with-
out any support from servers. Several works [35, 81] proposed obfuscation algorithms for
mobile P2P networks.
QoS vs LoP trade o . The main disadvantage of any obfuscation technique comes
from the clear trade-o  between QoS and Level of Privacy (LoP) that can be achieved by
the obfuscation. Most proposals that use an obfuscation technique provide a configurable
parameter or a tuning mechanism that achieves a balance between QoS and LoP based
on the intended situation. For example, Duckham and Kulik [48] propose a negotiation
algorithm between the user and the service provider to find a satisfactory balance of QoS
and LoP. They present di erent negotiation strategies and simulate them [49]. They propose
that the obfuscation region can be imagined as a set of discrete location. The negotiation
process terminates if the proportion of the obfuscation set that is closest to each POI in the
query is greater than or equal to some threshold value selected by the user. This threshold
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is a fraction ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, and it is called the confidence value. The confidence
value reflects the satisfactory QoS chosen by the user where 1.0 means perfect QoS. Cheng
et al. [29] also study this trade-o  in their proposed probabilistic model for range queries.
2.4 Spatio-temporal Cloaking
Many researchers in the mobile location privacy field tried to combine both k-anonymity
and obfuscation to benefit from the advantage of both approaches [64,75,167]. This involves
creating a cloaked region of minimum area Amin which satisfies the condition of k-anonymity
i.e., the clocked region is guaranteed to include k ≠ 1 users in addition to the user that
generated the query. Usually, the parameters k and Amin are considered as the privacy
requirements set by the user. The literature refers to this approach as spatial cloaking.
Obviously, the main disadvantage of spatial cloaking is the need for TTP anonymizers
inherited from the k-anonymity approach. Although spatial cloaking can protect the privacy
of the user at specific time snapshot, it is not guaranteed to maintain the required k and
Amin for a location trajectory of the user. An attacker may use the location trajectory
data as a QI to discover the actual identity of the user. Di erent clustering and analysis
algorithms for location trajectory data was developed e.g., [102,153,159].
The location trajectory in this context is the path that a moving object follows through
a geographical area as a function of time. It can be represented by discrete timestamped
location points (xi, yi, ti) ordered in time. Consider a toy example of a dataset of trajectories
that captures the movements of people as shown in Figure 2.6. Each record in the dataset
has a unique pseudonym, ID, corresponding to a user. For instance an individual with
ID = 2 visited the locations (2, 1) , (5, 5) , (7, 6) at timestamps 1, 3, 4 respectively. Although
this data set does not contain any identifier such as name or a QI such as age, the attacker
may still be able to link the given spatiotemporal data points of a record to a certain user.
Let us assume the attacker knows that the individual of ID = 3 was at work at time 1 and
the work location is (2, 2), then the attacker can link this path to that person and learn
other locations visited by her. This shows that combining some background knowledge to
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ID Trajectory
1 (1, 3, 1)æ (2, 5, 3)æ (4, 3, 4)æ (5, 5, 7)æ (5, 7, 8)
2 (2, 1, 1)æ (5, 5, 3)æ (7, 6, 4)
3 (2, 2, 1)æ (3, 2, 5)æ (4, 2, 6)æ (7, 5, 7)
Figure 2.6: Movement trajectory data
a published spatial and temporal database creates threats to the privacy of the individuals
in that database.
Di erent approaches for protecting spatiotemporal location privacy were developed.
Ghinita et al. [67] propose a spatiotemporal cloaking that prevents the attacker from tracing
exact locations based on prior knowledge about maximum user velocity. The attacker’s
background knowledge of the map represented by privacy sensitive locations is considered
in that approach to improve the privacy. Chow and Mokbel [33] propose that cloaked regions
need to be selected in such a way that the group of k-users selected for the cloaked region of
the first query must be included in all cloaked regions of the subsequent queries. One obvious
disadvantage of this approach is that the area of the cloaked region can become very large,
eventually, after processing a su cient number of queries as the users move farther. The
cloaked region area can be reduced if the anonymizer was able to get movement directions
and velocities of the users in addition to their locations beforehand. An algorithm to cluster
queries based on the mobility patterns of the users proposed by Pan et al. [129]. The
algorithm tries to balance between the o ered level of privacy and the incurred distortion
from the anonymization. Other alternative approaches are also proposed for protecting
spatiotemporal location information, such as mix-zone [126–128], path cloaking [87,88] and
dummy paths [104].
2.5 Cryptography Based Mechanisms
Privacy protection mechanisms discussed so far, except for the policy-based ones, su er
from the following general disadvantages.
• QoS/Privacy level trade o .
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• The area of the obfuscation region can be reduced if the attacker has a background
knowledge about the map.
• Heavy dependence on the distribution of other mobile users over the geographic space.
• Requires a critical mass of users to sign up for the service so as to ensure the timely
formation of anonymity sets.
• Dropped/unanswered queries if the required privacy parameters cannot be met with
threshold time limits.
• Trusted third party requirement, which requires major changes to the current commu-
nication network topologies, represents a performance bottleneck and can be a single
point of attack or failure.
In contrast, the cryptographic approaches try to apply cryptographic techniques to the
query/answering mechanism to achieve location privacy. In this section, we review the
proposals in this area.
Khoshgozaran and Shahabi [92] give a method to process private queries for n nearest
neighbor objects by transforming all static and dynamic objects of the map to another space
using Hilbert curves. The proposed method preserves the privacy of the user in a relatively
e cient manner in terms of computational cost compared to the classical encryption tech-
niques. The Hilbert curve is a type of space-filling curve that can preserve the closeness of
points in the transformation. For a query from the user, the privacy aware database returns
the set of points that are nearest to the queried point in the Hilbert curve space. Another
cloaking algorithm that uses Hilbert curve is proposed by Kalnis et al. [90] also preserves
the reciprocity property.
A combination of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) technique [32] and Hilbert curve
proposed by Ghinita et al. [68] to achieve location privacy. The database initially is pop-
ulated with approximate neighbors using Hilbert curve and the clients use PIR to retrieve
nearest neighbors without revealing the query. The biggest drawback of private query
methods is the requirement of a preprocessing step that encrypts the entire database at
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the service provider. This is very impractical in typical LBS scenarios. Moreover, such
encryption and lack of visibility into the contents of the user’s query is a tough sell, where
the service provider has to blindly answer the queries. We compared the performance of
di erent PIR methods and suggest some performance enhancing heuristics in our paper [57].
To overcome the di culties that come along PIR implementation, Khoshgozaran et al. [93]
and Papadopoulos et al. [130] suggested a secure processor on the server side to ensure that
the content provider is oblivious of the retrieved answer of the query. Further discussion on
PIR techniques and their implementation challenges in Chapter 5.
To protect the location privacy in proximity service where the LSP alerts the user if
one of her friends is in her vicinity, Mascetti et al. [113] proposed two protocols called
C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash. The two protocols rely on the symmetric cryptography
concept. Because it uses symmetric key cryptography, it is assumed that users are sharing
the same secret key. Each user has to send an update of her location to the LSP periodically,
but since this update is encrypted it is guaranteed that the LSP cannot determine her
position. Regarding the privacy with respect to other users, i.e., friends, the user will
express her position by specifying a region of a geographical space with a spatial granularity
that satisfies her privacy preferences.
Marias et al. [110] proposed an approach based on the secret sharing scheme of Shamir
[139]. The main idea of Shamir’s scheme is to express the secret information by some random
polynomial of any degree n, f(x) = a0+a1x+ . . .+anxn. Let the secret information be the
number a0, then compute the secret shares which are the evaluation of the polynomial at
n+1 points such as f(1), . . . f(n+1). Clearly, all the shares are required to reconstruct the
polynomial and then compute the secret information, a0 = f(0). The approach requires a
di erent architecture where the location information needs to be partitioned into a number
of shares and distributed among a set of LSPs. The user that is interested to find the
location information of an object must access all the servers holding the shares of that
object’s location. The main disadvantage of this approach is the requirement of keeping
synchronized information among all the servers.
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2.6 Di erential Privacy
Anonymization and obfuscation mechanisms discussed previously are describing a method
for concealing the user’s data; but, do not give a measurement tool for the advertised pri-
vacy level. Although di erent evaluation methods are proposed e.g., [7, 29], yet they lack
for a precise measurement of the amount of leaked information that could be useful for the
adversary [144]. Furthermore, anonymity and entropy-based metrics could produce inaccu-
rate assessments of the privacy levels o ered by the algorithms [141]. Recently, the research
tends toward di erential privacy as an alternative mechanism to protect the privacy of loca-
tion data. Di erential privacy was first proposed by Dwork [52], and then later enhanced in
several works [25,65,107] to avoid many of the weaknesses and suit di erent types of appli-
cations. Di erent implementation techniques and application areas for di erential privacy
have been studied [51,53,114,157].
The most important feature of this technique is the disciplined statistical analysis for
evaluating the protection level of privacy. On the other hand, the attacker’s background
information is one of the biggest challenges that faces any privacy protection mechanism
in general. Substantial background information for LSP are publicly available today with
su ciently high reliability and detail, which makes this problem remarkable for a privacy
protection mechanism. Based on strong mathematical theory, di erential privacy ensures
that the attacker cannot identify individuals from a protected dataset regardless of the
amount of background information that he has.
First, the main concept of di erential privacy technique is introduced, then we will
explore di erent methods suggested in the previous research to implement this technique
in the realm of location privacy preservation.
2.6.1 Intuition of di erential privacy
In statistical databases, the communication with the database typically occurs through
aggregate queries. The main idea of di erential privacy is that, instead of publishing the
original database, another copy is created in a way so that the statistical accuracy of the
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Name Age HIV
Peter 27 1
John 50 0
Mary 45 1
Sally 32 0
Luis 60 0
Helen 28 0
Iris 33 1
Figure 2.7: Sample of medical dataset.
answer to the aggregate query against the released (modified) database is degraded to
guarantee non-disclosure of any information related to any specific record in the database.
Consequently, the attacker cannot determine whether or not a certain record from the
original database changed in the released database. For a deep discussion of the method
with related mathematical proofs, the reader is referred to Dwork and Roth [54]. We
present here a quick overview to give an intuition about the main concept. In Chapter 8,
we discuss di erential privacy further and present our implementation for protecting privacy
in LBSs using this technique. We use the following trivial example to illustrate the idea of
compromising a statistical database. Assume a database table, T , shown in Figure 2.7 for
medical records, where the value 1 for the field HIV indicates that the corresponding person
has that disease and 0 is not. Assume the attacker knows that Mary’s age is 45, then he
can execute the query,
Q1 : select sum(HIV) fromT whereAGE= 45,
to find out if Mary has HIV or not. Similarly, even if the attacker does not know the exact
age, his knowledge about the victim could be enhanced by using this attack. For instance,
if the attacker knows that Peter is one of the patients in the database and he does a query
as follows
Q2 : select sum(HIV) fromT,
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he will get an answer 3. Based on that, his guess of Peter being HIV positive is 37 . If the
attacker knows that, Peter is between age 25 and 35, he can issue the following queries
Q3 : select count(ú) fromT whereAGEØ 25 and AGEÆ 35,
Q4 : select sum(HIV) fromT whereAGEØ 25 and AGEÆ 35.
The attacker will gather that there is a total of four records that match Q3 and the
query Q4 returns 2. So, the attacker can conclude that the chance of Peter being HIV
positive is now 12 , which is greater than his previous conclusion. One way to enhance the
privacy in this situation is to introduce a perturbation mechanism in the answer. When
the attacker who is expected to know the privacy enhancing techniques in place sees the
answer for query Q4, he cannot be sure about his probability assignment of Peter being
HIV positive anymore. We formalize this concept as di erential privacy as follows.
Consider a statistical database where, instead of returning the exact answer, it uses
some random perturbation mechanism that takes a dataset T as input and produces output
y œ Y . A mechanism, M : T æ Y , is applied to the answer before it is returned. The
mechanism M is called ‘≠di erentially private if
Pr [M (T ) = y]
Pr [M (T Õ) = yÕ] Æ exp(‘)’y, y
Õ œ Y, (2.1)
where the datasets T and T Õ di er in at most one record. It is obvious from Equation
2.1 that the smaller the value of ‘ the higher the privacy level. If both numerator and
denominator were 0, then by convention the ratio is assumed 1.
Let T Õ be a copy of T with Mary’s record removed. Assume now that the attacker can
access this new copy, T Õ, and he knows how the mechanism M works. The attacker sends
the query Q1 to the server and gets the answer as perturbed by the privacy mechanism,
y =M (Q1) œ Y . Given y, T Õ, and M , the question now is the attacker able to determine
whether Mary is HIV positive or not? Since the returned value, y, is chosen at random from
the output set Y , the attacker may add Mary’s record to the dataset T Õ and execute Q1
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for each possible value of HIV field, which is {0, 1} in this example. Let the answers be y0
and y1 for the inputs 0 and 1, respectively. From Equation 2.1, Pr[y0=y]Pr[y1=y] Æ e‘, which means
that the chance for the attacker to di erentiate between the two possible values of HIV is
not greater than the threshold value, e‘. The concept can be generalized for any range of
the output set as long as the condition in Equation 2.1 is satisfied for each possible output
y œ Y . From this example, it is clear that di erential privacy does not put any limitations
on the attacker’s power.
2.6.2 Di erential privacy for location data
To the best of our knowledge, Machanavajjhala et al. [107] is the first work that formally
proposes di erential privacy to protect location data. It suggests an enhanced version of the
di erential privacy, called the probabilistic di erential privacy, which is utilized to create
synthetic datasets from the US Census Bureau data for the purposes of statistical analysis
for mobility patterns of individuals. The basic idea was centered on building a statistical
model derived from the original data, and then use this model to replace some of the points
in the original data.
Applying di erential privacy to protect spatial data is not easy due to the di culties
that may arise from the sensitivity of these applications. Perturbing location data without
carefully calibrating the added noise, usually, yields to a meaningless result. Another prob-
lem faced by di erential privacy technique in LBS is that di erential privacy was designed
to deal with applications in which the published information is collected for many users.
While in the case of LBS, what is required is to protect the data for a single user. Instead
of directly applying di erential privacy, Dewri [42] introduced the idea of creating a set of
k anonymous locations, and then a random location drawn from a Laplace distribution is
selected for the query. The advantage is that the probability of choosing any one of these
locations does not exceed certain threshold e‘. To protect the spatiotemporal data of a
moving object Assam and Seidl [10] require a TTP that uses a Kalman filter to generate
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an optimized set of di erentially private obfuscated nearby locations. The query’s location
is chosen from that set and sent to the LPS.
A new privacy metric, ‘≠geo-indistinguishability, is introduced by Andrés et al. [6].
The authors argue that a user normally will demand higher privacy in his near perimeter
while she is going to be less interested in privacy as this perimeter is increased. To achieve
this, they add planar Laplace noise to the location data of the user. As a result, the
amount of noise shall be higher in locations closer to the true location of the user and
progressively less as we move away from it. Many other approaches extend the concept of
‘≠geo-indistinguishability [18,26,121,158] to build location privacy protection mechanisms.
2.7 Motivation
Location privacy loss has been a recognized problem for several years and hence several
attempts have been made by the research community in coming up with algorithms that
preserve location privacy while not giving up the utility of LBSs. LPPMs come in various
flavors. Initially, these LPPMs were one-size-fits-all solutions that o ered enhanced privacy
to all users of the system at an equal level. Soon, researchers realized that privacy needs are
di erent for di erent users, and even for the same user, privacy requirements are di erent
in di erent situations. The most recent LPPMs proposed in the literature provide their
users configurable levels of privacy that are balanced against QoS.
A common theme emerges when one looks at the survey of existing techniques. TTP-
based techniques su er from several disadvantages. They are impractical as they require
fundamental changes to current architectures and revenue models. In real life, it is di cult
to find a trusted third party that is cheap or free. Payment-based third parties can become
expensive. Also, most TTP-based techniques require a critical mass of customers for them to
achieve reasonable privacy levels. This requirement of TTP has a significant impact on QoS
as users often have to wait till k other users accumulate. Some algorithms even proposed
discarding the user’s query if it cannot be answered by the TTP within a specified threshold
time period [63]. Third parties become additional attack targets and in many cases a breach
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of a TTP results in total loss of privacy for the customers. TTP-based techniques evolved
during a time when mobile devices had a very limited processing power and can only be
considered thin clients. So, third parties not only played a role in enhancing privacy, but also
in taking most of the client side processing burden. This creates a performance bottleneck
in the architecture at the third parties. A third party with performance problems will
impact all the clients connected to it. Although one might assume that these bottlenecks
can be avoided by using redundant third party servers, it will only exacerbate the other
problems such as cost of building trust, waiting for critical mass of clients on the failover
server, reconfiguration of clients etc., So there is a need for the research community to look
into third party free protocols, study them and propose new techniques.
Later developments in hardware have resulted in mobile devices that are powerful
enough to implement e cient algorithms. Thus newly proposed privacy preserving tech-
niques that take advantage of the superior, although limited, power of current mobile de-
vices should be practical for current day user. The techniques need to work within the
framework of current service providers without requiring them to make huge architectural
changes. This will eliminate single points of failure and distribute the computing require-
ments more e ciently. Moreover, they need to be practical in terms of the kind of data
expected from service providers. In recent years, LBS search often results in richly tagged
POIs that not only contain location information, but also other interesting information such
as ranking, customer reviews, business hours etc., Without other meta-data about POIs,
the POI search boils down to nearest neighbor search problem and there are several pro-
posals in the literature that address this problem. So, techniques proposed should do more
than just rank the result set only based on distance from the user.
Eliminating the requirement of trusted third party does not eliminate the threat to
user’s location privacy. Now, the techniques have to deal with a sophisticated attacker that
can be the service provider itself. Thus techniques are needed that enhance user’s location
privacy in the presence of a semi-trusted LSP.
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2.8 Problem Statement
Lots of existing proposals in the LBS privacy area require trusted third parties that
have their own problems as explained earlier. These proposals assume a very limited mobile
devices hardware and don’t properly utilize the capabilities of modern mobile hardware.
Moreover, most of these techniques fail if the attacker is a semi-trusted service provider
itself. So our problem statement can be summed up as follows.
We need a set of LBS privacy preserving techniques with the following properties.
TTP needs to be avoided. As discussed earlier, a TTP introduces inherent problems
such as single point of failure in terms of availability, performance, security, and privacy.
Take advantage of the modern mobile hardware. Modern mobile hardware can be
compared with personal computers from a few years ago in terms of their performance
capabilities, programmability, and available resources. Any proposal should take advantage
of these advances.
Does not require extensive changes in existing architectures. Any proposal should
not require extensive changes in existing LBS architectures. Such proposals immediately
become impractical as they require huge expenditures from the service providers, where
customer privacy may not be the top most priority.
Provide for configurable LoP. Privacy requirements, even for the same user changes
based on the situation. The user may not care if she is placed accurately in a sports stadium,
but may care even if placed inaccurately when traveling across town by an attacker. So any
technique proposed should be able to take this into consideration and be configurable using
some parameters.
QoS cost. The privacy achieved often comes with a cost of degrading quality. Often
in the form of delay between request and response. So any technique proposed should be
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practical enough that, the noticeable delay should still be in the acceptable range for the
given parameters.
Should address both single and multiple query scenarios. The proposed techniques
should, of course, preserve the privacy of the user when making a single query to the LBS.
Most users though use the LBS in a repeated fashion as they move around . As we show later
in Chapter 7, multiple query scenario poses its own risk to the privacy. So any technique
should consider both scenarios.
Measurable improvement in privacy. Any technique proposed should be implemented
using openly available standard libraries. Their practicability needs to be proven (or dis-
proven) based on the observations and measurements made on this implementation. More-
over, specific privacy measures need to be considered and shown that the implementation
has actually improved these privacy measures.
Realistic top-K ranking. The majority of proposed privacy preservation mechanisms
for location-based services in the existing research ranks the result set of POI based only on
distance. Since this approach boils down the problem of calculating the result set of POIs
to the nearest neighbor search, it has an advantage of less demanding computations. But,
real providers for location based services rank the result set of POIs based on the distance
and the prominence value of each POI on the set.
40
Chapter 3
State of User’s Location Privacy
In this chapter, we present the current state of location privacy in terms of LBSs by
presenting how powerful the service provider can be in determining accurate user locations
even with incomplete data. By showing this, we wish to drive the point on the need for
equipping the client with defensive privacy protection mechanisms that are practical and
do not rely on trusted third parties.
Location privacy is an important expectation by the users of LBS. Location privacy
can be lost when an attacker eavesdrops and monitors communication between the users
and the service provider. There are several techniques proposed and implemented in the
communications security space that address this problem. In this dissertation, we are mainly
concerned with loss of location privacy in spite of an assumption of secure communication
between the user and service provider. We are concerned with the case where the user has a
certain expectation of location privacy when using the LBS from the service provider. But
in these days, where, accurate information about the user including her location is treated
as an asset and can be easily monetized by service providers, many users pay attention to
what data is being collected about them and often interested in implementing LPPMs that
reduce the accuracy of location inference by the service provider to acceptable levels. In this
chapter, we present our work done in this regard, which shows that the user’s expectation if
not being tracked can be easily breached by a resourceful service provider without directly
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collecting location data. The example we pick is the driving habits data, that is commonly
being collected by automobile insurance companies. Most of these programs do not directly
collect user’s location, but collect driving habits data, in exchange for which they o er the
opt-in users a potential discount. We show that, by using few techniques, these companies
are capable of inferring user’s location with reasonable accuracy breaching the expectation of
the user of her location privacy. Using this, we argue that, similar to the modern techniques
being developed to enhance location privacy, the service providers have access to data and
techniques that enhance the accuracy of inference of user’s location. This builds a case for
the importance and urgency of location privacy preservation techniques presented in this
work.
3.1 Collecting Driving Habits Data: Problem Definition
To demonstrate such a situation, we use the case of pay-how-you-drive programs. Many
automobile insurance providers these days o er programs where they collect driving habits
data from their customers in exchange for discounts in their premiums. Many auto-insurance
owners are probably familiar with the insurance discounts one can get by enrolling in
telematics-based pay-how-you-drive programs. Examples of such programs include Pro-
gressive’s Snapshot1 , AllState’s Drivewise2, Safeco’s Rewind3, Aviva’s Drive4, and many
others. These programs rely on the collection of driving habits data (time of driving, speed,
mileage, etc.) during a monitoring period, which is later analyzed to o er a customized
discount to the policy holder [43].
These pay-how-you-drive programs o er many advantages to both insurers and the
consumers. Insurers can o er more accurate pricing to consumers based on their driving
habits. This increases a ordability for safe drivers, and motivates others to adopt safer
1www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot
2www.allstate.com/drive-wise.aspx
3www.rewindprogram.com
4www.aviva.co.uk/drive
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driving habits. Given the incentive to drive less, these programs also help reduce road
accidents, tra c congestion, and vehicle emissions. Telematics have also proven useful in
monitoring driver safety (e.g. the OnStar program), evaluating accident liability, preventing
vehicle theft, tracking fleet movement, and routing tra c e ciently. For the customer, the
advantage, particularly for a safer driver, is that their premium matches the risk profile
more closely and they are usually promised that their premiums will not increase due to
the participation in these programs.
While few programs disclose that their data collection devices track the driver, most
do not (or at least claim not to) track exact GPS locations, and imply an expectation of
privacy that the customer’s destinations are not tracked. Please note that all insurance
companies are required to collect their customers address, so they already know the source
of most user’s trips. So, privacy of the destination location is expected by most users of
these programs. Privacy policies clearly state what information is collected, the possibility
of sharing the data with third-parties, using it for fraud prevention and research, or to
comply with the law. Even if the service provider itself is trusted, the sharing of the data
with third parties for processing, fraud prevention, compliance etc., increases the risk to
location privacy from entities that are authorized to get the data.
Our goal is to show that, service providers or authorized third parties, are capable
of breaching user’s location privacy even if GPS location data is not directly part of the
collected data. A number of researchers have shown that privacy cannot be guaranteed
simply by avoiding sharing or avoiding the direct collection of private data. The possibility
of linking using quasi-identifiers, or other sophisticated methods, always remain (Section
1.3.1). Half of the individuals in the U.S. population can be uniquely determined if their
home and work locations are known at the level of a census block [74]. In GPS logs, people
can be identified based on the last destination of the day and the most populated cluster of
points [86, 97]. We treat driving habits data as quasi identifiers in our technique, but our
goal is to identify the destination of the trip instead of the identity of the user.
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To achieve this, we develop a location inference attack that executes on real traces of
driving habits data, and attempts to identify the destinations of the trips during which the
data were collected. Our techniques extract potentially quasi-identifying information such
as tra c stops, driving speed and turns from the data, and match them to publicly available
map information to determine potential destinations of a trip. In the rest of the chapter,
we describe the implementation of these techniques and demonstrate that a number of trips
can indeed be geographically matched to their destinations using simple driving features.
Our conclusions are based on a probabilistic ranking of the possible destinations of a trip.
Although not a foolproof method, this study shows that the destinations of certain trips
can be very easily identified, thereby raising concerns about current expectations of privacy
set by the data collection agencies. Of greater concern is the relatively unsophisticated
(often common sense) nature of the concepts underlying our inference algorithm. We can
only imagine, in the hands of a resourceful attacker with access to better databases, the
accuracy of the destination inference can be further improved.
3.2 Location Privacy Model
In this section we model the user’s location privacy in the context of driving habits
data. Location tracking enables inferences about an individual’s lifestyle and social circles,
most of which may be considered private. Although the decision to share one’s location is
a personal one, such decisions can only be made when the intent to collect location data is
fully disclosed. Therefore, location data collection and sharing practices should be explicitly
stated in the privacy policies of pertinent businesses. The di culty arises when the location
information is inferable from other types of seemingly unrelated data, in which case, either
the possibility of inference is unknown to the business, or the location data is inferred and
used without consumer’s consent. We make the conservative assumption that if inferences
are possible, they will be made.
We study the threat of location data in Section 1.3. Location inference is a deduction
about the geographic location of an event from other known facts. We focus on the problem
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in the context of driving habits data collected with the consent of the driver. The collected
data has no direct tracking of the user’s location. Therefore, user’s are led to have an expec-
tation that the data collection agency, or an adversary with access to the data, is unable to
track the driver using this data. Consequently, we assume that obtaining knowledge of the
destinations of travel is a clear violation of the location privacy expectations of the driver.
This also implies that if a destination can be reached via more than one route, an inference
of the correct destination is considered a violation even if the correct route is not inferred.
We also assume that the driver has typical driving habits, such as staying within reasonable
speed limits and taking best possible routes.
3.3 Driving Habits Data
In the pay-how-you-drive context, the intent of collecting driving habits data is to assess
the risk of the driver, not necessarily to determine where the user is driving to. So driv-
ing habits data includes features such as time of driving, speed, acceleration/deceleration
patterns, distance traveled, braking practices, and others. Unless the associated service
explicitly requires customer tracking, collection of location data is avoided for privacy con-
cerns. We explain a typical data collection exercise by using an auto-insurance discount
program as an example. Typical auto-insurance discount programs (propelled by driving
habits data) are opt-in programs where the driver has to enroll to be evaluated for a dis-
count in her insurance premium. Upon enrollment, the driver receives a data collection
device that can be plugged into the on-board diagnostic (OBD) port of the vehicle. The
device collects driving habits data over a period of several days to few months. Some devices
can periodically upload the data to a background server using consumer telecommunication
networks. The device is returned to the agency at the completion of the data collection
phase. Based on factors such as distances driven, time when driven, and absence of hard
brakes, the driver is issued a discount in the insurance premium for the current and future
terms.
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3.3.1 Data collection
Often some insurance companies let the user view near real time plots of the driving
habits data collected on them. Unfortunately, the data underlying these plots is not avail-
able for download. With the ability to read most of the data from the vehicle’s on-board
computer, the collected raw data is expected to be precise and frequent. Therefore, we
used a commodity tracking device (LandAirSea GPS Tracking Key) to collect the raw data
pertinent to this study. This battery powered device logs detailed driving data such as ve-
hicle speed and GPS position, which can be later extracted into a computer through a USB
connection. Note that a device connected to the OBD port can easily obtain more than ten
samples per second; our tracking device operates at a much lower resolution of one sample
per second. Although the device collects the GPS location (useful for validation later), the
only data fields used in the inference process are: time stamp (t), driving speed (s), and
distance traveled (d). We introduce here the term “trip” to mean a subset of the collected
data, signifying a drive from one point of interest (e.g. home, o ce, hospital, store, friend’s
home, etc.) to another. Each Èt, s, dÍ tuple of a trip is a data point of the trip.
We kept the devices in our vehicles for a period of 15 days in order to collect data from
regular home-o ce trips, occasional shopping trips, and visits to infrequent places. We also
collected a few trips between random locations at varying distances. During these trips,
normal driving habits were maintained.
We use a total of 30 trips in this study. All trips are in the Denver, Colorado area, and
includes home to work and work to home drives, visits to the airport, the downtown area,
local grocery stores, school drop-o s, social visits, and others. Length of trips range from 1
mile to 25 miles, and spanned interstates, state highways, city roads and residential areas.
3.3.2 Pre-processing
Pre-processing is the first step in our inference attack. The idea in this step is to clean
the data and remove anomalies that are a result of tra c stops and occasional zero-speed
points we attribute to device errors. Our inference algorithms currently do not account for
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slow or “stop-and-go” driving resulting from heavy tra c; removal of data points collected
during such conditions help infer locations accurately in more number of trips.
Two steps are performed in this process. In the first step, we identify the data points
where the driving speed is zero (possible stop in tra c). Thereafter, all data points between
two zero-speed data points (inclusive) are removed if the total distance traveled between
those two points is less than a threshold (0.5 mile used in this study). In the next step,
consecutively time-stamped zero-speed data points are removed if they do not span a time
interval of at least 3 seconds.
After the tra c pre-processing, we note the unique distance values corresponding to the
remaining data points with a zero speed value. We refer to these distances as stop-points,
possible distances from the beginning of a trip where the driver had to halt due to tra c
stops at signals or stop signs at intersections.
3.4 Location Inference Method
Our location inference method works under the hypothesis that the stop-points of a trip
can be used as a set of quasi-identifiers for the destination of the trip. Therefore, if the start-
location of the trip is known, we can search a map of the area for paths that begin at the
start-location, and have tra c stops at distances given by the stop-points. The assumption
of a known start-location is not unrealistic, since the data collectors are typically aware of
the street address where the vehicle is parked overnight. Start-locations in subsequent trips
can be obtained from the destinations of previous trips. Unless the roadways in the area
are very regular, it is expected that a relatively smaller number of paths will satisfy the
constraint to match every stop-point. The end-points of these candidate paths are potential
destinations of the trip. We will employ a ranking process when multiple candidate paths
are identified. In the following, we give a step-by-step account of the inference process as
executed by us.
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3.4.1 Area map as a graph
The first step in identifying candidate paths is to obtain a reliable map of the area.
We obtained the map data available from the crowd-sourced OpenStreetMap project. The
map data is collected for the greater Denver area, where our experiments took place. The
data comes in the form of XML formatted .osm files. These files are processed to generate
a graph with 323928 nodes, and 639395 directed edges representing motorways, trunks,
primary/secondary/tertiary/residential roads, and corresponding link roads. Nodes are
typically placed at intersections. Nodes are also placed between two intersections if the road
in between is curved. Therefore, the length of a road segment can be accurately computed
by aggregating the distances between successive nodes placed on the road segment. Each
node is labeled with its latitude and longitude coordinates. Each edge is labeled with the
geodesic distance between the two nodes of the edge. Distances are computed using the
Vincenty inverse formula for ellipsoids, available as part of the gdist function in the Imap
R package. Edges are also annotated with a road type extracted from the downloaded
XML files. This map data5 covers an area of more than 1500 sq. miles in Denver, Colorado
and its suburbs, spanning between latitudes 39.41015oN and 39.91424oN , and longitudes
105.3150oW and 104.3554oW .
Speed limit information was di cult to obtain. Although it was available with some
commercial providers, we were not able to obtain that information. After experimenting
with some free data we obtained from Denver county, we figure out that precise speed data
for each road segment does not improve the accuracy much compared with when we assign
an estimated speed limit based on the road type. So we assigned speed limit values to the
edges of the graph based on the road type indicated in the OpenStreetMap xml data. For
example, for internal roads we assigned a 25 mph speed limit and 65 mph for the highways.
A capable adversary can obtain more accurate speed limit data from commercial sources.
5crisp.cs.du.edu/datasets
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Figure 3.1: Disabling of shortest path constraint while exploring highway nodes.
3.4.2 Generating candidate paths
Candidate paths are generated by performing a standard depth-first search (DFS) of
the map graph. The DFS starts at a node corresponding to the start-location of a trip and
outputs all paths that satisfy the constraints discussed next.
Stop-point matching
During the DFS traversal, we keep track of the length of the path from the start node.
This constraint requires that, at any stage of the traversal, the current path must have
an intersection node (3-way or more) at all stop-points less than the current length of the
path. However, since tra c stops often happen a few feet away from the signal (the exact
coordinates of the intersection), we allow for a slack while matching the path length to a
stop-point. The slack is set to 500 feet in this study. Stop-point matching is not performed
for the last stop-point, since the last stop-point appears due to the vehicle being parked,
rather than due to a tra c stop.
Shortest path
The second constraint requires that, at any stage of the traversal, a path to a node
must always be the shortest one (within a slack of 0.1 miles) from the start node to that
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node. The constraint is motivated by typical driving behavior where a shortest path is
preferred when traveling short distances inside the city. In such cases, shortest paths are
often fastest paths too. This is a reasonable assumption in lieu of tra c conditions data
at the time of the trip. However, the assumption fails when traveling long distances, where
the driver is likely to take a faster (not necessarily shorter) route through the highway.
Nonetheless, we can make the assumption that the driver would take the shortest route up
to the highway, and then again from the point of exit on the highway to the destination. We
incorporate this assumption by changing the start node to be the currently explored node,
if the current node is part of a highway segment. As a result, the shortest path constraint
remains disabled as long as the exploration continues on the highway nodes; the constraint
is enabled when the exploration enters non-highway nodes, although the start node now is
the last highway node (point of exit) on the path (Figure 3.1).
Turn feasibility
The third constraint requires a path to always satisfy feasible speed limits at points of
right and left turns. At every point of the exploration, we compute the angle by which a
vehicle would have to turn when moving from the current node to the next node(Figure
3.2). An angle higher than 60o is considered a turn, in which case we consult the trip data
to ensure that the speed at that point of time was under 25 mph. We use the current length
of the path to extract the closest data point from the trip, and use the speed in that data
point as the current driving speed.
Length
The length constraint terminates the exploration along a particular path when the path
length exceeds the trip length. The path is then a candidate path if all stop-points (except
the last one) have been matched in the path. When multiple candidate paths to the same
end node are discovered, we retain the one with the least number of turns.
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Figure 3.2: Turns along an explored path.
The nodes in our map graph correspond to points on roadways. However, the initial few
data points (and the last few as well) of a trip may correspond to driving on a parking lot or
a driveway. We used the GPS coordinates logged by the tracking device to manually discard
some of these initial data points such that the first data point of a trip always corresponds
to a node of the map graph. This processing is not required when more elaborate map
data is used to generate the graph; many online services (e.g. Google Maps) already use
commercial maps with data for parking areas, bikeways, and pedestrian paths.
3.4.3 Candidate ranking
The output of the DFS traversal above subject to the four constrains presented is a list
of candidate paths. The candidate paths in our experiments ranged from as few as 4 to
as many as 196. We process the candidates through a ranking procedure to arrive at the
top inferred destination of a trip. This is where the speed limits assigned by road types
come into picture again. The ranking procedure makes use of information on typical speed
limits along the candidate paths to find ones that best match the speed changes observed
in the trip data points. We begin by first creating an ideal speed model for each candidate,
then augment the model with driving behavior typically seen when making turns, and then
compute a probability for the observed trip data to have been generated from the model.
The candidates are ranked based on decreasing order of the probabilities. In other words,
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we create a speed profile of a typical driver for each candidate path and compare it against
the actual speeds observed.
Ideal speed model
The ideal speed model of a path P is a representation of the speeds that an ideal
driver would follow when driving along the path under ideal conditions. An ideal driver is
considered to be one who drives at exactly the speed limit, and ideal conditions imply no
acceleration or decelerations in the driving speed. The model can be formally expressed as
a function M of distance d and a path P . The output of such a function is the legal speed
limit at distance d from the beginning of path P (assuming speed limit is same along both
directions of travel).
M(d, P ) = slimit (3.1)
In a discrete representation, the ideal speed model is an array of distance and speed pairs
at points where the speed limit changes along the path.
Augmenting the model
An ideal speed model can be improved by correcting the output speed in parts of the
path where the vehicle would be performing a turn. Even an ideal driver in ideal conditions
will decelerate to a reasonable speed to make a right or a left turn. A turn is assumed to
happen exactly at the node joining the two edges that make the turn. We assume that
all left turns happen at a speed of 15 mph and all right turns happen at 10 mph. The
augmented model, denoted by Maug, gradually reduces the output speed to the turning
speed over a distance that depends on the acceleration and deceleration capabilities of the
vehicle. Similarly, the model also incorporates the required acceleration behavior after the
turn is complete. For all vehicles in this study, we use a fixed deceleration rate of 25 feet/s2
(= 7.8m/s2 = 0.8g, g being the acceleration of gravity), and a fixed acceleration rate of
6.5 feet/s2(= 2m/s2).
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Figure 3.3: Speed profile for a trip, along with that generated from the ideal and the
augmented models for a di erent path.
The augmented model also incorporates the information that the vehicle must have
come to a complete halt at all stop-points. Similar to the turns, the output speed is
corrected around the vicinity of the stop-points as well. Figure 3.3 compares the speed
values from a trip, and the values generated from the ideal speed model and the augmented
model along a similar path to the same destination.
Probability of a candidate path
Given a trip T with n data points, Èti, di, siÍ; i = 1, ..., n, and a path P , we obtain the
speed values generated by the augmented model along path P at distances d1, ..., dn. We
denote these values by sÕ1, ..., s
Õ
n. The probability we seek is
Pr
Ë
T |Maug(di, P ) = sÕi; i = 1, ..., n
È
. (3.2)
We assume independence of speed values across time and distance, which gives us the
probability as
nŸ
i=1
Pr
Ë
Èti, di, siÍ|Maug(di, P ) = sÕi
È
. (3.3)
Therefore, for each time instant ti, we seek to compute the probability of observing
speed si when the speed should have been s
Õ
i at distance di along the path. The probability
is computed from speed variation models based on standard Gaussian distributions. For
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speed value sÕi, the distribution used is
f =
Y__]__[
N (sÕi + s
Õ
i
10 ,
s
Õ
i
30) , s
Õ
i Ø 20mph
N (sÕi, 1) , otherwise
, (3.4)
where N (µ,‡) signifies a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation ‡. The
distribution implies that, for speed limits of 20 mph or more, the mean driving speed is 10%
higher, and 99.7% of the drivers drive between speeds of sÕi and s
Õ
i + s
Õ
i/20. For example,
in a road with speed limit 60 mph, most drivers are assumed to drive at speeds between
60-72 mph, with 66 mph being the mean. For lower speed limits, we assume that drivers
are more likely to stay close to the limit. The probability is then computed as
Pr
Ë
Èti, di, siÍ|Maug(di, P ) = sÕi
È
=
si+‘ˆ
si≠‘
f(x)dx, (3.5)
where ‘ is a negligible number (10≠5). To avoid issues of precision, we take the sum of the
logarithm of the probabilities instead of the product of the probabilities at di erent time
instances. The ranking is not a ected because of this transformation.
3.5 Empirical Observations
We applied the inference algorithm to the data from 30 trips. Inference correctness
depends on factors such as stop-points, abidance to the shortest path assumption, ability to
drive at speed limits, accuracy of the data collection device, and the correctness of the map
data. The algorithm was unable to generate any path leading to the actual destination in
12 out of the 30 trips. However, in 16 of the remaining 18 trips, the actual destination was
always in the top three destinations generated after the ranking. In fact, in 11 of the 30
trips, the actual destination of the user is also the destination indicated by the first ranked
path generated by our attack. Table 3.1 lists the trip length, number of candidate paths,
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Table 3.1: Rank of actual trip destination from amongst the candidate paths.
trip length (miles) number of candidates rank of actual destination
1.48 12 1
1.59 12 1
2.60 50 1
3.23 15 1
3.78 11 2
3.85 23 1
3.93 52 1
3.93 49 1
3.95 37 3
5.47 11 2
5.89 18 1
5.84 20 1
7.95 196 2
9.42 26 4
13.15 37 3
14.10 53 1
14.57 68 1
24.10 42 13
and rank of actual destination for the 18 trips with successful inference. We are unable to
find a correlation between the number of candidate paths and the ranking performance.
3.5.1 Illustrative example
Figure 3.4 shows five candidate paths identified for one of the trips. A total of 196
candidate paths were found for this trip. All candidate paths match the four stop-points of
the trip (7.95 miles in length). Candidate path 118 is also the actual route taken during the
trip. The last plot in the figure shows the end nodes (destinations) of all candidate paths.
Irrespective of the large number of candidate paths identified for this trip, most destination
nodes cluster around a small number of localities. This is worth noting, since only four
stop-points are involved over a distance of 7.95 miles in this trip; yet the ways to match
them to an actual map are quite limited!
Figure 3.5 compares the speed profiles of the actual trip and that generated by the
augmented model for a path. It is clear that the more similar the speed limits and turns
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candidate #118 (actual trip) candidate #106 candidate #60
candidate #32 candidate #9 all destinations
stop-points
Figure 3.4: Sample candidate paths generated for a trip. Candidate path 118 is the actual
route taken during the trip. The bottom right plot shows the destinations of all (196)
candidate paths generated for this trip. A: start node; B: end node. Map data: Google
(2013).
along a path are to that of the actual route, the higher is the ranking. Candidate paths 9, 32
and 118 progressively cover more of the highway, thereby increasing the match probability.
3.5.2 Ranking performance
In spite of our attack operating with less accurate and detailed data (device limitations)
and with lesser environmental data (such as tra c conditions for the day of the trip), the
ranking method is found to be robust in identifying the actual destination of a trip. If
the destination is the end point of a candidate path, the path is often found in the three
most likely paths that match the speed profile of the trip. Note that the ranking procedure
does a point-by-point probabilistic comparison of the speed values observed in the trip and
that along an entire path. Therefore, although we are not interested in the actual route
followed during a trip, the obtained paths often represent the exact driving route. An
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Figure 3.5: Speed profile during actual trip and that generated by augmented model for
sample paths.
interesting observation is that, even if the top ranked destination is not the actual one,
they are usually very close (within 0.5 miles) to each other. Therefore, the locality of the
destination can be inferred almost always! The ranking method su ers when speed limits
are not reasonably followed, either due to excessive speeding or slow movement in tra c,
and another candidate path matches this noisy speed profile. Again, a capable adversary
with insurance risk information based on user demographics can come up with a more
realistic speeding model for the user e.g. based on age or make/model of the car, tra c
density information of the locality etc. In addition, the attacker can easily get access to
commercially available information such as tra c conditions on day of the trip, actual speed
limit information, road blockages, whether intersection has signal or a stop sign etc., which
can be utilized to improve the accuracy.
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3.6 Summary
We developed an inference algorithm to demonstrate that inferring the destinations of
driving trips is possible with access to simple features such as driving speed and distance
traveled. The algorithm does fail in some cases. However, we believe that communicating
the existence of this threat to privacy is a priority over perfecting the algorithm. We
summarize our observations in this study in the following points.
• Although multiple candidate paths may satisfy the stop-points and turn feasibility
constraints, the number of neighborhoods where the paths end can still be limited.
• A robust ranking method can easily identify candidate paths that do not conform
with the speed profile of the trip, possibly leaving behind ones that end near the true
destination.
• The speed attribute in the collected data is a crucial component in the inference
process. It is worth exploring how the data collection process can be modified to
introduce noise in this attribute, of course, without a ecting its intended use.
• Finally, it is possible to infer the destination (often the full route) of a trip from
driving habits data such as speed and distance traveled. It is crucial that agencies
that collect such data acknowledge this fact and inform their customers about it.
Through in this work, we showed that keeping the GPS location private is not su cient,
especially if the attacker is someone that has authorized access to the data such as the service
provider itself or an authorized third party, thus highlighting the need for developing LPPMs
that protect against a curious service provider itself. For a reader interested in studying
this attack further with the intention of developing a method to prevent this specific attack,
we direct them to concentrate on the failed inferences in our experiments. In other words,
determine what features of the data made the inference fail and incorporate those features
into the OBD device.
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Chapter 4
Architecture
In this chapter, we present the sequence of interactions between the user’s mobile device
and service provider, a high-level overview of the data exchanged and exactly what part
of the interaction needs protection in order to maintain a configured level of privacy when
the user consumes local search services. First, we briefly discuss the current typical setup.
The rest of the discussion elaborates on our proposed architecture. The changes we propose
while disruptive will not require any new physical asset installations such as towers and
are confined to software changes. The fact that physical changes to the topology are not
required makes our proposal practical. The overall flow of interactions between the mobile
device and the service provider in our proposal is common across all the protocols presented
in the rest of the dissertation. We also, maintain the practicality aspect when we propose
the data that is exchanged i.e. to allow for detailed meta-data of points of interest to be
exchanged, not just their geographic location.
4.1 Privacy in Local Search
Substantial development of technologies in mobile devices has led to the emergence of
many applications that take advantage of multiple capabilities of such devices. Most mobile
devices these days come with a positioning chip, so much so that it has become an integral
part of these devices. Taking advantage of the location information that is available via
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this GPS chip has become a major focus of software companies in the mobile space. Among
the most popular applications is local search. Local search applications such as Google
Places1, Yelp2, AroundMe3, and others, appeared in the last decade to meet a wide range
of users’ demands. Providing useful local search based on user’s location has become a
major o ering and is considered an important revenue stream for these service providers.
These applications are essentially web searches for points of interest, except that the query
the user enters is appended with her location tag. The service provider responds with a list
of POIs sorted based both on the distance and the prominence value, decided by the service
provider. In spite of the development of these applications and excellent utility they provide
to users, collecting location data raises various concerns about the privacy of individuals.
Indeed, we find a large portion of users demand to protect their location privacy, yet consider
local search applications to be an invaluable tool in their devices [19]. Unfortunately, the
current design of the local search applications fails to meet the privacy requirements of the
user who asks for pragmatic guarantees for non-disclosure of her location data. In today’s
real scenarios the service provider undertakes to abide by a privacy policy toward the user,
which often prevents the user from taking full advantage of the local search application,
or give up her expectations about maintaining her location data private (Section 2.1). We
start our discussion here by the following example.
Alice is located at Point A, 5 Av & w 43 St, New York, NY, USA, and wants to find
neighboring pizza locations. She uses a local search platform such as Google Places to
perform the search on her mobile device. Figure 4.1a shows the top ten locations retrieved
by Google based on their prominence and distance from the true location of Alice. However,
Alice is unwilling to reveal her true coordinates. Hence, she denies permission to access her
GPS coordinates and instead executes a search query for pizza from point B. Results of
this query are shown in Figure 4.1b. Note that, only 30% of POIs are common between the
two results. Therefore, results returned in this search are inaccurate. On the other hand
1www.google.com/search/about/features/02
2www.yelp.com/mobile
3www.aroundmeapp.com/
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(a) Locations for the query point, A (b) Locations for the query point, B
(c) Locations for the query point,C
Figure 4.1: Pizza locations returned by Google search in 5 Av / w 43 St, New York, NY,
USA.
point B is 10 km away from Alice’s true location, A. From the standpoint of QoS, in this
case, Alice is unaware of the level of degradation in the result. Figure 4.1c shows the top
ten pizza locations from another pseudo location point, C, which is 5 km away from A. The
results now di er from the query of the actual location only in one POI.
This example illustrates the existence of a trade-o  between QoS and the level of privacy
protection in location-based applications. Notice that Alice can ensure her location privacy
and at the same time, obtain an acceptable QoS level as the ratio of common POIs between
the two locations is 90% although the point C is five kilometers away from the true location.
A recent study on privacy for location-based search (2014) [46] determines that the form of
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information exchanged between the user and the service provider plays an important role in
the QoS/privacy trade-o  in LBSs. Empirical results of that study show that it is unlikely
to obtain accurate results while maintaining privacy at the same time if a high density of
queried objects were in the search area. So, an LPPM should allow the user to aggressively
trade o  the QoS for a large enough area to achieve a su ciently perturbed location. Shokri
et al. [143] considered the QoS/privacy trade-o  as one of the fundamental elements of any
LPPM. The authors model user–attacker objectives by using the framework of Stackelberg
Bayesian games. They developed an optimization algorithm to determine the best pseudo
location that minimizes the chance for the attacker to discover the user’s location while
maintaining the minimum distance between true and pseudo locations. Along the same line
Bordenabe et al. [18] develop a method that maximizes the QoS for a threshold degree of
geo-indistinguishability. Both of these works assume that the POI list from the server is
sorted only by distance. An arbitrary ranking function for local search results, instead, is
proposed by Dewri and Thurimella [46]. If one were to observe most popular POI search
providers these days, the list of POIs is not necessarily sorted only by the distance from
the location of the user. In fact, most popular providers, e.g. Google, use three main
factors for object determination in local search [124]. First factor is the relevance, which
involves the semantic matching of search keywords and object descriptions. Prominence
value is the second factor, which is expressed as the relative importance of the relevant
objects regardless of their location. The third factor is the distance from the query point.
The prominence of a POI is derived from multiple sub-factors such as reference counts, the
highest score of objects that refer to this object, the number of user reviews, and the extent
of services o ered, among others. Interestingly, in the earlier example we can clearly see the
e ect of the prominence value on the search results. The POI p2 is replaced by pÕ1 when the
query is issued from point C; p2 appears in the search results in Figure 4.1a although it is
farther than pÕÕ1 from A. The same scene is repeated in Figure 4.1b. For instance, it is very
clear that the POIs pÕ1, pÕ2, pÕ3, pÕ4 are closer to A than the POIs p1, p2, p9, p10. However, we
see in Figure 4.1a that p1, p2, p9, p10 show up in the search results instead of pÕ1, pÕ2, pÕ3, pÕ4.
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4.2 Non-private Architecture
The interaction with the service provider starts with the user, using some mobile ap-
plication, typing in a query (e.g. pizza restaurant in Denver) and submitting it to the
application. The application uses the GPS chip that is commonly found on all modern
mobile devices to obtain the geographic location of the user. It adds this location tag to the
query that the user typed and sends the request to the service provider. Note that, the more
accurate the user’s location that is sent along with the query, the more useful (relevant) the
results the service provider returns. In the current LBS model, the service provider returns
not just one, but a sorted list of POIs (typically 10–20) to the requesting application on
the user’s mobile device. Points of interest data that service providers maintain nowadays
contain lot more data than just a name and geographic location. It contains metadata such
as detailed description of the business, business hours, user reviews etc. These additional
attributes are combined together into a single value called the prominence, which represents
the importance of the POI. The user is not just interested in the nearest POI, but a POI
that is optimum based on both distance from the current location and its prominence. So,
the sort order of the returned list is based not just on the distance, but also the prominence
value of the POIs. The user then picks one of these POIs for her purpose.
One has to note that the location privacy in this scenario is based entirely on the
privacy policy of the service provider. If the service provider is assumed to be semi-honest,
i.e. honest but curious, then the location privacy of the user is completely lost, as it is
exposed to the service provider directly. In this case, one of the LPPMs such as the ones
discussed in Chapter 2 needs to be implemented to enhance the location privacy. Our
objective in this chapter is to come up with a general architecture for a TTP free LPPM
that allows for the prominence value to be transmitted and be used.
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4.3 Request–Response Protocol
We use a di erent request-response architecture which is performed in two round-trips.
The first round-trip is to get a list of POIs with just their names, locations, and their
prominence values. In the second round-trip, the mobile application sends a set of POIs
that are of interest to obtain detailed information about the POIs that are chosen. That is,
initially, the user sends a query that includes the keyword(s) along with her location tag to
the service provider. Location tags help the server define a wide geographical area wherein
objects relevant to the search are identified. The location tag could be the name of a public
area, a postal code, a street address, or an exact latitude/longitude of the location. LSP
then responds by sending the set of matching POIs with respect to the user’s location. In
order to prevent unwarranted data collection and protect the privacy of the user, we adopt a
TTP less protocol where the client and server ends of the application perform intermediate
meta-data exchanges to calculate the final result set. The client end application uses the
meta-data to assess the results with respect to some geographic cloaking area or multiple
pseudo location points. Given this information and the user’s privacy preferences, the
client-end application can now retrieve, privately, the query’s answer.
One has to note that, in this model, during the first round-trip, the location information
is sent as coarse as possible so that the service provider cannot accurately determine the
location of the user. However, when a smaller set of POIs are included in the second round-
trip, whose detailed information is desired, the service provider can easily pinpoint user’s
location to a more granular level. So, preventing the service provider from learning a more
accurate location of the user when the second query is issued is the core goal of our proposal.
In this dissertation, we deal with two approaches to this problem.
1. Encrypting the query in such a way that the service provider cannot tell exactly what
POIs the user is looking for extra information on, but still be able to respond with
valid results.
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2. We propose several approaches to anonymize the queried set of POIs in the second
round-trip.
In either approach, the first round-trip of getting a list of POIs over a large region
remains the same. The second round-trip is where LPPMs come into play. Although the
techniques used and the exact query di ers in the approaches presented, the idea remains
common; the attacker should not be able to gain more than an acceptable level of knowledge
about the user’s location from the second round-trip.
4.3.1 First round-trip
The user starts the process by specifying the search keyword through the client applica-
tion interface. The client application determines a large geographical area that includes the
current position of the user. This can be done by randomly select a su ciently large area
(say 500km2) around the user’s location, which could be obtained using the onboard GPS
unit. We will refer to this area as retrieval area, AR. An example of this query format will
be a query such as “cafe in Los Angeles, CA,” as is supported by the Radar Search method
of the Google Places API4. We require such a large AR to prevent inference attacks against
the user’s location during this step. The client sends the coordinates of the generated AR
along with the search keyword to the server. After it receives the query, the server compiles
it and determines the matching set of POIs. The location information and prominence
value of each obtained POI are sent to the client. We aim to reduce the communication
overhead by sending only the location and the prominence information instead of entire
features (e.g. object names, phone numbers, addresses, etc.) corresponding to each POI at
this point. It is assumed that the user does not care if the attacker places her in the large
area picked in this step. If the user requires better privacy than this, then the size of AR
can be increased. But beyond some point, the user is better o  using an o ine approach
such as using downloaded maps or o ine GPS locators.
4developers.google.com/places/web-service/search
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4.3.2 Second round-trip
In the second round-trip, an LPPM considers the current user location and the list
of POIs and their prominence information obtained from the first round-trip to produce
a smaller list of POIs that are preferable based on their location and prominence. These
preferred POIs are then used in a query to the server to obtain detailed information about
them. The number of preferred POIs that the user wishes the algorithm to pick can be
configured, represented by a number K. Naturally one can argue that just by increasing
K, the user can increase her privacy, as more POIs generally seem to get distributed across
larger areas. But this method works only to an extent. Our assumption is that the attacker
knows the algorithm and most of the parameters used in the LPPM, and he can pre-calculate
the top-K POIs for each location on the map and keep the list ready. Now, his job, if he
is able to see the exact top-K POIs used in this step is to match them against his pre-
calculated list and determine the exact location of the user. If the LSP is semi-trusted,
more sophisticated algorithms are needed. This is because, a semi-trusted LSP can easily
determine the exact location of the user (or at least narrow it down to a very small area)
if it has the knowledge of the top-K POIs, as the LSPs have access to vast amounts of
geographical data at their disposal [56].
So, based on desired sensitivities, the user configures the application with an area large
enough that she does not care if the attacker locates her there. In the application, this
is usually specified by the user in the settings screen where she can pick a block, mall,
subdivision etc., indicating the large enough acceptable area. This coarseness specification
is internally translated into a number representing the side of a square area. Now, the goal
of the LPPM is to prevent the attacker from determining the location of the user in an area
smaller than the configured square. In order to do this, we present two sets of techniques.
One based on encryption and second based on heuristics. These approaches are presented
at a high level in the next two sections, with just enough detail to show the di erences in
the contents of the second query produced in this step.
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Client Server
Coordinates of large area + Search query
Location + Prominence for all matching POIs
Encrypted request for detailed features of top-K POIs
Encrypted response for detailed features of top-K POIs
1
2
3
4
First round-trip
Second round-trip
Figure 4.2: Client/Server communication steps in PIR based LPPM.
4.4 PIR Based Approach
The PIR method mentioned in Section 2.5 seems like a plausible candidate solution to
our problem. This method uses cryptographic techniques based on rigorous mathematical
assumptions that allow the user to privately download information from a database provider,
i.e., the content provider cannot tell which information had been accessed by the user.
Figure 4.2 shows the protocol steps.
In these techniques, the query for the top-K POIs is encrypted using some private key
and sent to the server. The server performs its computation on the encrypted query and
returns the answer to the client. Notice that, the private key is required to decrypt the
answer, so the server cannot decrypt the query nor the answer. Once it has the answer
from the server, the client can decrypt this answer using its private key and hence get the
required detailed information about the top-K POIs.
The PIR approach o ers a high level of privacy protection and in fact, it solves this
problem both in the single query and multiple queries scenarios. A single query scenario
is where the user issues a single query and a subsequent query is issued after enough time
that the attacker assumes both queries to be independent. In a multiple query scenario the
user keeps issuing queries as she moves around. The multiple query scenario carries with it
higher risk and will be explained in detail in Chapter 7. Since the attacker cannot observe
the contents of a query at all (because of encryption), he cannot narrow down the user’s
location to an area smaller than the AR selected by the client application in the first step,
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Request: detailed features for the interest set
Response: detailed features for the interest set
Client Server
Coordinates of large area + Search query
Location + Prominence for all matching POIs
1
2
3
4
First round-trip
Second round-trip
Figure 4.3: Client/Server communication steps in heuristic based LPPM.
no matter how many subsequent queries are issued by the client. Therefore, the attacker
cannot learn any additional information about the user’s location.
4.5 Statistical Based Approach
As we will see in Chapter 5, PIR su ers from a problem of very high demand for
computation and bandwidth resources, making this method impractical as a solution to
our problem. Thus, we propose a new architecture for LPPM based on statistical privacy
guarantees. Figure 4.3 summarizes the steps of the communication between the client and
the server for this new protocol. Steps 1 and 2 are identical to the previous one (Figure
4.2). For Step 3, we develop a method that will run on the client device to determine a
set of POIs in such a way that the semi-trusted LSP cannot easily estimate the precise
location of the user. The POI set that is generated by the local privacy algorithm must
include the top-K POIs, so as to not reduce the utility of the LBS to the user. This set of
POIs obtained by running the algorithm locally is called the interest set. The interest set
is a set of POIs that contains the top-K POIs with respect to the user’s current location
and few additional POIs to guarantee privacy preservation for the user. The client now
requests the detailed feature information about the interest set and the server will respond
by sending back the requested details. Requesting detailed information about specific POIs
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is already widely supported by major service providers, e.g., the Google Places API5 has a
Place-Details call that provides detailed information including user reviews.
Compared to the conventional process, this protocol incurs slight additional commu-
nication and computation overhead. However, as demonstrated later, the overhead can be
maintained within levels that does not have a noticeable impact on user experience.
4.6 Ranking the POIs
The query in the second round-trip needs to be built in such a way that it contains all
the POIs that the user may be interested in. The first step in this process is to rank the
POIs obtained in the first round-trip based on their distance and prominence and pick the
top K POIs. Towards this goal, we model the broad geographical area (AR) selected in
Step 1 of the protocol by a square grid G of size Z◊Z cells. The set of all cells is denoted by
C. A geographic location is then signified by a cell c œ C. A cell is defined as the smallest
amount of distance the user has to move to be recognized as existing in a di erent location.
This means, as long as the user moves within the boundaries of a cell, she will be considered
as staying in the same location. A user located in the cell cu sends a search keyword to
the server for a specific type of POI. Suppose that P = {p1, p2..., pn} represents the set of
POIs within the broad area and corresponds to the search keyword sent by the user. Let
0 < Pi Æ 1 be the prominence value of the POI pi œ P and assume that pi is located in
a specific cell ci in the grid G. Let the user be currently located at the cell cu. The rank
of pi is computed as a weighted combination of its prominence value and the normalized
distance from ci, given as
rankÕ(pi, cu) = –◊ distnorm(cu, ci) + (1≠ –)(1≠Pi). (4.1)
The length of the diagonal of G is used as the normalization factor for the distance.
The parameter – is a weighting coe cient such that 0 < – Æ 1. Thus, the ranks of objects
5developers.google.com/places/documentation/
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are between 0 and 1, with lower ranks implying better choices. In most situations, values
of – and Pi are not revealed to the user. Hence, we redefine the ranking function as
rank(pi, cu) = distnorm(cu, ci) + “i, (4.2)
where “i = 1≠–– (1 ≠Pi). Since – is a constant, both functions result in the same ranked
ordering of the objects.
Therefore, in the first round-trip, the server sends the tuples T = {Èidi, li, “iÍ |i = 1...n}
to the client, where li is the POI’s location6 and idi is a unique identifier for the POI. Using
T and the current location of the user, the privacy-preserving algorithm can sort the set P
based on the rank of its items and extract out the subset of top-K POIs.
The key di erence between the PIR-based and the statistical-based LPPMs when it
comes to privacy is that PIR uses encryption and keeps the query secret from the attacker,
i.e. the attacker does not know the contents of the query in the second round-trip, whereas
in statistical/heuristic approaches, the attacker can observe the contents of the query in
the second round-trip, but still cannot determine the user’s location precisely. Hence, for
PIR, the privacy guarantee is straightforward. But with statistical-based LPPMs, such as
the ones presented in chapters 6,7, and 8, the privacy achieved needs to be quantified in
order to prove their e cacy. Towards that goal, in the rest of the sections of this chapter,
we build the model and symbols needed as a background to discuss the statistical-based
approach.
4.7 Threat Model
The main privacy requirement for the client in the context of our problem is to not
disclose the location information of the user when the query is sent to the server. This
privacy requirement arises from the model of a semi-trusted service provider. In this model,
the trust on the service provider is defined in terms of two dimensions, (i) answering the
6Locations are typically provided as latitude/longitude pairs; we convert them to cell coordinates as per
the AR discretization setting.
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client’s query and (ii) discovering private information about the client. A semi-trusted
service provider is trusted in the first dimension, which is the query answer, where it is
clear that the service provider is not interested in giving a malicious answer for any query.
On the other hand, the service provider can collect the user’s queries and infer some private
information about her from these queries. Similar to what is typically assumed in the
literature, the security protocol is publicly known. So everyone, including the attacker,
knows details of the LPPM algorithm utilized by the user. In addition, the attacker:
• has the ability to eavesdrop and observe the contents of the query and interest set;
• is also assumed to have some information (background knowledge) on the initial lo-
cation of the user, e.g., the attacker may know the user’s residential or work address;
• knows the map of the geographical area and has access to the POI database;
• knows (or can accurately guess) the user’s selection of privacy preference parameters;
• can pre-process a POI database to map the observed interest set to the corresponding
smallest geographic area;
The service provider or an eavesdropping adversary, defined above, will try to figure
out the location of the user from the exchanged messages between the client and the server
when they process the protocol steps shown in Figure 4.3. So, ultimately, his goal is to
determine the cell the user is in, based on the observed interest set.
At this point we will focus on the single query scenario and the enhancements to the
attacker model required in the case of multiple queries will be presented in Chapter 7. Let
the probability distribution   represent the adversary’s knowledge about the user’s location.
We denote the prior probability estimate of the attacker for the user being located in the
cell c by  0(c). Since the adversary knows the details of the utilized LPPM, by observing
the interest set, he can update his probability distribution as follows:
 1(c) = Pr (c|I) = Pr (I|c) (c)
Pr (I) ’c œ C,
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where Pr(I|c) is the probability of generating the set I if the user is at cell c and  1(c) is
the posterior estimate of the attacker for the user being at the cell c. Note that  0 models
the knowledge of the adversary before the query is issued to the LBS. A common form of
this knowledge is a uniform distribution spread over a subset of cells in the grid G. It is
also reasonable to assume that  0 spreads over an area larger than the area inferable from
an LPPM; otherwise, the background knowledge of the adversary is already stronger than
the guarantees of the LPPM. The inferable area from an LPPM is the smallest area which
the attacker can restrict the probability of the user’s location inside. We formalize this
inferencing process in Chapter 6.
4.8 Abstract Model for LPPM
The privacy preserving algorithm in this context can be abstracted as the composition
of two functions A(R(·)), such that R maps a cell to a region (set of cells, i.e. an element
of the power set of C) and A maps that region to a (sub)set of the matching POIs, i.e.
R : C æ 2C and A : 2C æ 2P . The domain of the function A is determined by the range of
R, denoted as C1, C2, ..., Cm œ 2C . Correspondingly, let I1, I2, ..., Im be the POI (sub)sets
that are mapped to these regions by A. Without loss of generality, assume an arbitrary
set Iu œ {I1, I2..., Im} that is generated as the interest set for a user located in region Cu.
Consider the case when Iu ”= It, t = 1, ..., u ≠ 1, u + 1, ...m. Given Iu, the attacker can
determine Cu. For all cells cj /œ Cu , we have  1(cj) = 0, then for all cells ci œ Cu , the
posterior probability is
 1(ci) =
Pr (Iu|ci) 1 (ci)
Pr (Iu)
= Pr (Iu|ci) 0 (ci)q
cjœCu Pr (Iu|cj) 0 (cj)
. (4.3)
4.8.1 Assessments
We use a set of metrics to assess the privacy and the QoS of the LPPM. Following is a
detailed explanation for each of these metrics.
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Obfuscation
This technique has been applied to protect the location privacy in LBS in various other
research (Section 2.3). It is based on hiding the user’s location within a geographical area
of the site that contains the real location of the user, rather than accurately revealing the
exact location when requesting the service. So, the user can have access to the information
related to her location, while upholding the privacy. In order to achieve obfuscation, we
should have a “large” number of cells (including the cell of the user) in the region Cu with
positive probabilities. This number may be specified as part of the privacy policy of the
user. However, the user specified requirements cannot be achieved if the adversary has a
prior probability knowledge that allows him to narrow the user’s location down to a smaller
area. Hence, a precise statement (such as the  0 function) is necessary for the adversary’s
knowledge.
The adversary can sample one cell at a time (without replacement) based on the distri-
bution  . The expected number of cells that the adversary would sample before arriving at
the user’s actual location creates an obfuscation area for the user. We call this the expected
inexact privacy metric. It can be computed using the following closed form expression
expected_inexact( , cu) =
ÿ
c ”=cu
 (c)
 (c) +  (cu)
. (4.4)
Expected inexact privacy can be viewed as the smallest obfuscation area one can expect
if the attacker is successful in learning an approximate presence area using the sampling
method. The area can be obtained by multiplying the metric’s value with the area of one cell.
We will refer to this measure by the areal privacy metric. On the other hand, the expected
exact privacy reflects the probability of not arriving at the user’s location in one single
attempt. The expected estimation error of the adversary measures the average distance
between the true location of the user and the location estimated by the adversary [143].
When   is a uniform distribution over a subset C of cells, expected inexact privacy is equal
to |C|≠12 cells. For example, for a uniform distribution over an area of 32 ◊ 32 cells, the
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expected inexact privacy is 511.5 cells. Say that the cell area is 0.01km2, then the areal
privacy of the user is 5.115km2.
Convergence
Based on the prior probability distribution of the attacker, the chances for the user being
in some cells may be higher than the chances of the other cells within the region Cu. In fact,
the disclosure of the interest set Iu, which is part of the execution of the protocol proposed in
the Section 4.3, gives the attacker some additional information about the current position
of the user. The attacker is now able to build a new posterior probability distribution
based on Iu and his prior probability distribution (Equation 4.3). However, if the posterior
probability distribution of the attacker for the region Cu is directly proportional to the
prior probability distribution, then this will ensure that the set Iu has no contribution to
improving the attacker’s knowledge about the new location of the user within the boundaries
of the region Cu. We refer to this as the convergence property of the algorithm. In Equation
4.3, convergence is achieved if Pr(Iu|ci), for any ci œ Cu , is a constant. Therefore, the
probability of producing the output Iu should be equal for all cells in the region Cu.
The convergence condition is hard to satisfy for the case of multiple queries. So in order
to measure the contribution of an LPPM in improving the attacker’s knowledge about the
new location of the user, we use a metric called nearness privacy. This metric is based on
the adversary’s best guess according to the distribution  . Given a probability distribution
  over the cells in the grid and the user’s current location cu, nearness privacy is computed
as
nearness( , cu) = distance(max
c
 (c), cu). (4.5)
We use Euclidean distance in our evaluation. If multiple cells have the most probable
value, then we pick the cell closest to cu as the adversary’s guess. Note that when   is a
uniform distribution, nearness will be zero.
74
The quality of service
To achieve a high level of obfuscation, the region Cu must contain the largest possible
number of cells; in other words, a trivial solution is to always use the entire grid G in the
query of the second round-trip. But, this may degrade the QoS by increasing the expected
communication overhead (Steps 3 and 4 in Figure 4.3). Therefore, the privacy algorithm
must choose the smallest possible set of POIs that covers the area of the region Cu. Ideally,
the sets I1, I2..., In should each have only K elements.
4.9 LPPM implementation
It is di cult to identify all the forms that can be taken by the privacy algorithm that
o ers an acceptable level of obfuscation, convergence, and high QoS. Here we present the
formulation of the problem and give an outline for designing an LPPM model that preserves
the desired properties.
Let’s assume that C is partitioned into regions R1, R2, ..., Rq, such that the top-K POI
sets for each cell in a given region are the same. Let the sets P1, P2, ..., Pq represent the
top-K POIs for these q regions. The function R is responsible for the creating disjoint
groups C1, C2, ..., Cm of the q regions such that, Ci = Ri1
t
...
t
Rit . The interest set of a
given group of cells Ci is obtained by the function A, Ii = A(Ci) = Pi1
t
...
t
Pit . Ideally,
the m groups created using the R function should satisfy the following constraints.
1. For all groups Ci,
---{c œ Ci| (c) > 0}--- Ø ”. The parameter ” indicates the obfuscation
level requested by the user. The trivial method to meet this requirement is to create
a single group of the union of all q regions. However, this solution may negatively
impact the quality of service of the application, which motivates us to include the
second constraint.
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2. Suppose that the function f(C1, C2..., Cm) determines the e ect of grouping the dif-
ferent regions on the quality of service. The function f may be defined as
f(C1, C2..., Cm) = max
i=1,2,··· ,m
--Ii--, (4.6)
where Ii is the interest set corresponds to the group Ci. What is commanded here is
to minimize f . In our setting, it decreases the communication overhead.
Therefore, given a cell cu, a privacy algorithm using R and A returns the set Iu as the
interest set if cu œ Cu. Note that R is a many-to-one function, i.e. a cell can belong to
only one of the C1, C2, ..., Cm regions. The function A also is not necessarily a one-to-one
mapping but is many-to-one. The obfuscation and convergence requirements hold for this
algorithm. Assuming Iu is unique (A(Ci) = Iu ≈∆ i = u), for all cells ci œ Cu , we have
Pr(Iu|ci) = 1.
) ’ci œ Cu, 1(ci) = Pr (Iu|ci)  (ci)
Pr (Iu)
= constant◊   (ci) . (4.7)
For all cells cj /œ Cu , we have  1(cj) = 0. By virtue of the first constraint of our prob-
lem, we have Ci,
---{c œ Ci| (c) > 0}--- Ø ”; therefore, at least ” cells (including the cell of
the user) in Cu have positive posterior probability (obfuscation). Also, the posterior prob-
abilities associated with this reduced set of cells is directly proportional to the background
knowledge (convergence). The observations trivially hold when Iu is not unique.
The function R is required to create m partitions from the regions R1, R2, ..., Rq, and
each partition Ci has at least ” cells with probability   > 0. Let the number of cells with
probability   > 0 for each region Ri is xi, where i = 1, 2, · · · q. So, we can represent the
set of regions {R1, R2, ..., Rq} by the set of integers X = {x1, x2, ..., xq}. The problem that
the function R should solve is: find {C1, C2, · · ·Cm} partitions for the multi-set of positive
integers X such that the sum of the numbers of each partition Cj Ø ” ’j = 1, 2, · · ·m. The
function R takes three input parameters; namely, the set X, the number of partitions m,
and minimum sum threshold parameter ”. By invoking R (X, ”,m) we should either get
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the required partitions or a flag which tell us that no such partition is possible. We claim
that if there is a computationally e cient algorithm to solve the problem of the function
R, then this algorithm can solve the number partitioning problem. Number partitioning
is an NP-complete problem [62]. The problem asks for deciding whether a given multiset
S of positive integers can be partitioned into two subsets such that the summation of the
numbers in both sets are equal. The algorithm that can solve number partitioning using R
is described as follows.
Given a set S of integers we compute the sum L of the numbers in S. If L is odd
then no partition exists for S, so we stop. If L is even we invoke R
1
S, L2 , 2
2
.
Then S has a partition if R succeeded; otherwise, S has no partition.
Verifying an instance solution of the problem R is trivial and we just show its NP
hardness; thus, the problem is NP-complete. We introduce in later chapters our heuristics
based techniques that achieve acceptable performance in terms of privacy achieved without
giving in too much of QoS.
4.10 Summary
In this chapter, we briefly describe the current prevalent communication architecture
and describe the changes we propose in order to implement a TTP free LPPM. The general
architecture we proposed, consisting of two communication round-trips, can be commonly
used across both PIR based techniques and heuristic-based techniques discussed in this
dissertation.
In the case of statistical-based techniques, we presented an abstract model that will be
used to quantify the privacy achieved and presented few metrics that can be used. One may
think of this abstract model as an outline to design a heuristic based LPPM. We show that
in heuristic based approaches, achieving privacy without compromising much of quality of
service boils down to creating an e cient partition of grid regions to improve obfuscation
and convergence while not losing too much QoS. We also showed that a technique that
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tries to achieve the optimum solution is NP-complete, and motivate the need for using
heuristic-based approaches that can e ciently partition the cells of the grid G into regions
that satisfy both privacy and QoS requirements.
In the next chapter, we present the first TTP less protocol, using PIR, as it has got con-
siderable attention from the research community. Our goal there is to study and implement
two representative PIR schemes and assess their feasibility for real life applications.
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Chapter 5
Investigation of PIR As a
Candidate Solution
PIR techniques allow users to query and retrieve records from a database without re-
vealing the query to the database. These techniques gather more importance as more and
more users rely on on-line services and at the same time demand better privacy. Compu-
tational PIR (cPIR) is a category of PIR that uses mathematical techniques to achieve its
goals. It requires the database to be pre-processed in some way at the service provider.
Once honestly followed, the PIR protocols ensure that it is computationally expensive for
the attacker, or the service provider itself, to decrypt the query, at the same time, be able
to respond with correct answers to it. The high level of privacy achieved using these tech-
niques comes at the cost of added computational and communication overhead. As new
mathematical techniques such as fully homomorphic encryption emerge, so does adoption
of them into cPIR. The e ort has been trending towards making cPIR e cient enough for a
practical implementation. There have been a few notable proposals in cPIR in recent years.
In Section 4.4 we characterize a protocol architecture (Figure 4.2) that adopts PIR to
preserve the location privacy of the user. We argue that, a PIR based protocol may represent
an ideal solution for our problem since the LSP will not be able to draw any additional
information about the user’s location through that protocol. In this chapter we present
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a brief survey of PIR methods and then we pick the most promising of these proposals,
implement them, run them against typical database and block sizes, and compare their
performance. The last such comparative study was done in 2007 by Sion and Carbunar [147]
and there is a need to take into account recent advances, and check if the performance of the
latest proposals come close to practical adoption. Although each algorithm proposed has
its computational and communication complexity measures presented in terms of database
size, anyone that implements it will quickly realize that, because of the multiplier parameter
associated with each order term, the performance achieved “in reality” using standard
implementations on practical hardware and network technologies can be quite di erent
from what one expects by just looking at the big O terms.
5.1 Preliminaries
In typical client/server scenarios, the user sends a query to the database, and the
database locates the relevant records and responds with the data i.e. the database server
has to know the query to be able to respond. In contrast, PIR is a protocol aimed to protect
the client’s privacy by allowing the user to still retrieve relevant information but without
revealing the query to the database. The need for such protocols to protect the privacy
of the clients arises from the model of semi-trusted service providers, where our problem
(location based search) exemplify this scenario.
A trivial protocol to solve this problem is for the server to send a copy of the entire
database to the client, who can then choose the required record(s) from this copy. It is obvi-
ous that this solution o ers ultimate privacy to the client, since the server has no idea about
which record(s) the client is actually interested in. It is also obvious that this approach is
impractical as the transfer of the entire database has high communication cost. The problem
now is to determine some approach that guarantees almost the same privacy but with lesser
communication overhead. Chor et al. [32] introduced the term PIR to define this problem
and propose the information-theoretic PIR scheme (itPIR). This scheme actually provides
an absolute privacy guarantee (the same level as the trivial solution provides) for the client
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with more reasonable communication cost. The main drawback of this scheme is that it
requires an identical copy of the database available with at least two non-colluding servers.
In fact Chor et al. [32] shows that nontrivial itPIR is not possible in the case of a single
database server. Another scheme to implement PIR is to use mathematical (cryptographic)
techniques known as computational PIR (cPIR). Here “computational” means to guarantee
that the server can compromise the privacy of the client only if it can solve a computation-
ally hard problem. The main advantage of this scheme is that it waives the requirement
of multiple servers. Unfortunately, the protocols that attempt to satisfy this approach, in
general, introduce high communication and computational overheads. We mentioned the
two major schemes of PIR viz., itPIR and cPIR. We discuss the details of various proposal
in each scheme below.
5.1.1 Information theoretic PIR techniques
In a simple itPIR scheme, the database is modeled as an n-bit string, x, replicated
among k servers where k Ø 2. In order to retrieve a certain bit xi from the database,
the client will send a uniform random bit string Sj of length n to each server such that
S1 ü · · · ü Sk = ei, where all the bits of ei are zero except for the bit at the ith position.
Each server responds by sending the result of bitwise XOR of x and Sj . The client then
XORs all the responses together to recover the bit xi. To reduce communication costs Chor
et al. [32] proposed embedding x in a d-dimensional cube, so the server can cover its string
Sj and all strings at Hamming distance 1 from it by d-bit long strings. For instance, by
embedding x in a 3-dimensional cube, two servers can emulate up to eight servers with a
total communication complexity O ( 3Ôn). Unfortunately, to emulate any larger number of
servers, it is required that the emulating server cover all possible codes with a Hamming
distance > 1, which adds more communication overhead.
Another set of proposals to reduce the number of servers use locally decodable codes
(LDC) [27,55,96,162]. LDCs are error-correcting codes in which a message x is encoded into
a codeword C (x) such that any bit of xi can be recovered e ciently, with high probability, by
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querying only k coordinates randomly in C (x). For PIR protocols based on this technique,
all the k servers are supposed to store the encoding of x. In order to retrieve the bit xi,
the client requests a uniform random coordinate (ideally one bit) in C (x) from each server.
Although the k coordinates requested by the client must be su cient to recover the bit xi,
each server can see that the client is just interested in one uniformly selected coordinate in
C (x).
Although bit retrieval theoretically is extensible, retrieving a block (or a record) of
several bits from the database is a more realistic scenario. Here a linear algebraic query
model is used where the database is modeled as a matrix D of n blocks, b1, · · · bn, each block
bi is m-bits long. By generalizing the simple itPIR scheme explained above, if k servers
have exactly the same replica of the database, the client can retrieve the block i privately
with total communication cost of k · (n+m). The first step is the same, where the client
generates k uniform bit strings of length n, such that S1 ü · · · ü Sk = ei, and sends one
bit string to each server. The server j now returns the vector vj = Sj ◊ D. The client
recovers the ith record by computing v1 ü · · · ü vk = ei ◊ D. This scheme is based on a
simple secret sharing mechanism. The secret is the index of the interested record, i, and
the secret shares are the bit strings S1, · · · , Sk, since i can be determined only if we know
all of these bit strings. But this scheme will fail if one of the servers does not respond, or
even worse, replies with a false answer. This problem can be described in general as follows.
Given total number of servers ¸, only k of them answers the client’s query. From these k
servers, h servers reply honestly, and the rest could lie. The goal is to retrieve the client’s
query privately for up to t non-colluding servers. Goldberg [71] addressed this problem
and proposes a protocol based on Shamir’s secret sharing [139] to generate the query’s
secret shares and then recover the answer code words using the Guruswami-Sudan error
correcting algorithm [77]. Devet et al. [41] improve the computation speed of Goldberg’s
protocol, as well as the minimum bound for the number t of non-colluding servers. Devet
used dynamic programming to decide the answer recovery algorithm among Berlekamp-
Welch [155], Guruswami-Sudan [77] or brute force methods. Henry et al. [83] also built on
82
the Goldberg’s protocol to develop a method for retrieving multiple blocks simultaneously
from the database.
itPIR is reasonably fast (negligible computation cost) and can guarantee privacy if the
servers are trusted. But, the major problem with itPIR schemes is the vulnerability of
query exposure when the replicated servers collude. In the most simple case, colluding
servers can totally nullify query privacy. This requirement of multiple non-colluding servers
makes itPIR impractical in most real scenarios.
5.1.2 Computational PIR techniques
The first attempt to solve the PIR problem without the need for multiple non-colluding
database servers was made in 1997 by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [100]. The proposed solu-
tion is based on the assumption that the server cannot solve the quadratic-residuo problem
e ciently (i.e., in polynomial time) [72]. In 2005 Gentry and Ramzan [66] constructed a
cPIR algorithm that is based on the „-hiding assumption, introduced by Cachin et al. [23].
The algorithm has a communication complexity of O (k + d), where k Ø logn is the se-
curity parameter and d is the length of the database block. This protocol achieves the
best performance in terms of reducing the communication cost compared to other known
cPIR protocols. However, it necessitates expensive computational operations, especially on
the server side, to generate the query response, which limits the practicality of the pro-
tocol [3, 130]. In fact, it turns out that the major deficiency in all cPIR protocols is the
high computational cost. In 2007, Sion and Carbunar [147] showed that the trivial PIR
protocol is more e cient than any other PIR protocol proposed by that time, when im-
plemented on realistic hardware and communication networks. The authors have focused
only on the protocol of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [100] in their analysis for cPIR schemes
and completely rejected itPIR by assuming that the requirement of replicating a database
is an unsatisfiable condition in real scenarios. Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit [3] proposed a
linear algebra based protocol that aims to achieve high computation throughput. A later
study by Olumofin and Goldberg [125] similar to the one done by Sion and Carbunar [147]
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conclude that this protocol is an order of magnitude more e cient than the trivial PIR.
Although, the query size for this protocol is large, the protocol has significantly reduced
the computational overhead compared to the previous protocols. Unfortunately, in 2012,
Jingguo Bi et al. [17] show a possible attack against the Aguilar-Melchor and Gaborit [3]
protocol by uncovering the secret linear relationship between the public keys and the secret
keys.
Xun Yi et al. [163] uses some variant of Dijk et al. [154] Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) to o er a cPIR. For a database size of n-bits and consisting of m records each of
the same length, the total communication and computational overhead of the protocol are
O(“ logm+ n“/m) and O(m“2 logm+ n“/2), respectively, where “ is the cipher text size,
which is determined by specific security parameters. Changyu et al. [47] also proposed
a scheme based on fully homomorphic encryption in which they take advantage of the
inherent parallelism in the BGV algorithm [20] to reduce the communication complexity to
O(log logn). However, the authors describe the protocol for single bit retrieval and left the
more practical block retrieval protocol to be addressed in later work.
When one looks at the existing research, a clear pattern emerges. E ciency achieved
on the communication overhead is balanced out by often increased computational com-
plexity. Even though newer proposals are clever and improve on both dimensions, further
improvements are needed for these to become really practical. In order to evaluate the
improvements achieved in cPIR performance over the years, we compare the first major
proposal [100] based on the quadratic residuosity assumption (QRP ) against the latest1
proposed protocol based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [163].
5.2 PIR Protocol Model
In this section, we present just enough background of the protocols, QRP and FHP ,
to keep the discussion complete. Also, we present them with common symbols so readers
get a better feel for their performance when represented in those common terms. In our
1At the time of this writing
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implementation for both QRP and FHP , we assume that the database consists of n blocks
(records) of equal length. Each block Bi is m-bit long. So the database is viewed as an
n ◊ m matrix, where each row in the matrix corresponds to one record in the database.
Before going into the details of the QRP and FHP protocols, it would be better to give an
overview of the general structure of cPIR schemes.
A cPIR protocol consists of three polynomial time algorithms; QueryGenerator,
ResponseGenerator and ResponseDecoder. First, the client uses the QueryGen-
erator algorithm to create an encrypted query and a private secret for a specific block of
index, j, and sends the query to the server. The server computes the response for the “en-
crypted” query on the database by using the Response-Generator algorithm, and then
sends this response back to the client. The client shall be able to retrieve the block j from
the received response using the Response-Decoder. In this chapter, we call execution
of all three algorithms, starting with query generation to response decoding on the client,
as a round-trip (this should not be confused with the previous definition for the round-trip
in Chapter 4). Two conditions must be satisfied by the cPIR scheme – correctness and
privacy. Correctness means that for any query generated for a block j by the QueryGen-
erator algorithm, the correct block must be recovered back from the response generated
by the ResponseGenerator algorithm by using the algorithm ResponseDecoder. The
privacy requirement stipulates that for any two queries for di erent blocks i and j in the
database, the server cannot distinguish one from the other with a non negligible probability.
The communication overhead and computational cost of a cPIR scheme are measured in
terms of n and m (the size of the database) and the size of the overhead induced by the
privacy protocol.
5.2.1 Description of QRP
Since this protocol is based on the intractability of the quadratic residuosity problem,
we will introduce the problem briefly before we describe the protocol.
85
Given an integer N and an integer x œ ZúN , x is said to be a quadratic residue modulo
N if there exists an integer y œ ZúN such that x © y2 (mod N). Otherwise we say it is a
quadratic non-residue. We denote the set of quadratic residues modulo N by QRN and
the set of quadratic non-residues modulo N by NRN . The Jacobi symbol is defined over
the set ZN as the product of the Legendre symbols corresponding to the prime factors of
N , and it can be computed in polynomial time [36]. The Legendre symbol is defined in
Equation 5.1. If the modulus is a prime, p, then it is easy to decide whether an integer
x œ Zúp is quadratic residue or not by just computing the Jacobi symbol,
1
x
p
2
. For composite
modulus, the Jacobi symbol cannot be directly used to decide the quadratic residuosity of
an integer x œ ZúN . Consider a composite modulus, N = p.q, where p and q are unknown
primes. We can still compute the Jacobi symbol
! x
N
"
, but in this case
! x
N
"
=
1
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p
2 1
x
q
2
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x œ QRN ≈∆
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=
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2
= 1. Half of the integers x œ ZúN have Jacobi symbol equal to
≠1 where
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q
2
, and we know certainly that they are not quadratic residues modulo
N . But, the other half have Jacobi symbol equal to 1 where
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= 1, then x œ QRN ; and, if
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= ≠1, then x œ NRN .
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x
p
4
=
Y_____]_____[
0 if a © 0 (mod p);i.e., a /œ Zúp
1 if x œ QRp
≠1 if x œ NRp
(5.1)
Therefore, if the Jacobi symbol is 1, Pr [x œ QRN ] = Pr [x œ NRN ] = 12 . A hard-set of
quadratic residuosity, Hk, is defined in Equation 5.2
Hk = {x|x œ ZúN , N = p.q
where p, q are k2 -bit primes and
! x
N
"
= 1
Ô (5.2)
The quadratic residuosity assumption states that for any integer x œ Hk, if the factor-
ization of N is unknown, there is no e cient algorithm to decide whether x is a quadratic
residue modulo N or not. In addition to the hardness of deciding quadratic residuosity for
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x œ Hk, the set Hk maintains a useful XOR property. That is, ’x, y œ Hk, the product x ·y
(mod N) is a QRN if both x and y are QRN or NRN ; otherwise the product is NRN .
Now that we have su cient background, we describe the QRP PIR protocol. Steps
of QueryGenerator, ResponseGenerator and ResponseDecoder routines are de-
scribed in Algorithm 5.1. The round trip starts at the client side, when the QueryGen-
Algorithm 5.1 QRP algorithms.
1: function QueryGenerator(⁄, n, j)
2: p1, p2 Ωrand_prime, where |p1| = |p2| = k/2
3: N Ω p1 · p2
4: for i = 1 to n and i ”= j do
5: Choose random qi œ Hk s.t. qi is QRN
6: end for
7: Choose random qj œ Hk s.t. qj is NRN
8: return (p1, p2, [q1, · · · , qn])
9: end function
10: function ResponseGenerator(N, [q1, · · · , qn] ,DB)
11: [z1, · · · , zm]Ω 1
12: for i = 1 to n do
13: for t = 1 to m do
14: if bi,t = 1 then
15: zt Ω zt ◊ qi (mod N)
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: return ([z1, · · · , zm])
20: end function
21: function ResponseDecoder([z1, · · · , zm] , p1, p2)
22: for t = 1 to m do
23: if zt is QRN then
24: bj,t Ω 0
25: else
26: bj,t Ω 1
27: end if
28: end for
29: return ([bj,1, · · · , bj,m])
30: end function
erator routine is invoked to create the query vector [q1 · · · qn] for a database record j,
using the private key (p1, p2) and a public key N . The client then sends [q1 · · · qn] and N
to the server which computes the response [z1 · · · zm] and sends it back to the client. Using
the response received from the server, the client will recover the record Bj using the Re-
sponseDecoder routine, thus completing the round-trip. Notice that, deciding whether
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an integer zt is QRN or not (line 17 in Algorithm 5.1) is a polynomial time operation
because the client knows the primes (p1, p2) which form the private key.
We will not present detailed proofs for the correctness and privacy of either algorithm
here. The interested reader may refer to the original references. However, the security
of QRP , intuitively, follows from the quadratic residuosity assumption. The correctness is
based on the XOR property of Hk. As it is obvious, if bj,t = 0 in the original database, then
zt is the accumulated product of QRN integers, which results in a QRN integer. On the
other hand, bj,t = 1, means the accumulated product of zt will include one NRN integer,
which results in a NRN integer.
5.2.2 Description of FHP
This protocol is based on a variant of the Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme
proposed by Dijk et al. [154]. In FHE, mathematical operations can be performed on
encrypted inputs to produce an encrypted version of the result. Thus, a semi-trusted
party can perform computations on encrypted inputs and produce correct results without
knowing the plain values of the inputs. In Dijk et al. [154] scheme the user chooses a security
parameter ⁄ and determines a parameter set fl = ⁄, ÷ = (⁄+ 3) ÁlognË , “ = 5(⁄+ 3) ÁlognË2 .
The secret key, sk, is a random odd integer of length ÷-bit. The public key is pk = sk · q0,
where q0 is a random odd integer chosen from [1, 2“/sk). To encrypt M œ {0, 1}, the
user, who knows sk, chooses two random integers p œ
1
≠2⁄, 2⁄
2
and q œ [1, 2“/sk). The
ciphertext, c = E (M,pk) © M + 2 · r + q · sk (mod pk). With the secret key sk, the user
decrypts a ciphertext as M = D (c, sk) © (c (mod sk)) (mod 2).
The protocol consists of the three algorithms given in Algorithm 5.2. In the Query-
Generator, the client calculates pk and sk based on the security parameter ⁄. In line
6, rs and qs are random integers chosen as specified by the FHE scheme described above.
Notice that, in line 6, –s œ {0, 1} is the plaintext and –ˆs is its encryption. So the query
basically is nothing but an encryption of the index of the required block. For the Respon-
seGenerator algorithm, each block Bi is viewed as a bit vector [bi,1, · · · , bi,m]. Before it
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Algorithm 5.2 FHP algorithms.
1: function QueryGenerator(⁄, n, j)
2: Generate pk and sk
3: ¸Ω ÁlognË
4: –1, · · · ,–¸ Ωbinary_representation of j
5: for s = 1 to ¸ do
6: –ˆs Ω E (–s, pk) = –s + 2 · rs + qs · sk (mod pk)
7: end for
8: return (sk, pk, [–ˆ1, · · · , –ˆ¸])
9: end function
10: function ResponseGenerator(pk, [–ˆ1, · · · , –ˆ¸] ,DB)
11: ¸Ω ÁlognË
12: for i = 1 to n do
13: —i,1, · · · ,—i,¸ Ωbinary_representation of i
14: Êˆi Ω
r¸
s=1 –ˆs + (—i,s ü 1) (mod pk)
15: end for
16: [z1, · · · , zm]Ω 0
17: for i = 1 to n do
18: for t = 1 to m do
19: if bi,t = 1 then
20: zt Ω zt + Êˆi (mod pk)
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: return ([z1, · · · , zm])
25: end function
26: function ResponseDecoder([z1, · · · , zm] , sk)
27: for t = 1 to m do
28: bj,t Ω (zt (mod sk)) (mod 2)
29: end for
30: return ([bj,1, · · · , bj,m])
31: end function
can create the response, the algorithm must compute the encryption values corresponding
to each record Êˆ (lines 10–12 in Algorithm 5.2). This additional computation cost comes
as a penalty for the reduction that has been made in the communication cost. Hence, in
this protocol, the query size is logarithmically proportional to the number of records where
as it is linear in the case of QRP . Finally, recovery of queried record j at the client is
straightforward as shown in the ResponseDecoder routine.
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5.3 Implementation Details
In implementing both QRP and FHP algorithms, we used open source, peer validated
libraries that implement the underlying arithmetic. A not too old, not too modern hardware
platform is chosen to represent a typically available hardware architecture. Also, normally
available Ethernet based LAN connections are used between the server and the client. Our
goal is to be realistic in terms of hardware and network platform selection. We implemented
both protocols using C++ on Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS virtual server machine with 4 core Intelr
Xeonr CPU E5≠ 2695 v3 @ 2.30GHz with cache size of 35MB and Debian GNU/Linux 7
client machine –Intelr Xeonr E5405 @ 2.00GHz. We use the NTL (version 9.4.0) library
[145] to perform big integer modular operations. NTL is a high-performance free open
source C++ library that o ers algorithms for processing arbitrary length integers.
Each of the algorithms was first validated for correctness, by making sure the retrieved
block of data on the client side exactly matches the corresponding block in the database.
The performance characteristics of each algorithm are verified independently. We used
similar techniques to test the performance as those used by the original authors of the
algorithms. This is so that we can compare our results with those published by the authors
and ensure that our implementation performs at least as good as those obtained by the
original authors.
After ensuring the correctness and satisfactory performance, the algorithms were nor-
malized by adjusting the parameters so that the privacy o ered by each algorithm is similar,
i.e., if the semi trusted server were to break the privacy and figure out the index j that is
queried by the client, the amount of work needed should be similar for both algorithms.
For FHP protocol, the authors [163] propose ⁄ = 60. This gives “ = 2205 and a public
key length of 2205 bits, so all the integers exchanged between the client (queries) and the
server (responses) are going to be of length 2205 bits. In fact setting ⁄ = 60 gives us a
low security level t 260. We set ⁄ = 85, so we have a security level of 285. With ⁄ = 85,
the public key length is 3080 bit. For the quadratic residue protocol, we choose k = 500,
so the moduli N is 1000 bits long. The fastest known algorithm for integer factorization,
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Table 5.1: Average Computation Time and Round-trip Time in minutes for QRP and FHP
for di erent database sizes. Database Size is represented as number of records ◊ record
size.
Database Size Computation Roundtrip
QRP FHP QRP FHP
10000◊ 10kB 2.041 1.361 2.111 1.366
10000◊ 25kB 5.041 5.637 5.214 5.651
10000◊ 50KB 10.353 11.308 10.698 11.335
10000◊ 100kB 21.189 22.409 21.878 22.465
20000◊ 10kB 4.068 3.070 4.137 3.076
20000◊ 25kB 10.146 10.862 10.319 10.877
20000◊ 50kB 21.239 22.721 21.583 22.752
20000◊ 100kB 42.019 44.649 42.711 44.711
30000◊ 10kB 6.034 4.553 6.103 4.558
30000◊ 25kB 15.281 16.284 15.454 16.299
30000◊ 50kB 31.349 33.126 31.701 33.157
30000◊ 100kB 63.274 68.699 63.965 68.761
number field sieve [21], can factorize an integer of length 1000 bits (under some heuristic
assumptions) in a time ¥ 285. With these settings we compare the performance of both
protocols under the same level for privacy.
5.4 Results and Analysis
Table 5.1 shows experimental results for both protocols running on di erent sized
databases. To generate the query, the QRP client creates n random integers of k bits
long, which gives a total computation complexity of k · n. FHP client encrypts logn bits
using DGHV a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, which require two multiplica-
tions and two additions for “ bits long integers. So the total computation complexity of the
query generation algorithm is 2 · “ · (“ + 1) · logn.
For response decoding, the QRP client will test the quadratic residuosity of each re-
ceived integer from the server. Given the factorization of N , the residuosity check requires
O
1
log3N
2
[146]. So the total computational complexity of the decoding algorithm is m ·k3.
For FHP , the response decoding algorithm is nothing but a long integer devision performed
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iteratively over m integers; each of these integers is “ bits long, so the total cost of the al-
gorithm is m · “2 bit operations.
The QRP client query consists of n integers and the response generated by the server
is m integers. Since each of these integers is k bits, the total communication cost of the
protocol is k · (n+m) bits. On the other hand, the client using FHP sends logn integer
numbers for each query and receives m integers representing the response from the server,
where the length of each number is “ bits. In order to address the problem of large query size
for QRP , Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [100] suggested a recursive technique to implement the
protocol. Unfortunately, this technique leads to exponential increment in both the response
size and the computational cost. Therefore we skip this technique in our implementation
and we choose to implement the QRP server using the classical producer/consumer pattern.
The server could start computing the elements of the response array as soon as the first
query element is received from the client, and then accumulatively update the response
array when new elements of the query array are available. Since the time for uploading the
query from client to server is negligible compared to the response computation time, this
implementation of the server would eliminate the impact of the large query size on the overall
roundtrip of the protocol. Clearly the query size of FHP is much smaller than the query size
of QRP . In Table 5.1 the di erence between the roundtrip time and the server computation
time represents the total communication and the client computation costs. Notice that this
di erence for QRP is ≥ 10 times larger than that for FHP . But as we will see shortly that
this gain in the query size of FHP comes at the cost of increased computation overhead at
the server side which can significantly impact the overall performance of the protocol.
The most expensive part for both protocols is the response generation that happens on
the server side. In the process of generating a response, both algorithms examine each single
bit in the database. If the bit is 1, the QRP server performs a modular multiplication for
two integers of k-bit, while the FHP server performs a modular addition for two integers of
“-bit. Even though “ = 3·k, NTL (on our server) performs modular addition of two 3000-bit
integers 10 times faster than a modular multiplication of two 1000-bit integers, which gives
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a worthy advantage to FHP over QRP . But, since the query generated by the FHP client
represents the encryption of the address of the required record, the server now must compute
an encryption Êˆ corresponding to each record in the database. This step includes additional
n · logn modular multiplication and addition operations for integers of size “ bits at the
FHP server (lines 11, 12 in Algorithm 5.2). We solve this problem also by implementing the
producer/consumer pattern as we did in the QRP server. The response array elements are
computed accumulatively as the next encryption value Êˆ becomes ready. But, one should
notice that the computation cost of Êˆ is significantly higher than the communication cost
of sending k-bit numbers. Specifically, in our settings the communication cost of sending
1000 bits is 0.01 msec while the computation cost of Êˆ is 0.8 msec. The e ect of this
additional computational cost of FHP increases with the number of records in the database,
which explains the performance degradation for FHP in our experimental results when the
number of the database records is increased (Table 5.1). Another observation is that the
FHP performance decreases as the size of the record increases. Notice that, the FHP
server needs to maintain two arrays, the size of each array is 3080◊ n bits, while the QRP
server will maintain one array of size 1000 ◊ n bits. This larger amount of memory (s 6
times) requirement by FHP causes a higher rate of cache misses; which in turn will increase
the computation time of the ResponseGenerator algorithm. We summarize the pros and
cons for both protocols in the following points.
• The QRP query size increases linearly with the number of records in the database,
n, while FHP o ers a good solution to this problem since the query size increases
logarithmically with n.
• The FHP protocol demands larger bit size for the security parameter “ than the
security parameter k for the QRP protocol. This causes a negative e ect on the
computation time and the response size for FHP .
• In general, the FHP performs better than the QRP for smaller databases while QRP
outruns FHP when the database is large.
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• Unfortunately, neither protocol is e cient enough to be practical. Both protocols
are much slower than a trivial protocol in which the server will transfer the entire
database to the client.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we have implemented and evaluated both Quadratic-Residuosity based
and Fully-Homomorphic Encryption based cPIR protocols that represent earliest and latest
work in this area. We have used standard middle-of-the-ground hardware, software and
open source libraries to implement them. Our goal has been to study the performance
characteristics of each of these algorithms with a focus on testing if the latest improvements
in cPIR schemes give enough performance gains as to make them useful in practical appli-
cations. We have normalized the protocols to o er similar acceptable privacy and run them
against various representative sizes of databases and records. We have compared the per-
formance statistics against that of the most trivial cPIR protocol. Our conclusion is that,
even though there are improvements in communication and computation costs, cPIR proto-
cols still require lot of work before they become e cient enough for practical applications,
especially, TTP less protocol for LBS.
Moreover, when one observes the already prevalent LBS architecture, one can see that
PIR techniques (both cPIR and itPIR) cannot be practically implemented on the current
LBS architecture. Even if one were to ignore the client side processing and the commu-
nication costs, cPIR requires extensive processing overhead at the server side and itPIR
requires replication of the service provider databases. Service providers may not be inclined
to these changes that are counter intuitive to their revenue models in the LBS business.
The alternative, which is transferring the entire database to the client, is even more counter
productive for the service provider’s business model, not to mention the communication
and capacity costs imposed on the client and the entire system in general. Hence, having
considered and studied carefully, we rule out PIR as a feasible method for our purpose, the
TTP less LBS protocol. In the next few chapters, we propose our own protocols that use
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statistical privacy techniques and apply heuristics to achieve that goal. While proposing
these techniques, our goal is not only to develop a proven technique in achieving guaran-
teed privacy levels, but also impose as minimal changes to existing prevalent architectures
as possible.
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Chapter 6
Single Query Scenario
Continuing the discussion from Chapter 4, we present in this chapter implementation
details of an e cient heuristic based LPPM. The goal is to implement optimizations and
heuristics with a focus on reducing processing times that makes it practical on mobile
devices. Even though mobile devices have come a long way in terms of processing power,
optimizations are required in order for the privacy protection methods to finish quickly
enough to preserve quality of service. Algorithms along with heuristics of the proposed
LPPM presented here are based on our work in [44]. Later, we present the implementation
details and assess the performance characteristics of the proposed LPPM.
First, we consider a simple scenario where the user issues a single query. In the next
chapter we enhance this architecture to be able to provide strong and e cient privacy
guarantees when multiple queries are made by the user. However, the model and sym-
bols introduced in this chapter are maintained and extended throughout the rest of the
dissertation.
6.1 Proposed LPPM
High levels of privacy measures discussed in Section 4.8 serve as an objective that one
may try to achieve while designing a search algorithm for local search. However, the question
remains open whether the computational cost associated with implementing this solution
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on a mobile device will be practical or not. Alternatively, instead of obtaining the optimal
regions C1, C2, ..., Cm, (Section 4.9) we have taken the engineering approach and divide the
set of cells C into predefined regions. These regions are created by overlaying the grid G
with a coarser grid of size Zˆ◊Zˆ. All cells contained within a coarser cell then form a region.
We will refer to such a region also as a box. In this case, we have m =
1
Z
Zˆ
22
(assume Z is a
multiple of Zˆ) and each box Bi is simply a sub-grid of the grid G with size of b◊ b, where
b = Z
Zˆ
. Note that, in this formulation, the user configures her required level of obfuscation
by setting the value of the parameter b indicating that she does not care if the attacker
narrows her location to an area greater than or equal to a b cells by b cells (b◊ b box). This
is often specified in real life approximations such as a mall, block and sub-division that is
usually translated by the application into the parameter b that represents their size. So,
pinpointing the user’s location to an area that is less than a b◊ b box will be considered a
breach of her expected privacy.
If the box Bu happens to be the b◊b box where the user is located, then the interest set,
Iu, is the union of the most highly ranked K POIs (top-K POIs) for each cell in Bu. The
need is to compute a set of top-K POIs for each cell in a subset of cells Cu and return the
union of these sets. Here, the subset Cu is a set of cells that form a box Bu which contains
the user’s cell, cu. Clearly, the obfuscation requirement is satisfied for this algorithm, since
for each cell c œ Cu,  1(c) > 0. Equation 4.3 for the probability that the user exists in a
cell ci œ Cu can be rewritten as follows
 1(ci) = Pr (ci|Cu) = Pr (Cu|ci) 0 (ci)q
cjœCu Pr (Cu|cj) 0 (cj)
. (6.1)
Since the grid G has been pre-partitioned into non-overlapping boxes of size b ◊ b, for any
box B, Pr (C|ci) = 1,’ci œ C, where C is the subset of cells included in B. By substituting
into Equation 6.1, we have  1(ci) = a constant◊  0 (ci); hence convergence holds as well.
Service loss minimization is also not performed explicitly; nonetheless, we expect the
union size of the top-K sets to be relatively low since neighboring cells are collected together
97
to form the regions. The interest set computation for the user is then performed in two
steps:
1. R: determine the box Bu where the cell of the user belongs.
2. A: obtain the union of the top-K POI sets of the cells in Bu.
Following the steps of the architecture presented in Section 4.5, the client determines
a large geographical area that includes the user’s location (AR), and sends the coordinates
of this area along with search keywords to the server. The server finds the list of matching
POIs within AR from its database, and sends back only the location and the prominence
information of the obtained POIs. The client locally ranks the received list of POIs and
determines the interest set Iu corresponding to the box Bu. The client then queries the
server for detailed information about the POIs in the set Iu. The server responds with
details of those POIs.
To determine the interest set, a brute force search is the trivial solution to compute
the union of the top-K POIs of the cells in a box. But it is computationally impractical to
implement on the client end, i.e., the mobile device. Hence, a faster algorithm to calculate
the interest set locally on the client end has been proposed.
6.2 Interests Set Computation
The top level procedure of our method is given in Algorithm 6.1. The algorithm starts
with the following pre-computations:
1. Partition the set Cu into two subset Cborder and Cinternal. The set Cborder is a set of
cells that occur at the border of the box Bu; Cinternal is the set of the remaining cells
of Bu.
2. Determine subset Pbox œ P , the set of POIs that occur inside, or on the border of the
box Bu.
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Algorithm 6.1 Compute the top-K set of POIs for the user’s box.
Input: Set P of all POIs; Set Cu of all cells in the box Bu; Prameter K
Output: Interest set I: the unioun of the top-K POIs for all cells ci œ Cu
1: function CreateTopK-List(P , Cu, K)
2: Cborder Ω border cells of Bu Û subset of Cu
3: Cinternal Ω non-border cells of Bu Û complement of Cborder
4: Pbox Ω POIs included in the box Bu Û subset of P
5: I Ω ?
6: rootΩ BuildTree(Data(P ), 1)
7: for all ci œ Cborder do
8: I Ω Ifi CellTopPOIs(root, ci, K)
9: end for
10: Preduced Ω Pbox fi I
11: rootΩ BuildTree(Data(Preduced), 1)
12: for all ci œ Cinternal do
13: if I = Preduced then exit for
14: I Ω Ifi CellTopPOIs(root, ci, K)
15: end for
16: return I
17: end function
Stage-I
Build the interest set for the border cells cumulatively by iterating through the cells of
Cborder, computing the top-K POIs for each cell and add it to the interest set I. In order to
obtain the set of the top-K POI for a cell, we use a kd-tree based branch-and-bound search
algorithm. The details of constructing the tree and modifying this technique to satisfy our
problem requirements are going to be discussed later in this chapter. For this stage we build
the kd-tree using the full set of POIs, P . In the next stage we will use a reduced search
space (POIs set) to build the kd-tree with less number of nodes, which leads to a smaller
tree and so improves the search time. Moreover, at this stage we do the computation for
a smaller partition of Cu cells, namely the border cells, while the small tree is used for the
larger partition.
Stage-II
By the end of Stage-I we have the set I that represents the top-K POIs for the border
cells of the box Bu. We create a new reduced search set of POIs, Preduced, for this stage by
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computing the union of the sets I and Pbox, where Pbox is the set of POIs that are located
within the box. Now a new kd-tree is built using the set Preduced. We use this kd-tree and
iterate through the cells of the set Cinternal to obtain the top-K POIs for each cell. Again
we cumulatively add the top-K POIs from each cell to the interest set, I. The algorithm
ends after either exhausting all the cells in set Cinternal or if I = Preduced, since we cannot
add any more POIs to I.
6.3 kd-Tree Branch-and-bound Search
A kd-tree data structure is chosen, because it is a data structure that gracefully adapts
the distribution of k-dimensional points and also can be used “e ciently” for range searching
and range counting queries. We built the kd-tree using the search set of the POIs, and then
used it to determine the top-K POIs for a cell cref in the grid. The tree built here is a
slightly modified version of the standard 2d-tree data structure (in our application k = 2).
So the concept of a 2d-tree is briefly reviewed here before the implementation of the proposed
2d-tree is explained.
The main idea of a 2d-tree is that it recursively partitions the plane into two half planes.
Let’s take as an example a set of points that are distributed in the xy-plane as shown in
Figure 6.1a and build a 2d-tree based on these points. Consider any random permutation of
the points, say (c3, c2, c7, c9, c6, c4, c10, c1, c8, c5). Take the point c3, which is the first point
that appears in the random list, and set this point as the root of the tree. The plane is
divided into two parts based on a vertical line through this point. In the tree, all points
that fall to the left of the point c3, i.e., the points with smaller x-coordinate values must
be added to the left subtree of the node c3. Similarly, every point with x-coordinate value
greater than the x-coordinate value of the point c3 must be in the right subtree of the node
c3. At this point the x-axis is referred to as the cutting dimension of the node. Then we get
the next point c2 where we switch our partitioning of the plane according to the horizontal
line that passes through this point. At the node c2 in the tree the left subtree consists of
the set of points that are below the horizontal line (smaller y-coordinate values) and the
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Figure 6.1: Building a 2d-tree example.
right subtree will include only the points above the horizontal line (greater y-coordinate
values). In this step, the cutting dimension is the y-axis. Continuing the same process for
the rest of the points we end up with the tree shown in Figure 6.1b. The left subtree for
any node ci represents the set of all points in the plane with a cutting dimension coordinate
values less than the value of the point ci, and the right subtree will contain all the points
that have values greater than the value of the point ci. The resulting tree is nothing but a
binary search tree in which the key is alternated based on the cutting dimension (axis) of
the node.
6.3.1 Building augmented kd-tree
Clearly, keeping a binary search tree balanced will significantly reduce the search time.
In Algorithm 6.2, the kd-tree is built by using a composite array, data, for the set P of POIs
that is sorted based on both x and y coordinate values. To create the first node (root) of the
tree the median point from the data set is chosen based on the current cutting dimension.
Then, branches of the tree are built recursively by considering all points and placing them
on either side of the root node. This ensures a more balanced kd-tree compared to building
it iteratively using randomly ordered points. Additionally, in Algorithm 6.2, each node in
the tree is augmented with the minimum possible “ value of POIs included in the subtree
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rooted at that node including the node itself (recall from Section 4.6 that “i = 1≠–– (1≠Pi)).
We denote this value by “min(.).
Algorithm 6.2 Build kd-tree.
Input: Composite array data of all POIs sorted based on both x and y; Index of cutting
dimension cd
Output: The root of kd-tree for the given set of POIs
1: function BuildTree(data, cd) Û cd is the cutting dimension
2: if size(data) = 1 then
3: tΩ kdNode(data[cd, 1], cd)
4: else
5: medianΩ size(data)/2
6: tΩ kdNode(data[cd, median], cd)
7: if median > 1 then
8: t.LeftΩ BuildTree(LeftPoints(data[cd], median), ((cd+ 1)%2) + 1)
9: t.MinLeftGammaΩ Min(t.Left.Gamma, t.Left.MinChildGamma)
10: end if
11: if median < size(data) then
12: t.RightΩ BuildTree(RightPoints(data[cd], median), ((cd+ 1)%2) + 1)
13: t.MinRightGammaΩ Min(t.Right.Gamma, t.Right.MinChildGamma)
14: end if
15: end if
16: return t
17: end function
6.3.2 Find the top-k POIs
Algorithm 6.3 shows how to calculate the top-K POIs for a given query cell cref . Two
lists are maintained – (i) a list T representing the top-K nodes (POIs), ordered according
to the rank of the nodes with respect to cref , and (ii) a list L of nodes to be explored,
sorted by a lower bound value. The lower bound value for a node represents the minimum
possible rank achievable for the subtree rooted at that node.
To compute the lower bound value for a node we associate two distance estimates to
every node c, dx(c) and dy(c), representing the minimum possible distance we expect to
find in the subtree rooted at node c, along x- and y- dimensions, respectively. Equation 6.2
gives the lower bound of the rank values in the subtree at node c.
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Algorithm 6.3 Compute the top-K set for reference cell.
Input: Root node root of kd-tree; Reference cell cref ; Parameter K
Output: Ordered list of top-K POIs with respect to the cell cref
1: function CellTopPOIs(root, cref , K)
2: T Ω empty list
3: LΩ empty list
4: L.Append(root)
5: while L is not empty do
6: ntest Ω L.Remove-And-Return-Head()
7: iΩ 1
8: if T.size = K and @isuch thatntest.lbound Æ T [i].rank then exit while
9: ntest.CalcRank(Cref )
10: T.PriorityInsert(ntest) Û rank based.
11: if T.size > K then T .RemoveLast()
12: If there exists ntest.left node then
13: L.PriorityInsert(ntest.left) Û lbound based.
14: If there exists ntest.rigth node then
15: L.PriorityInsert(ntest.rigth) Û lbound based.
16: end while
17: return T
18: end function
LB(c) =
Ò
dx(c)2 + dy(c)2
N
+ “min(c), (6.2)
where N is normalization factor for distance (see Section 4.6). Both distance estimates
are initialized to zero for the root of the tree and then updated as we explore the tree. Let
cref be (xref , yref ) and we want to calculate the lower bound for the left and right child
nodes of the node ci = (xi, yi). Further, assume that x-axis is the cutting dimension at the
node ci.
• If xref < xi, then the minimum possible x-distance for the nodes in the “right”
subtree of ci with respect to cref is dx(right) = |xref ≠ xi|, because all nodes in the
right subtree of ci have x-coordinate values greater than xi. We cannot estimate the
minimum y-distance for the right subtree here because we split on x-dimension at
this node. However, we can still retain the estimate from the node ci itself, e ectively
giving us dy(right) = dy(ci). For the left subtree we will retain the estimate for both
x and y distances from the node ci, i.e., dx(left) = dx(ci) and dy(left) = dy(ci).
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• If xref Ø xi, then the minimum possible x-distance for the nodes in the “left” subtree
of ci with respect to cref is dx(left) = |xref ≠xi|, because all nodes in the left subtree
of ci have x-coordinate values less than xi. As in the previous case, dy(left) = dy(ci),
dx(right) = dx(ci) and dy(right) = dy(ci).
The same line of reasoning can can be applied if the splitting dimension on node ci was
y-axis instead of x-axis.
During the search, we explore the nodes in L in their order of appearance, and terminate
when L becomes empty (line 5 in Algorithm 6.3), or it is determined that no node in the
subtree can potentially change the existing T list (line 8 in Algorithm 6.3). The latter case
can happen when the lower bound value of the first node in L is greater than the rank
value of the last node in T . Exploring a node involves the steps of checking if the node can
be inserted in the T list based on its rank (lines [9≠ 11] in Algorithm 6.3), computing the
lower bounds for the left and right children, and then inserting them in L (lines [12≠ 15]
in Algorithm 6.3).
Example. We present this example for further illustration of the process. In this example,
a grid size is assumed to be 320 ◊ 320 cells, giving us a normalization factor N = 1320Ô2 .
We consider a top-3 search query for the cell cref . In state–1, the first node c1 in L is the
root of the subtree shown in Figure 6.2. The minimum distance estimates for the root node
c1 are assumed as dx(c1) = 15 and dy(c1) = 5. The location and the “ values for cref and
for each node in our example subtree are listed below.
Location (x, y) “ “min
cref (204, 115)
c1 (190, 72) 0.26
c2 (180, 125) 0.25
c3 0.47
c4 0.38
c5 0.35
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bc : 0.294 1c : 0.360 cc : 0.4012 07 1 360T
state-3
Split on x-dimension
Split on x-dimension
Figure 6.2: Example of kd-tree search
Following Algorithm 6.3, if L is not empty we remove the first node, c1, and check
whether is it possible to add this node to T . Since the rank of c1 is
Ô
(204≠190)2+(115≠72)2
320
Ô
2 +
0.26 = 0.360 it will be inserted into T , after the node cb, as shown in state–2. Then we
look for the left and right children of c1. Since on c1 we split on x-dimension, all nodes
on the left subtree of c1 have x-coordinate values < 190. Since the x-coordinate of cref is
greater than the x-coordinate of c1, the minimum x-distance for the left subtree of c1 is
dx(c2) = |204≠ 190| = 14. The same argument is not possible for the minimum y-distance
of c2, so we retain this value from the parent node, dy(c2) = dy(c1) = 5. Thus, the lower
bound for c2 is LB(c2) =
Ô
142+52
320
Ô
2 + 0.25 = 0.283. For the right child, c3, we can only
retain the values from the parent, i.e., dx(c3) = dx(c1) = 15, dy(c3) = dy(c1) = 5. Thus,
the lower bound for c3 is 0.508. Now, nodes c2 and c3 are inserted into L based on their
lower bound as shown in state–2. In the next iteration, we remove the node c2 from L,
so the cutting dimension this time is the y-axis. Since y-coordinate of cref is less than
the y-coordinate of c2, all nodes on the right subtree of c2 will have y-coordinate > 125,
giving dy(c5) = |115 ≠ 125| = 10. With dx(c5) = dx(c2) = 14, the lower bound for c5 is
Ô
142+102
320
Ô
2 + 0.38 = 0.418. For the left child, c4, dx(c4) = dx(c2) = 14, dy(c4) = dy(c2) = 5
and the lower bound is 0.383. The rank of c2 is 0.307. The node c2 is inserted into T based
on its rank, and the nodes c4 and c5 are inserted into L based on their lower bound. The
status of both L and T at the end of this iteration is shown in state–3 in Figure 6.2. Once
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we observe that the lower bound value for c4 (the first node in L) is greater then the rank
of the last node in T , we can terminate the search and return the list T .
6.4 Improving the Grid Search Time
Even though optimized using a kd-tree, any reduction we can do on the number of the
top-K POI calculations could further improve the performance of our algorithm.
6.4.1 Skip top-k search for equivalent cells
We observe that when top-K POIs are being determined for consecutive cells (e.g. a
row or column of cells), it may be possible to skip the top-K search for certain cells. So
whenever Algorithm 6.1 iterates through a set of cells, it will take them either by rows
or by columns and invokes the actual determination of top-K POIs for that cell (function
CellTopPOIs) only when it is necessary.
Assume that T is the vector of top-(K + 1) POIs obtained for a cell cs using the kd-
tree search. Let ct be a subsequent cell in the same row or column. Given the structure
of the ranking function, the rank of any POI with respect to cs can at best reduce by
distnorm(cs, ct) (the “ values are constant) when computed with respect to ct . Consider
the (K + 1)th top POI for cs , i.e. T [K + 1]. The rank of this POI, and any other POI
not in T , can at best be Â = rank(T [K + 1], cs) ≠ distnorm(cs, ct) when computed with
respect to ct . Therefore, if we reorder T based on the ranks of the POIs with respect to
ct , and observe that the Kth POI rank is less than or equal to Â, then no other POI can
replace the first K POIs in the reordered T . In that case, the kd-tree search for ct can be
skipped, and the first K POIs in the reordered T are the top-K POIs for ct . Note that the
(K + 1)th POI is only known for cell cs, the last cell where a full search was performed.
Hence, Â should always be calculated using the last fully searched cell.
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6.4.2 Reducing the search space for non-border cells
An improvement can also be achieved if the number of nodes in the kd-tree itself can be
reduced. A smaller set of POIs (Preduced) is used in Stage-II of Algorithm 6.1 to construct
a new kd-tree for this purpose. One can easily verify that in the plane R2, the top-K POIs
of a point inside any given box is either inside the box, or is the same as the top-K POIs of
some point on the boundary of the box. The same argument also applies to our discretized
grid, provided the discretization is fine enough that, for any real-valued query point between
two cells on a border of the region, the top-K set matches the top-K set of either one of the
neighboring cells. For example, if set T1 is the top-K set of cell (1, 1) and T2 is the top-K
set of cell (1, 2), then the top-K set of any point (1, y); 1 < y < 2 is either of T1 or T2.
The physical distance between two cells in our empirical evaluation is 100 meters, which is
reasonably small to maintain the accuracy of this heuristic.
6.5 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss a set of experiments aimed to estimate the runtime perfor-
mance and the expected privacy overhead of the proposed architecture.
6.5.1 Experimental setup
We consider a 320 ◊ 320 grid over a 32 ◊ 32 km2 broad area (AR) centered at Los
Angeles, CA downtown (34.0522oN, 118.2428oW). This area is divided into a grid of cells
measuring 100m◊ 100m. Default values of – = 0.8 and K = 10 are used, and all distance
computations are Euclidean. We use multiple search keywords to obtain di erent POI
distributions, in terms of size and density. The business listings are obtained from the Sim-
pleGeo Places database. The SimpleGeo database does not include prominence values for
POIs; we assigned values to the POIs from {0.95, 0.90, ...,0.2, 0.25} using a Zipf distribution
with exponent 0.8. Lower prominence scores are more frequent under this distribution.
Experiments are performed on a 2.8 GHz quad-core Intel XeonTMsystem running Mac
OS XTM10.8.2 with 8GB memory. Run times of the algorithms to be executed on mobile
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devices are obtained on an AndroidTMemulator running a virtual device with an ARM
Cortex-A8 processor (≥ 800 MHz) and 512MB memory. We also run the algorithms on a
virtual device using the Intel Atom system image (with 1GB memory). All implementations
are single-threaded.
6.5.2 Runtime performance
Table 6.1 lists the average time to compute the interest set across the di erent regions
for a given coarse grid Gˆ consisting of Zˆ ◊ Zˆ regions. The number of cells in each region is
b◊b = Z
Zˆ
◊ Z
Zˆ
. For example, a 10◊10 coarse grid results in 100 regions (sub-grids) of 32◊32
cells. The execution time for each region is taken as the average of 10 identical runs. Each
cell in the table shows the time for the two di erent devices (ARM and Atom). Except for
when large regions (a 5◊5 coarse grid) are created for some high density POIs, the execution
time using the ARM processor is within one second; in fact, it is less than 500 milliseconds
for a majority of the cases. We get almost a five fold improvement in the computation
time by using the Atom processor, with most computations in the 20 to 100 ms range.
Although the Atom processors are currently more suitable for tablet computers, e orts
have already been successful in porting them to smartphones. We also tested our algorithm
on a physical Samsung Galaxy Note smartphone with a dual-core 1.5GHz Snapdragon S3
processor. The observed run times for the 10◊ 10 coarse grid are a three fold improvement
over the emulated values on the ARM device. In addition to the overhead associated with
the interest set computation, our architecture also incurs a communication overhead. This
overhead appears in the first round-trip of the architecture (Figure 4.3), where the client
has to obtain the locations and “ values of the matching POIs inside the AR. However, the
overhead is negligible if—the latitude, longitude and “ values of a POI are encoded as 32-bit
numbers, and 1000 matching POIs exist inside the AR, then a total of 12KB of data needs
to be downloaded before computing the interest set. Assuming a 3G connection with 320
KB/s speed [148] , this download will incur an additional 37.5 ms to the process. Observe
the average times the algorithm took to run on a real android device in Figure 6.3 on a
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Table 6.1: Average time (milliseconds) to compute interest set for di erent sizes of the
coarse grid (Zˆ ◊ Zˆ). Top and bottom values correspond to the ARM processor and the
Atom processor virtual devices respectively.
computation time (ms) given a coarse grid
search query no. of POIs 80◊ 80 40◊ 40 20◊ 20 10◊ 10 8◊ 8 5◊ 5
bus station 32
10.83 15.32 24.41 43.47 49.65 76.96
2.0 2.9 4.71 8.62 9.84 15.18
farmers market 50
24.99 31.93 45.69 74.04 92.25 140.88
4.03 5.4 8.12 13.62 17.32 26.78
police 84
35.12 46.72 71.25 128.58 179.54 396.82
5.82 7.93 12.41 22.93 31.9 70.38
starbucks co ee 92
33.73 43.51 63.26 117.24 156.18 478.98
5.5 7.21 10.79 20.57 27.49 84.84
grocery 95
34.49 44.11 64.43 119.55 178.24 386.67
5.89 7.84 12.02 23.03 34.48 75.34
restaurant italian 124
46.1 57.39 81.74 155.23 206.6 539.14
7.29 9.3 13.77 27.02 36.2 94.71
liquor store 125
50.29 64.12 92.82 180.66 277.67 831.41
7.54 9.88 14.8 29.42 45.38 135.69
bookstore 126
46.29 57.12 80.66 152.26 221.03 650.29
7.63 9.92 14.83 29.55 43.41 128.76
library 141
58.54 72.38 102.61 194.44 275.47 783.86
8.67 11.02 16.19 31.38 44.88 128.72
night club 149
61.27 72.56 96.27 172 266.14 644.26
8.84 10.9 15.35 29.59 46.25 115.82
clothing store 169
72.09 86.95 120.06 235.17 320.04 920.34
11.14 13.99 20.53 42.34 58.63 171.79
car rental 196
91.37 107.25 142.95 252.14 352.26 889.84
13.67 16.89 23.97 44.91 63.83 165.54
parking 281
136.63 160.78 202.45 363.43 504.01 1248.92
19.55 23.91 33.26 62.34 87.48 220.6
atm 297
131.66 148.88 190.53 339.13 491.26 1382.03
18.62 21.75 29.72 57.46 85.47 250.42
gas station 347
153.38 169.56 210.34 383.49 565.08 1580.96
23.12 26.32 34.82 69.25 105.49 308.41
pharmacy 369
173.49 195.14 247.32 446.25 649.94 1846.01
24.45 28.08 36.97 70.33 104.13 303.26
cafe 608
305.48 328.5 385.3 613.32 805.09 2097.42
44.18 49.64 61.73 107.47 146.33 407.17
bakery 834
444.79 457.99 525.32 803.75 1078.03 2776.04
61.7 66.73 80.89 137.3 193.21 539.39
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40 ◊ 40 coarse grid. The average across all POIs we experimented with is around 100ms.
Figure 6.3: Average run times (milliseconds) on actual device (for 40x40)
So, even combined with communication overhead, most mobile users should see sub-second
response times.
6.5.3 Expected privacy and overhead
We consider three di erent forms for the adversary’s prior probability distribution – (i)
no knowledge–uniform-global: equal probability throughout the 320◊ 320 cells, (ii) locality
knowledge–uniform-local: equal probability in a circle of 25 cells radius, zero everywhere
else, and (iii) precise knowledge–gaussian: normally distributed probabilities; mean cell at
the center and variance of 50 cells. Figure 6.4 depicts the uniform-local and the gaussian
knowledge distributions. We assume that the attacker’s background knowledge is always
correct, i.e. the user can never be at a cell where the attacker’s prior probability is zero.
Figure 6.5 shows the expected privacy achieved for di erent coarse grid sizes. The data
points in each line correspond to Zˆ = 80, 40, 20, 10, 8 and 5, from left to right. We choose
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 34.0522o N
118.2428o W
5000 meters
Figure 6.4: Uniform-local (right) and gaussian (left) background knowledge. Darker cells
imply higher probability.
three di erent keywords—starbucks co ee (92 POIs), gas station (347 POIs) and bakery
(834 POIs)—to evaluate the quantities in the case of low, medium and high density POIs.
Based on empirical data, it is reasonable to say that the expected exact privacy for all
three POI densities is much above levels of concern, greater than 90% in this case. This
implies that it will be di cult for the adversary to accurately make a random “guess” about
the user’s location using the posterior distribution, even if precise information (Gaussian
knowledge adversary) on the whereabouts of the user is available to the adversary.
The expected privacy under inexact localization depends primarily on the extent of
background knowledge. As expected, the uncertainty about the user’s location is signifi-
cantly less when the adversary has more precise knowledge. Larger values of Zˆ help improve
the expected privacy to some extent. Note that, for lower values of Zˆ (larger sub-grids),
the privacy level we observe (high or low) is primarily due to the prior knowledge of the
adversary. Larger sub-grids will encompass most of the locality where the adversary’s prior
knowledge is concentrated. Since the convergence requirement is enforced, the expected
privacy value from the posterior distribution will be the same as that from the prior distri-
bution.
The expected interest set size shows some variations across di erent knowledge forms
and POI densities. In general, smaller values of Zˆ results in more cells in a region; therefore,
more number of top-K sets are merged to create the interest set. The denser the POI, the
higher is the number of unique top-K sets. The set sizes are larger for the uniform-local
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Figure 6.5: Expected privacy and expected interest set size trade-o . Data points in each
line correspond to Zˆ = 80, 40, 20, 10, 8 and 5, from left to right.
and gaussian knowledge adversaries; since the user is highly likely to be located in central
downtown, the variations in the top-K POIs are also expected to be the most (due to the
higher concentration of POIs).
The solid data points in the first three plots signify the case of Zˆ = 10 (output regions
of the R function are 32 ◊ 32 cells). Irrespective of the general trends, use of this value
results in expected privacy levels of at least 2 km2 (200 cells) and interest sets of around
30. An area of 2 km2 is equivalent to around 1000 homes with 22, 000 ft2 lots, which we
consider to be a significantly large area for a privacy conscious user. The expected interest
set size is larger than what is necessary, but may prove to be useful if the user does not find
an acceptable choice in the top-10 results. Retrieval of detailed feature data for 30 POIs
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is also not expensive considering that most current applications already retrieve more than
that (Google Places allows retrieval of data on up to 60 POIs in a query).
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed our first algorithm that fits into the two-roundtrip archi-
tecture. We used the realistic ranking method that considers the prominence of the POIs in
addition to the distance from the query point. We brought together several techniques to
ensure that the LPPM is e cient enough for a client side implementation. We implement
these algorithms on realistic simulators and actual mobile devices to ensure that the cost
of quality of service drop is minor.
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Chapter 7
Multiple Query Scenario
Pursuing our model from the previous chapter, the user is located in box Bu which
consists of b ◊ b cells and the interest set Iu is the union of the top-K POIs of each cell
in Bu. As long as multiple queries by the user happen when the user is in the same box,
the attacker’s knowledge of the user’s location will not be enhanced. The coarseness of
the attacker’s estimation of user’s location remains b◊ b cells. Consider the case where the
user moves form one box to another between two consecutive queries and the time interval
between these two queries is larger than the time needed by the user to reach the farthest
cell in AR from the current cell. In this case, the attacker is still not able to enhance his
knowledge about the user’s location. This is because, there is enough time for the user to
move to any cell in the grid G. The work in this chapter is based on our outcome in [58,60].
Now we consider the converse scenario, where the time interval between the two queries
is less than the time needed by the user to go from the current cell to the farthest possible
cell in grid G. In this case, the attacker may be able to narrow down the user’s location
to an area less than b◊ b cells. This is illustrated in Figure 7.1. Let T be the time period
needed by the user to move by one cell, assumed to be constant. It shows two adjacent
boxes A and B, where b = 4. Assume that the time interval between two queries, t, is less
than or equal to the time required to move by one cell (0 < t Æ T ). Let us further assume
that the user was in one of the cells in box A that borders with box B. The user moves by
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one cell into box B and then issues her second query. This clearly allows the attacker to
narrow down the user’s location to the boundary cells (shaded) of the box B because he sees
the first query’s interest set matches with box A and the second query’s interest set matches
with box B, and the user had only enough time to move by one cell. The attacker is able to
narrow down the user’s location to an area much smaller than b◊ b, thus clearly breaching
the user’s privacy requirement. This shows that obfuscation is not guaranteed in the case of
multiple queries happening across boxes: this is the main problem this chapter addresses.
The techniques proposed for single query scenario need to be enhanced to preserve the
privacy of the user to the expected b◊ b level in the case of multiple queries.
Figure 7.1: Location inference during multiple queries.
7.1 Extended Attacker Model
For the multiple query scenario, in addition to the capabilities mentioned in Section 4.7,
we assume that the attacker knows the unit time period, T , needed by the user to move by
one cell. If the attacker observes two consecutive queries, based on the time elapsed between
the two queries, the attacker can estimate the maximum number of cells, n, the user can
move between the two queries. For the multiple query scenario, we continue utilizing the
notations introduced so far, but we modify it by using a subscript to indicate the query
number, e.g. Bk represents the box selected for interest set generation during the kthquery
qk. By definition, Bk contains the user’s location at that time instance and Ck is the set
of cells in Bk. Correspondingly, Ik is the generated interest set, and  k represents the
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attackers estimated probability distribution at the end of the kth query. The distribution
 1 is the attacker’s estimation after the first query is made, as given by Equation 4.3.
The attacker’s goal is to narrow down the user’s location to a specific cell. Short of
that, the attacker tries to determine the likelihood of existence of the user in a particular
cell, by calculating a probability distribution of the user’s existence in each cell. Within the
selected area, the attacker can pre-determine the possible b ◊ b sized boxes that could be
selected by the algorithm. He computes the interest set for each of these boxes. Once he
observes the interest set Ik, for any query, he looks up the boxes whose interest set match
Ik and determines the possible set of b◊ b boxes the user could be in.
7.2 Algorithm for Multiple Query Scenario
The reason for privacy loss during multiple queries with time interval constraints is due
to the fixed pre-partitioning. Fixed pre-partitioning is suitable for the single query scenario
or the first query, but not for the subsequent queries in the multiple query scenario. In the
case of multiple queries, to prevent this privacy loss during a subsequent query, instead of
keeping the initial fixed partitioning, we first create a new area, hereafter called the selection
area, by expanding the box generated at the previous query to its neighboring cells. If n is
the number of T time periods elapsed between two subsequent queries, then a neighboring
cell is any cell that is no more than n rows or columns away from the current box. Formally,
n =
Ï
tk≠tk≠1
T
Ì
, where tk≠1 and tk are the time of issuing queries k ≠ 1 and k, respectively.
Next, the box for the new query is determined by selecting a random box of size b◊ b from
within the selection area that also includes the user’s cell.
7.2.1 Selection area
The selection area, Sk, represents all possible boxes the user could be in for query, qk,
given as
Sk =
Ó
b◊ b boxes in ficœBk≠1 nbr(c, n)
Ô
nbr(c, n) = {cÕ|cÕ can be reached from c inn steps} .
(7.1)
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If the user does not hit the border of the grid G while moving n steps from any cell in
box Bk≠1, then the selection area Sk for the query qk forms a square of size (b+2n)◊(b+2n).
If the border of G is reached before the n steps, Sk can be a rectangle. However, if Z is
large enough, the chance of having a rectangular Sk is slim. Figures 7.2a and 7.2b show Sk
where n = 1 and n = 2, respectively. The numbers inside each cell ci signify the number of
b◊ b boxes inside the selection area that contain the cell, i.e., the number of possible b◊ b
boxes from which the algorithm could choose for the next query if the user is located in ci.
We call this number the weight wi of a cell. For instance, in Figure 7.2b the algorithm can
(a) n = 1.
4 6 8 8 6 4
6 9 12 12 69
8 12 16 16 12 8
4 6 8 8 6 4
6 9 12 12 69
8 12 16 12 8
(b) n = 2.
Figure 7.2: Selection area for a (4◊ 4 size) box.
choose one out of sixteen possible boxes.
Let the cells of Sk be numbered c1, c2, c3...c(b+2n)2 starting at the top left corner, con-
tinuing row by row. As we advance by one cell to the right along the horizontal direction,
the number of possible boxes that could be created from the cell c2 increase by one as well.
If 2n Ø b, this increment continues until the cell cb is reached. This is illustrated in Figure
7.2b, where b = 4 and n = 2 . When 2n < b, the increment of the number of possible boxes
stops at the cell c2n+1 as shown in Figure 7.2a, where b = 4 and n = 1. The number of
possible boxes for the rest of the cells in the first row continue to be b until we reach the
cell occurring b cells before the top right corner if 2n Ø b. If 2n < b, then it will continue
to be 2n + 1 until we reach the cell that occurs 2n + 1 cells before the top right corner.
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Thereafter, the number of possible boxes decrease till it becomes one again at the cell on
the top right corner. Coming to the second row, one can easily deduce that the first cell
on the second row has two possible boxes, one from the cell above and one at the current
cell. Similarly, the next cell can generate four possible boxes, two boxes created at the cell
above and two created at the current cell, and so on. The number of possible boxes for
rest of the cells can be determined following the same process. One has to note that the
same logic applies for a traversal along the vertical direction. A weights matrix with the
number of possible boxes for each cell can be formulated as follows. Create a row vector
x¯ of the weights of the first row and a column vector y¯ of the weights of the first column.
The multiplication y¯ ◊ x¯ gives the weights matrix for the entire Sk.
7.2.2 Choosing a box
Our algorithm makes the selection of the b ◊ b box (for interest set generation) based
on whether the issued query is the first one, or one of the subsequent ones. Algorithm 7.1
uses pseudo functions whose objectives are discussed next. For the first query, as described
Algorithm 7.1 Box selection for interest set generation.
Global Initialization: Time of previous query tp = 0; Previous box Bp = null
Input: Current time t; Box size b; User cell cu
Output: Box B
1: function BoxForCurrentQuery(t, b, cu)
2: G Ω Z ◊ Z grid Û Initial grid.
3: if first query then
4: B Ω G.FixedBox(b, cu) Û (b◊ b) box from pre-partitoned grid.
5: else
6: nΩ
Ï
t≠tp
T
Ì
7: S Ω G.GetSelectionAreaBoxes(Bp, n) Û (b◊ b) boxes in selection area.
8: B Ω RandomSampling(S, cu) Û Random box from S includes cu.
9: end if
10: tp Ω t
11: Bp Ω B
12: return B
13: end function
in Section 6.1, the grid G is pre-partitioned into fixed non-overlapping boxes of size b ◊ b.
The algorithm simply chooses the box that contains the user’s cell.
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Let us assume that the algorithm is trying to generate the interest set for query qk and
n be the maximum number of cells the user could have moved after the previous query.
For the second query, and subsequent ones, the algorithm first calculates n based on query
timestamps and determines the selection area Sk. The box for the current query Bk is
selected by picking a b◊ b box uniformly at random from Sk such that it contains the user.
The algorithm uses the same techniques presented in the previous chapter for the single
query scenario to e ciently generate the interest set Ik.
Since the client can cache earlier results, it only requests details for POIs that are new
to this box, i.e. Iretrieve = Ik≠ I, where I is the cache (set) of all POIs retrieved earlier and
Iretrieve is the set of POIs to be retrieved by the current query. This will continue till the
current user session ends. When the time interval is large enough for the user to reach the
farthest cell in G, the algorithm starts a new session with the fixed pre-partitioning step.
7.2.3 Obfuscation
Since the user cannot move any farther in the given number of time units (n), the
chance for the user being in a cell outside the selection area is zero. Refer to Figure 7.2 for
the cases where n = 1 and n = 2. Further, each cell in the selection area (any numbered
cell in the figure) has a chance (probability > 0) that the user could exist in that cell after
n time units. Algorithm 7.1 randomly selects a box from this selection area when issuing
query qk, and because there is non-zero probability of user being in any cell of the box
selected for the new query, obfuscation is preserved.
7.3 Specific Scenario
In this scenario, we assume that the selection area Sk is a square and the attacker can
infer the exact interest set Ik. Given Ik, the attacker is able to find all boxes of size b ◊ b
corresponding to the set Ik. But we assume here that, there is exactly one b ◊ b box (the
one that was actually used by the algorithm Bk) corresponding to Ik. Further, the user’s
movement model is assumed to be a simple random walk. So, the user located in any cell
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ci œ Ck≠1, can move n cells in any direction or she could stay in the same cell with equal
probabilities before issuing query qk. This gives us a square of side length n+b+n = 2n+b,
which represents the set of all possible cells, Ck, the user could move to in n time units
from current cell ci. In this case, for any cell cj œ Ck the transition probability Pr(ci æ cj)
is a constant value fl = 1(b+2n)2 ; for all other cells, it is zero.
Refer to Figure 7.2. It shows the selection area Sk that is created based on the box
Bk≠1. By following the same logic used for counting the number of possible boxes from a
cell ci in Section 7.2.1, if the user moves n steps or less from the top left corner cell of the
selection area, we can reach only the top left corner cell of the box Bk≠1. Considering the
next cell in the first row of Sk , we can reach the first two cells in the box Bk≠1. This will
continue until the cell cb, if 2n Ø b, or the cell c2n+1, if 2n < b. The process is symmetric if
started from the right side, vertically down from the top corner, or vertically up from the
bottom corner. Thus, the weight wi also represents the number of cells in Bk≠1 that the
user could be in and reach ci in at most n steps. Note that for cells within Bk, the weight
wi includes the possibility that the user decides to stay in the same cell, ci. By the time the
user performs query qk, the attacker combines his knowledge of the user’s movement model
and Bk to compute a new distribution for the user’s location as follows.
⁄k(ci) =
ÿ
cjœC
(Pr(cj |Bk≠1)◊ Pr(ci æ cj)) , (7.2)
where ⁄k represents the probability distribution of the user’s location based on the move-
ment model. After observing the new interest set, and a subsequent determination of the
box Bk of the current query, the attacker can enhance his knowledge using Bayesian infer-
ence
 k(ci) = Pr(ci|Bk) = Pr(Bk|ci)◊ ⁄k(ci)q
cjœBk
(Pr(Bk|cj)◊ ⁄k(cj)) . (7.3)
Let the previous probability distribution for the attacker  k≠1 be uniform, i.e.,  k≠1(ci) =
1
b2 ’ci œ Bk≠1. We have – (i) the number of non zero terms (or 1b2 terms) in ⁄k(ci), given by
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Equation 7.2, is wi and Pr(ci æ cj) = fl, ’cj œ Bk. Hence, ⁄k(ci) = fl.wib2 , (ii) the weight wi
of any cell ci in the selection area also represents the number of boxes that includes ci, and
selection is done uniformly at random, hence Pr(Bk|ci) = 1wi . By substituting these values
of ⁄k(ci) and Pr(Bk|ci) into Equation 7.3, the probability distribution in the new box Bk is
 k(ci) =
1
wi
◊ fl.wib2q
cjœBk
1
1
wj
◊ flwjb2
2 = 1
b2
. (7.4)
So we conclude that, the probability distribution for the current query  k is uniform if the
probability distribution for the previous query was uniform.
7.3.1 Uncertainty of the attacker
To measure the attacker’s uncertainty, we use entropy (Equation 7.5). Intuitively, a
higher entropy value reflects higher uncertainty for the attacker about the user’s exact
cell [141]. If the attacker’s expectation of the user’s existence in all cells, c œ Ck, is equal,
then the entropy is maximum and it is equal to 2 log b, where b is the side length of the box.
Throughout the following discussion, we will refer to a box that maintains this property as
a balanced box. A balanced box is a square area of size b◊ b where the probabilities of the
user’s existence in any cell is the same
H ( k) = ≠
ÿ
cœCk
 k(c) log k(c). (7.5)
Without any other background knowledge, if the attacker narrows down the user to a
b◊ b box, he assigns equal probability of 1b2 to each cell in this box, which indicates highest
uncertainty for the attacker.
We have just shown that if the box used in the previous query is balanced, then the box
used for the current query will also be balanced. Even for the case where the previous query
uses a unbalanced box, in most cases, the entropy measure for the next query increases.
It eventually converges (not in an ever increasing sequence) to the maximum value (the
entropy of a balanced box). We show this phenomenon in action by using four movement
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simulations: two along pre-defined paths (denoted by P1 and P2) for 1000 queries, one along
a random path (denoted by P3) for 5000 queries and a spiral path (denoted by P4) originating
at the top-left corner of a 320 ◊ 320 cells map, and moving towards the center. The pre-
defined paths are generated such that the user is exposed to varying local distributions of
the POIs. The privacy parameter b is set to 32, which implies an obfuscation expectation
of roughly 10km2. We simulate two di erent scenarios for the attacker’s initial knowledge
 0.
Gaussian a two-dimensional Gaussian distribution centered at the user’s actual location.
Precise probabilities distributed between the user’s actual location and a few neighbor-
ing cells.
Figure 7.3 summarize the entropy values for the four movement simulations in the context
of the Gaussian initial knowledge. The quick convergence1 to a uniform posterior distribu-
tion (entropy saturation) is evident in all three simulations under our assumptions for this
scenario. It is also evident that once the entropy attains its highest value, changes do not
occur. Figure 7.4 depict similar observations for the case of a precise knowledge attacker.
7.4 General Scenario
In the above section, we assume an attacker having high inference capabilities that can
infer the exact interest set and relate that to a single box. But we model that attacker with
an assumption of a random walk in terms of user’s movement behavior. This is done to
introduce the concepts that we will discuss with a more realistic attacker in this section.
7.4.1 Movement model
After the first query, the user starts moving along a path and uses the LPPM to retrieve
POIs at time t > 1. We assume now that a summary of the user’s movement patterns is
1Entropy in Figure 7.3 looks like a flat line because only for the few first queries the attacker will get
values less than the saturation value.
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(a) Path P1. (b) Path P2.
(c) Path P3. (d) Path P4.
Figure 7.3: Entropy of the obfuscated area with Gaussian background knowledge for the
attacker.
available to the adversary in the form of a transition matrix. A transition matrix T (Ai, Aj)
provides the probability of the user moving from one area Ai in G to another area Aj .
For example, the set of cells can be divided into non-overlapping areas of b ◊ b cells, and
the adversary’s knowledge of the user transitioning between these areas is encoded in the
transition matrix. A transition matrix can be extracted from available traces of a user’s
movement [141]. We consider the transition probability between individual cells to be
directly proportional to the transition probability between the areas to which they belong.
If ci and cj are two cells in areas Ai and Aj respectively, we compute the cell-wise transition
probability matrix as
Pr(ci æ cj) = Pr(Ai æ Aj)
b2 ◊ b2 =
T (Ai, Aj)
b4
. (7.6)
This computation does assume that all cells in an area are habitable; it is easy to accom-
modate the case of some cells being inhabitable by modifying the proportionality constant
b4.
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(a) path 1. (b) path 2.
(c) path 3. (d) path 4.
Figure 7.4: Entropy of the obfuscated area with precise background knowledge for the
attacker.
Let tk≠1 denote the time step when the user last used the LPPM, and the current
time be tk = tk≠1 + Tn. The LPPM outputs Ik at this time step. Before using this
new observation, the adversary refines his location distribution using the known movement
model of the user. Starting with the notation ⁄0 =  k≠1, the adversary first obtains ⁄k by
iteratively applying the following expression
⁄k(c) =
ÿ
cÕœC
!
⁄k≠1(cÕ)◊ Pr(cÕ æ c)
"
. (7.7)
This computation updates the adversary’s last known distribution with information based
only on the movement patterns of the user. This is same as the forward variable in a typical
forward-backward algorithm. In the absence of any output from the LPPM,  k = ⁄k. A
final update can be performed using the output Ik, similar to as in the first query
 k(c) = Pr(c|Ik) = Pr(Ik|c)⁄k(c)q
cÕœC
Pr(Ik|cÕ)⁄k(cÕ) . (7.8)
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Figure 7.5: Prior and posterior distribution after queries along a path. Darker (red) regions
signify higher probability mass.
Figure 7.5 shows snapshots of the inference process of the adversary at di erent points
in time. The user in this case uses an LPPM to generate a perturbed location by adding
planar Laplace distributed noise, and makes queries using this location. The figure depicts
how the location of the perturbed query point (in addition to knowledge of the perturbation
mechanism and the user’s transition matrix) helps the adversary refine the prior distribution.
As seen in the beginning of the path, the refinement resulted in good approximation of the
user’s actual location. As the user moves, the distribution becomes more concentrated, and
refinements depend on where the perturbed point is generated.
Given all outputs generated by an LPPM along an entire path, the posterior distribution
at a time step can be better refined by using knowledge of what output was produced after
that point in time (by using a backward variable). We do not perform this refinement in
the computation of  k. As such, the accuracy of the adversary’s method in estimating
intermediate locations of the user (the path) is assumed to be not critical; it is the final
destination that we seek to keep private. The presented method aligns with the forward-
125
backward algorithm when executed at the last query point; no observations exist after the
last query to compute a backward variable.
7.4.2 Computing Pr(I|c)
Let Iretrieve denote the interest set observed by the adversary in the query qk. Recall
that the POIs of interest Ik may only partially be in this set, since some of them may be
available in the cache I of earlier queries. Consider the following two sets.
‹k(c) = {B|B œ Sk and c œ B}
÷k(c) = {B|B œ ‹k(c) and Iretrieve ™ BS(B) ™ I fi Iretrieve} (7.9)
‹k(c) denotes the set of b ◊ b boxes in the selection area Sk that contain cell c; ÷k(c)
are boxes in ‹k(c) such that all newly requested POIs (Iretrieve) are part of the POIs box
set BS for all boxes B œ ‹k, which itself is fully contained in the union of the cache and
the newly requested set. Pr(Iretrieve|c) is then equal to |÷k(c)||‹k(c)| .
Computation of ÷k(c) is straightforward for the adversary once ‹k(c) is known. However,
the adversary does not know Sk since it depends on the previous boxes, Bk≠n. Nonetheless,
the adversary can perform approximations, denoted by ‹ˆk(c) and ÷ˆk(c). As base cases, we
have ‹ˆ1(c) = {B|c œ B} and ÷ˆ1(c) = {B|c œ B and BS(B) = I1}. To approximate ‹ˆk(c),
the adversary can consider the union of all selection areas that can be generated from boxes
in ÷ˆk≠1(c).
‹ˆk(c) = {B|BÕ œ ÷ˆk≠1(c) and B œ SÕ and c œ B}
÷ˆk(c) = {B|B œ ‹ˆk(c) and Iretrieve ™ BS(B) ™ I fi Iretrieve}, (7.10)
where SÕ is the selection area generated from the box BÕ. We use in |÷ˆt(c)||‹ˆt(c)| as an estimate
of Pr(Ik|c) in Equation 7.8.
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7.5 Empirical Evaluation for General Scenario
In this section, we discuss the experiments performed to support the conclusions from
several aspects of the proposed algorithm. The first set of experiments compare both privacy
and performance of our LPPM against the geo-indistinguishability based LPPM introduced
by Andres et al. [6]. The second experiment is performed to show that requesting the details
of the additional POIs in incremental fashion will significantly reduce the bandwidth impact.
In the third experiment we measure the impact of the box size on the privacy of our LPPM.
Andrés et al. generate perturbed locations for location-based POI search. Geo-indistingui-
shability provides probabilistic limits on the inferential advantage that an adversary can
gain with knowledge of the perturbed location and the perturbation mechanism. Given a
user cell cu and a privacy parameter ‘, the mechanism adds random noise drawn from a
planar Laplace (extension of the Laplace distribution to two dimensions) distribution to the
user’s location and generates the perturbed location z. Doing so provides the guarantee
that
Pr(z|c1)
Pr(z|c2) Æ e
‘d(c1,c2), (7.11)
where c1 and c2 are any two cells, and d is a distance function. To retrieve POI details, the
mechanism then issues a query using z and an AR around z. All POIs inside the AR are
retrieved from the service provider. Andrés et al. provide confidence bounds on the size
of the AR that also includes a specific area around the actual location of the user called
the interest area, denoted by AI . The user can then choose a POI from the retrieved set
depending on how far it is from her location.
7.5.1 Experimental setup
The same experimental setup described in Section 6.5.1 is used here. We further process
the grid to identify cells that are not habitable (potentially because of a natural or artificial
blockage). We perform this step by collecting the latitude and longitude of the center
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of each cell, and then using the snapToRoads function in Google’s Maps Roads API2 to
determine the cells that have a road within 100 meters. This gives us a bitmap signifying
if a cell is habitable or not.
Paths and transition matrix
To generate paths along which queries will be made, we consider five regions surrounding
Los Angeles–El Segundo, Pasadena, Hollywood, Montebello and the Los Angeles downtown–
and use them as sources/destinations that the user mostly travels between. We randomly
choose a pair of cells from these five regions as source and destination locations of the user,
and then generate a path originating at the source cell and ending at the destination cell.
We generate a set of 100 paths using this method. A path is always generated such that it
contains habitable cells only.
We encode the 100 paths into multiple transition matrices for use in adversarial infer-
ence. Assuming region sizes of 16◊16 cells (2.56km2), 32◊32 cells (10.24km2), and 64◊64
cells (40.96km2), we create three transition matrices. Each transition matrix is obtained by
the dividing the 320◊320 grid into regions of the corresponding size, and then counting the
frequency of transitions happening between regions in the 100 paths. The three di erent
region sizes are used in parametric evaluation of our method. For all other experiments,
the 32 ◊ 32 size is used as the default. A transition matrix is known to the adversary,
while the exact paths are unknown. Note that a transition matrix created in this manner
implies strong background knowledge since it captures all (and only those) paths on which
we will apply an LPPM. It also implies that the adversary’s background knowledge is al-
ways considered correct, i.e. the user can never be in a region (or cell) where the transition
probability is zero.
2developers.google.com/maps/documentation/roads/snap
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POI retrieval and local cache
We consider that query results must be up-to-date at all points along a path; therefore,
the LPPM is invoked at every point along a path. However, we implement the LPPMs
with local caching functionality, i.e. results retrieved earlier will not be downloaded again.
The geo-indistinguishability approach, as described in the original work, cannot directly
make use of the local cache. We assume a modification where the server only returns
identifiers of POIs inside AR; details are then retrieved only for POIs not in the cache. The
geo-indistinguishability AR is also not guaranteed to contain the top-K POIs for the user.
For fair comparison, we always set the radius of the AR to the smallest value such that it
contains the user location, as well as all POIs in the top-K set of the user.
7.5.2 Privacy
When multiple queries are performed, the distribution of the POIs along the path has
a direct impact on the interest set requested by the user. As such, the nearness and areal
privacy metrics (Section 4.8.1) can fluctuate (both increase or decrease) over time. Figure
7.6 depicts the values of these two metrics for one of the paths, with “gas station” as the
search keyword, and box length b = 32 cells. Since our interest set retrieval mechanism (ISR)
issues requests only if the POIs are not in the cache, the number of queries are subsequently
lower than the geo-indistinguishability (GI) approach. The GI approach can also makes use
of a cache; however, it must issue a query at every time step to determine which POIs in
the cache correspond to the result set. When retrievals are made infrequently, the nearness
metric can be sustained comparatively higher. More queries enable better approximations
for the adversary. It is di cult to make a similar observation on the areal metric from the
figure.
In order to understand the overall behavior in multiple paths, we look at the quartiles
of the two metrics across all the paths and three POIs with varying density. Figure 7.7
depicts this result. Similar to the observation stated above, nearness in the ISR approach is
maintained at a higher level than that in the GI approach. The maximum value of nearness
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Figure 7.6: Nearness and areal privacy variation along a path. Search keyword = gas station
and b = 32 cells.
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Figure 7.7: Nearness and areal privacy quartiles. b = 32 cells.
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in the lower quartile (25%) of the ISR data is indeed higher than the upper quartile (75%)
of the GI data. The interquartile ranges show no overlap, demonstrating strong evidence
that the median nearness value in the two approaches are significantly di erent.
For areal privacy, we observe that ISR has a higher median value in the three POI types;
although, there is no evidence of significant di erences. We do observe that for medium and
high density POIs (“gas station” and “bakery” respectively), the ISR approach maintains
comparatively lower variance in the areal privacy than the GI approach. This is indicative
of a stable approach, irrespective of the path taken by the user during the queries. For
most parts (upper 75%), the metric is also higher (Ø 8km2) than the theoretical minimum
(5.1km2).
We can assess how much information a privacy mechanism has revealed by also focussing
strictly on the final destination of a path. Destinations of travel can be argued to be more
private than the exact path taken by the user to the destination. Therefore, it is important
to analyze what is the state of the adversary’s inference when the user has reached the end
of a path. Figure 7.8 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
distance between the last cell of a path and the cell with the highest probability in the
adversary’s final inferred distribution, i.e. the nearness value. The CDF is generated by
collating observations in all the 100 paths and the three POI keywords. Comparatively,
about 10% of the cases in the ISR approach has a final nearness value as low (¥ 1.8km) as
the GI approach; in general, the values are always better. The adversary’s inferred location
in the ISR approach is significantly distant (> 5km) in about 30% of the cases, and more
than 2km in 95% of the cases.
7.5.3 Bandwidth impact
The interest set retrieval mechanism aims to exploit the fact that top-K sets do not
frequently (and significantly) change for nearby query points. We exemplified this in Figure
7.6, which shows gaps between query points. Further, since the approach only retrieves
details on pertinent objects, i.e. objects that are part of a top-K set along the path, we
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Figure 7.8: Empirical CDF of distance between last cell in a path and the most probable
cell in the inferred distribution. b = 32 cells.
also expect that download bandwidth is preserved. Figure 7.9 shows the quartiles for the
total number of POIs for which details are retrieved by the ISR and GI approaches. The
figure also shows the maximum number of POIs inside the large geographical area for each
of the three keywords. It can be seen that the GI approach could potentially result in
the download of details for all the POIs as a result of using an AR. To contrast this, the
ISR approach downloads details on a median of 12%–30% of the POIs. Although the ISR
approach uses a union of various top-K sets to generate the box set, it does not result in
too many redundant downloads.
Figure 7.10 displays the frequency distribution of the cardinality of the interest set
across all queries (three search keywords and all paths). A total of 264,627 data points are
used to generate this distribution. Recall that the interest set is the set for which details
are retrieved from the server at a query point. It is empty if the required details are already
in the cache (retrieved earlier). We observe that in approximately 90% of the query points,
no communication was necessary with the server (empty interest set). This confirms our
statement that top-K sets seldom undergo changes between query points. Further, the
distribution is heavy tailed, with the frequency dropping significantly as size increases. In
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other words, smaller interest sets are abundant. This is evident of the fact that whenever
top-K sets change between successive query points, the changes are often very small (one
or two POIs). The top-K set landscape in local search is recurrently plateaued and is slow
rising; to the best of our knowledge, this characteristic is rarely exploited by a privacy
mechanism.
7.5.4 Impact of box size
Figure 7.11 depicts the nearness and areal privacy for three di erent choices of the
parameter b. Recall that smaller box sizes imply lower expectations of privacy. The trends
we observed in the case of 32 ◊ 32 box size is repeated for other box sizes too, albeit at
varying degrees. For example, using a smaller box size leads to lower privacy values, and
they increase as larger box sizes are used. A larger box size does imply a larger box set,
and can lead to the retrieval of more number of POI details.
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7.6 Summary
In the previous chapter and this chapter, we have presented two LPPMs that address
the single and multiple query scenarios respectively. As discussed in Chapter 4, both LPPMs
are proposed within a two round-trip communication architecture. The focus of both chap-
ters has been to propose algorithms that are TTP free, but are practical enough for a mobile
device. Much of the client-server programming interfaces necessary to implement the pro-
posed method are readily available today. The interfaces available in the Google Places API
can be adopted to implement the protocol. The Google Places API Radar Search Service3
allows an application developer to search and retrieve information for up to 200 places at
once, but with less detail than is typically returned in other forms of search. A request is
made using a HTTP URL, and can include the query keyword, a location, and a radius.
For the method proposed in this work, the location used may be a popular landmark, or
simply the center of a randomly generated large box that includes the user. The maximum
allowed radius is 50km. The result of the request is returned either as a JSON object or
an XML document, which includes the matching POIs’ geometry (latitude and longitude),
place_id (a unique identifier of the POI) and rating, among other metadata. Although the
developer can use the place rating as a prominence value, the exact value used by Google is
not yet contained in this result. Details of POIs in the interest set can be obtained using a
Place Details4 request. Such a request returns detailed information about a place identified
using a place_id. The returned JSON object or XML document includes data such as the
address of the POI, current events happening there, phone number, opening hours, photos,
price level of services o ered, user reviews, the POI’s rating, and the website of the business,
among other things. The availability of programming interfaces such as these makes the
proposed privacy preserving POI search architecture feasible in the current market.
We show how both the LPPMs perform well in di ering attacker’s background knowl-
edge situations. We have shown these LPPMs to be reasonable in terms of performance
3developers.google.com/places/web-service/search
4developers.google.com/places/web-service/details
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using simulation and proved their e cacy using empirical data. We feel the need to extend
these concepts such that the privacy o ered can be measured more using statistical tools. In
the next chapter we address this while maintaining the same communication architecture.
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Chapter 8
Di erential Privacy Based Solution
Our proposals in chapters 6 and 7 for location privacy centered around the cloaking
of the user’s location. However, this model failed to provide a formal guarantee on what
an adversary can learn by observing the communication between a location privacy pre-
serving mechanism (LPPM) and the application server. More recent proposals such as
geo-indistinguishability by Andres et al. [6] address this issue by bounding the degree to
which an adversary can distinguish between two locations. A persistent assumption in
these proposals (more than a decade worth of research) is that location-based queries (or
geo-queries) produce results that are dictated only by the distance of a result object from
the query location. However, clearly verifiable in any popular location-based application,
geo-query results are ranked based on multiple criteria, distance being just one of them
(Section 4.1).
Extending location privacy models to bridge this long present gap is therefore im-
portant, and forms the main goal for this chapter. We provide analytical results that
characterize the privacy and the quality of service assurances of our extended model. We
provide conclusive evidence to support our claims by applying the approach to a nearby POI
search in a real-world database. In addition, we develop a prototype Android application
to demonstrate how existing third party APIs can be utilized to execute the various steps
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in the approach, and assess its e ciency and accuracy on a mobile device. The work in this
chapter is based on our outcome in [59].
For most part in this chapter, the empirical evaluation is performed using the same
experimental settings described in Section 6.5.1. Parametric evaluation is shown on three
POI keywords, namely bookstore, gas station, and cafe. There are 155 bookstores, 347
gas stations and 608 cafes inside the evaluation area, thereby giving us three scenarios
corresponding to low, medium, and high occupancy POIs. As before (Section 6.5.1), we
assigned values to the POIs from {0.95, 0.90, ...,0.2, 0.25} using a Zipf distribution with
exponent 0.8. To further validate our claims, we implement an Android application that
can use the on-board GPS device, or a simulated GPS that can provide any desired latitude
and longitude to the application. Using this application, we perform experiments covering
five di erent cities (Los Angeles, New York, Paris, Vienna and Beijing), and 15 di erent
keywords chosen from the place types list in the Google Places API. More details on the
experiments are provided in their respective sections.
8.1 Architecture
A typical location privacy preserving mechanism (LPPM) for geo-queries may generate
an obfuscated location for a query and then retrieve a set of POIs contained within an area
centered at the obfuscated location. Execution of these steps is supported, for example,
in the nearbysearch and details endpoints in the Google Places API. The retrieved
set is then filtered for the user’s actual location and presented to the user. We refer to
this architecture as a 1-roundtrip architecture. LLPMs can di er in terms of their privacy
guarantees depending on how the obfuscated location is generated. They also di er in terms
of their communication overhead depending on the size of the area of retrieval. The local
filtering of results can be done strictly on the basis of distance (keep only POIs that are
within a certain distance of the user), or on a combination of distance and the prominence
value. Note that the former method has received the most attention in the privacy research
community, while the latter method is what is deployed in most non-private local search
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applications. For example, a search for “cafe” in a popular platform such as Google does
not always return the nearest cafes, but the top cafes determined by the query location and
the prominence value. Therefore, a geo-query search is more accurately a top-K search.
Any LPPM designed along the lines of the above discussion can provide top-K results
by modifying the filtering mechanism. Therefore, we do not consider the filtering process
to be a significant downside of an LPPM. However, the architecture levies a high commu-
nication overhead owing to the retrieval of all POIs in a large area. The data pertaining to
a complete POI typically contains details such as name, address, contact numbers, ratings,
photos, and multiple reviews. Since most POIs will be filtered out, the bandwidth con-
sumed while retrieving all such details for the POIs inside the area of retrieval is wasted.
We therefore consider our 2-roundtrip querying architecture described in Chapter 4 which
significantly reduces this communication overhead and allows for the ranking of POIs based
on an arbitrary function based on location and prominence.
Recall that in the 2-roundtrip architecture, an LPPM retrieves minimal details about
the set of POIs within AR. It is su cient to obtain the location and prominence of a POI in
this step. Search providers do provide results with such minimal information, for example,
a radarsearch query in the Google Places API returns the names and locations of POIs
within a specified distance of the given location. Prominence values are not yet included
in these results, but as shown in Section 4.6, they can be communicated without revealing
the underlying computation function. A filtering process is next applied on the POIs and
a relevant subset is determined. All details for this subset of POIs are then retrieved from
the provider and presented to the user.
8.2 Enforcing Indistinguishability
Consider an LPPM that generates some output set o of POIs and shares it with the
service provider as part of the querying process. This output in turn can be used by an
adversary to infer potential locations for the user. Under the assumption that the LPPM
under use is known to the adversary, along with knowledge of underlying parameters (except
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the user’s location), this inference can be expressed in terms of an odds-ratio with respect
to any two locations c and cÕ , given as
Pr (c|o)
Pr (cÕ|o) =
Pr (o|c)  (c)
Pr (o|cÕ)  (cÕ) , (8.1)
where   represents the prior knowledge of the adversary, expressed as a probability dis-
tribution over the set of possible locations C. If an LPPM generates o independent of the
location, i.e. Pr(o|c)Pr(o|cÕ) = 1, we can say that Pr(c|o) Ã  (c) (convergence), implying that the
LPPM did not reveal any information of significance to the adversary. We can then say
that any two locations are indistinguishable based on the output of the LPPM. Since the
prior knowledge of the adversary can vary, and is outside the control of the LPPM, it is
often the output probabilities (Pr(c|o)) that are subjected to analysis. The objective is to
maintain a degree of indistinguishability between two locations, i.e. the odds-ratio should
remain as close as possible to the ratio of the prior probabilities.
8.2.1 Geo-indistinguishability
The principle of geo-indistinguishability provides a quantifiable degree to which the
odds-ratio can deviate from the ratio of the prior probabilities [6]. Consider a 1-roundtrip
LPPM that generates an obfuscated location cz from a discrete set of locations, and then
retrieves all POIs within a distance radR of cz.
Definition 8.1 (‘-geo-indistinguishability). An LPPM is ‘-geo-indistinguishable if, for any
output cz produced by the LPPM, and any two locations c, cÕ œ C ™ C with d(c, cÕ) Æ r, we
can have
Pr (cz|c)
Pr (cz|cÕ) Æ e
‘r,
where d is a distance function.1
For an intuitive understanding, assume that the LPPM is used to query for a user
located in Los Angeles downtown. Geo-indistinguishability then ensures that an adversary
1Division by zero in ab Æ c can be resolved by writing the expression as a Æ bc.
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will be unable to distinguish with high certainty the user’s location from other locations in
the downtown area; although, the odds-ratio will enable the adversary distinguish between
a location in the downtown area versus a location in one of the suburbs (farther away from
the user’s location). The odds-ratio is always within a factor of exp {‘d(c, cÕ)} of the ratio
of prior probabilities. Therefore, the inferential advantage due to the use of the LPPM
decreases as the adversary attempts to narrow down the user’s location to smaller and
smaller areas. Andres et al. proposed this principle for LPPMs along with a mechanism
that achieves it. Their mechanism generates cz using a planar Laplace distribution centered
at the user’s location. They also discuss how radR can be determined such that it contains
all POIs within a distance radI from the user’s actual location.
8.2.2 Indistinguishability for top-K results
We first introduce the notion of a zone. A zone for a given location tells us what other
locations generate similar top-K results. We use topK(.) to denote a function that returns
the top-K POIs for a given location.
Definition 8.2 (Zone). For a given location c0 and 0 Æ m Æ K, a zone Zm is defined as
Zm(c0) = {c|c œ C, |topK(c0) fl topK(c)| = K ≠m} .
Therefore, zone Zm contains all locations with exactly m mismatches in the top-K set,
relative to the given location c0.
Figure 8.1 depicts an area of Los Angeles, overlaid with a set of zones. Assume that the
user is located in the central zone Z0. For any pair of locations in Z0, the top-10 cafe sets
are the same (zero mismatch). When expanding into zone Z1, the top-10 set undergoes a
change in one of the POIs (one mismatch). Therefore, for any location c œ Z1 and cÕ œ Z0,
we have |top10(c) fl top10(cÕ)| = 9. Similarly, the number of mismatch increases as we move
father out from Z0.
An ‘-geo-indistinguishable LPPM introduces probabilistic uncertainty based on the
distance between two locations. As such, the adversary will gain some inferential advantage
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Figure 8.1: Variation in the top-10 cafe set in Los Angeles. Ranking performed with – = 0.8.
when distinguishing between the point pairs (A,B) or (C,D) in Figure 8.1. With ‘ = ln 42000m ,
the prior probability ratio will at most change by a factor of 1.94531 for A and B (or D),
and by 3.24901 between A and C. However, from the standpoint of querying from zone
Z0 , locations A and B are equivalent since they produce the same result set; similarly C
and D are equivalent under the relation of mismatch count. This brings us to the question
of whether geo-indistinguishability can be extended to arbitrary functions (instead of only
distance) of locations, and if so, under what constraints. More specifically, in the context of
ranked geo-queries, we would like an LPPM that provides indistinguishability between two
locations based on the similarity of query output from the two locations. In this direction,
we extend ‘-geo-indistinguishability as follows.
Definition 8.3 ((f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability). Let C be a set of locations and O be the
discrete set of outputs produced by an LPPMM . Given a function f such that f : C◊C æ
[0, 1] and a privacy parameter ‘ Ø 0, the mechanism M is (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability if
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’C ™ C and ’o œ O, we have
Pr (o|c)
Pr (o|cÕ) Æ e
‘”,
where f (c œ C, cÕ œ C) Æ ”.
In other words, for any subset of locations where pairwise relations (as measured by the
f function) are bounded by some ”, the degree of indistinguishability is also bounded by a
function of ”. The principle can also be extended to any subset of O ifM has a continuous
range. Since the condition applies to any conceivable subset of locations, we can say that
if f(c, cÕ) = ” for any c, cÕ œ C ™ C, then
e≠‘”
 (c)
 (cÕ) Æ
Pr (c|o)
Pr (cÕ|o) Æ e
‘”  (c)
 (cÕ) . (8.2)
For example, if f measures the fraction of mismatches, then all locations in Z0 (Figure
8.1) form a subset where ” = 0. This gives us perfect indistinguishability for locations in
Z0, i.e. Pr(c|o) Ã  (c), ’c œ Z0. The boundaries of the zones depicted in Figure 8.1 can
expand or shrink depending on the density of the POIs in the area and how ranking is
performed. If large central zones do exist for the user, it presents us with an opportunity
to provide strong privacy guarantees.
The next question is whether a (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism exists. Indeed,
the general di erential privacy mechanism suggested by McSherry and Talwar holds the
evidence that a (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism is possible [114]. This mechanism is
driven by a quality function that can associate a real valued score to any (o œ O, c œ C)
pair, with higher scores being more desirable.
Theorem 8.1. Let s be a quality scoring function s : O◊ C æ R+. Given c œ C and ‘ Ø 0,
the general mechanism Mg chooses output o with probability Pr(o|c) Ã exp
) ‘
2s(o, c)
*
. The
general mechanism Mg is (f, ‘µ)-geo-indistinguishable, if ’C ™ C, we have
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max
oÕœO;c,cÕœC
!
s(oÕ, c)≠ s(oÕ, cÕ)" = µ”,
where ” = maxc,cÕœC f(c, cÕ) and µ is a constant.
Proof. For some output o œ O, and any c, cÕ œ C ™ C such that maxc,cÕœC f(c, cÕ) = ” and
maxoÕœO;c,cÕœC = (s(oÕ, c)≠ s(oÕ, cÕ)) = µ”, we have
Pr (o|c)
Pr (o|cÕ) = exp
5
‘
2
!
s(o, c)≠ s(o, cÕ)"6 qoÕœO exp # ‘2s(oÕ, cÕ)$q
oÕœO exp
# ‘
2s(oÕ, c)
$ Æ exp 5 ‘2µ”
6
exp
5
‘
2µ”
6
= e‘µ”.
The general mechanism requires that, in all subsets of locations, the sensitivity of the
quality function (maximum di erence in scores) is always within a constant factor of the
maximum value of the f function in the subset. Therefore, as more and more locations are
considered, the sensitivity of the quality function must grow at a rate proportional to the
change e ectuated in the maximum f value. The proportionality constant µ is important
here since it dictates the inferential advantage controlled by the mechanism. Next, we
instantiate this mechanism in the context of the 2-roundtrip querying architecture.
8.3 Applying 2-Roundtrip Querying Architecture
The application we consider for a 2-roundtrip querying architecture first retrieves lo-
cation and prominence data on a set of POIs, computes the top-K sets of a specific set
of locations, and then retrieves details on K POIs. More specifically, the application first
chooses a location cz uniformly at random from within a radius radz from the user’s lo-
cation cu. The area created by using this radius is the obfuscation area and denoted by
AZ . Then, the application, retrieves the location and prominence of all POIs matching the
search keyword that are within a distance radR of cz(POIs included inside AR). Thereafter,
the top-K set of every location (cell) within a radius of radI from cz is determined. One of
these sets is chosen using a (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism and details are retrieved
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for POIs in the set. Before discussing the mechanism, we provide some insight into the
choice of the various radius values in the application.
8.3.1 radz, radR and radI
A typical nearbysearch using the Google Places API requires specification of a similar
radius. Consequently, AR must fully encompass AZ . This can be achieved by setting
radR Ø 2 · radz. A typical radarsearch using the Google Places API allows for this value
to be up to 50 km. Top-K sets are computed for every location (cell) in AI , and a choice is
made from within these sets. We want the top-K set of the user to be a part of this sampling;
since cz is always within a distance of radz from cu, inclusion of the user’s top-K set can
be guaranteed by setting radI Ø radz. We do not assume that the three radii values are
unknown to the adversary. Therefore, the choice of radI reveals a first level approximation
of the area of presence of the user. We choose radz to control this approximation, and
subsequently set radI = radz. Service providers can limit the number of POIs returned
from within the area of retrieval (radarsearch puts a limit of 200); therefore, we choose
radR to the minimum value necessary, i.e. 2·radz. This approach leaves us with making one
parametric choice, radz , with the other two decided as radR = 2 · radz and radI = radz.
8.3.2 Choosing a top-K set
We use the computation process discussed in Chapter 6 to determine the top-K sets
of all locations in AI . Let T = {t1, t2, · · · , tm} represent the collection of these top-K
POI sets corresponding to the cells c1, c2, · · · , cm œ AI , i.e. topK(ci) = ti. We consider the
following instantiation of the general mechanism Mg.
Definition 8.4 (Mechanism Mfgi ). Let the quality scoring function s : T ◊AI æ R+ be
the fraction of matches between a set t œ T and the top-K set of location c œ AI , i.e.
s(t, c) = |t fl topK(c)|
K
.
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Given the user location cu, mechanismMfgi outputs a set t œ T with probability Pr(t|cu) Ã
e
‘
2 s(t,cu).
Details are subsequently retrieved for the POIs included in the output produced by
Mfgi.
Theorem 8.2. Mechanism Mfgi is (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable for locations in when
f(c, cÕ) = 1≠ |topK(c) fl topK(c
Õ)|
K
.
Proof. The f function here is the fraction of mismatches in the top-K sets of two locations
c and cÕ. If maxc,cÕœC™C f(c, cÕ) = ”, i.e. f(c, cÕ) Æ ”, then |topK(c) fl topK(cÕ)| Ø K (1≠ ”).
Consider |topK(c) fl topK(cÕ)| = K (1≠ ”). Therefore, the two top-K sets di er in K”
elements. The maximum di erence in quality is provided by the set t which has the least
overlap with one of the sets, and the most overlap with the other while satisfying the
condition. If t overlaps in K”+ b elements in one set, then at least b elements of t will also
appear in the other set. Therefore, the maximum di erence in quality scores in this case
will be K”+bK ≠ bK = ”.
For cases where |topK(c) fl topK(cÕ)| > K (1≠ ”), the sets will di er in less than K”
elements; so the maximum di erence in quality scores will be less than ”.
Combining both cases, when |topK(c) fl topK(cÕ)| Ø K (1≠ ”), the maximum di erence
in quality scores will be ”.
max
oœO;c,cÕœC™C such that f(c,cÕ)Æ”
!
s (o, c)≠ s !o, cÕ"" = ”.
Here the constant µ = 1. Therefore, by Theorem 8.1, the mechanism is (f, ‘)-geo-
indistingui-shable.
(f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability implies that, for all pairs of locations in AI whose top-K
sets have at most a fraction of ” mismatch, the probabilities of producing a certain output
from either location in the pair will di er at most by a factor of e‘” and at least by a
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factor of e≠‘” of each other. For location pairs where there are no mismatches (” = 0),
the probabilities will be equal. For location pairs with complete mismatch (” = 1), the
probability ratio is between e‘ and e≠‘. This captures the guarantee that any location c
(including the user location cu) will be indistinguishable in zone Z0 (defined corresponding
to topK(c)), and di cult to distinguish from locations in nearby zones. The best case
happens when the entire AI is covered in a single zone, a possibility that can emerge when
POIs are sparse, and their ranking involves both distance and prominence.
8.3.3 Characterization
MechanismMfgi makes locations in zone Z0 indistinguishable from each other; however,
the degree of indistinguishability reduces with respect to locations in other zones. Therefore,
we seek to understand how indistinguishability degrades compared to a conventional ‘-geo-
indistinguishable mechanism. The degradation depends on the rate at which the zones
change, which for a characteristic set of locations, creates favorable conditions.
Theorem 8.3. Let o be the output of an ‘gi-geo-indistinguishable mechanism and o˜ be
the output of an (f, ‘fgi)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism when the input (user) location is
c0. Let Cm = {c|c œ C, d(c0, c) Ø ‘fgim/‘giK} with d as the Euclidean distance function. If
Zm(c0) ™ Cm for all m œ {0, 1, · · · ,K}, then ’c œ C
Pr (c|o˜)
Pr (c0|o˜) Æ
Pr (c|o)
Pr (c0|o) .
Proof. Figure 8.2 illustrates the relationship between Zm(c0) and Cm. For all c œ Z ™
Zm(c0) ™ Cm, we have f(c, c0) = mK . Therefore,
maxcœZ Pr(o˜|c)Pr(o˜|c0) = e
‘fgim/K
Æ e‘gid(c0,c),’c œ Z [since c œ Cm]
Æ maxcœZ Pr(o|c)Pr(o|c0) .
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Figure 8.2: Zm(c0) and Cm with Zm(c0) µ Cm.
Considering Z as singleton sets (Z = {c}), we obtain ’c œ Zm(c0)
Pr (o˜|c)
Pr (o˜|c0) Æ
Pr (o|c)
Pr (o|c0) .
Using the fact that C = Kfi
m=0
Zm(c0), we have from Equation 8.1, ’c œ C
Pr (c|o˜)
Pr (c0|o˜) Æ
Pr (c|o)
Pr (c0|o) .
The above theorem characterizes when a (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism is not
worse than a conventional geo-indistinguishable mechanism in terms of the discriminatory
advantage (the odds-ratio) introduced by the mechanisms. In conventional geo-indistingui-
shability, relative to any fixed location c0, indistinguishability as measured by the out-
put probability ratio diminishes continuously with increasing distance from c0; whereas
the changes generate a monotonic step function in Mfgi. Theorem 8.3 implies that the
step function ‘fgi‘gi f (c0, .) should preferably grow slower than the distance function d (c0, .).
Therefore, any zone Zm should start at a distance of ‘fgim‘giK or more from c0. Figure 8.3
shows this minimum distance in three di erent scenarios. Each scenario captures the case
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Figure 8.3: Desired minimum starting distance of a zone relative to a location.
when the ‘ values are chosen such that a given level of confidence (v) is always present
in the service quality. The parameter ‘ in geo-indistinguishability is chosen so that the
area of retrieval contains the obfuscation area (radz = 1km) with confidence v [6]–the
three corresponding ‘gi values are ‘0.99 = 0.00664, ‘0.95 = 0.00474, and ‘0.90 = 0.00389.
Correspondingly, the parameter in (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability is obtained such that at
most 8 mismatches can happen with probability v–the three corresponding ‘fgi values are
‘0.99 = 32.67, ‘0.95 = 19.68, and ‘0.90 = 13.38. We discuss the methodology for this in
Section 8.4.3. At a confidence level of 95%, zones are required to have a span of at least
415.19 m, which changes to 492.02 m at 99%. When a zone is wider than this minimum
necessary size, it allows subsequent zones to be narrower by an equal amount. Since not all
locations in Z0 are always the required distance away from the closest border of Z0, it is
clear that the inequality does not hold for all query locations c0. Nonetheless, the inequality
may still hold farther out if subsequent zones are wider than necessary. On 1000 random
queries in Los Angeles with – = 0.8, we observed that the average radius of Z0 and Z1
(relative to the centroid of Z0 ) is 908 m and 2.086 km respectively for a dense POI such
as cafe, while it is 1.212 km and 2.473 km for a sparse POI such as bookstore. In Section
8.7, we empirically compare the privacy guarantee under the expected distance estimation
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error metric that captures the overall impact of the user possibly querying from central and
border locations in Zm.
8.4 Retrieval Accuracy
The retrieval accuracy in the 2-roundtrip architecture described above is determined
by the number of matches in the top-K set chosen by mechanism Mfgi and the top-K set
corresponding to the user location. This in turn is influenced by the density of relevant POIs
in the neighborhood of the user. For example, the top-10 restaurants relative to a residential
location may not be very di erent, while that relative to a downtown location can change
within a short distance of the user location. Similarly, for a more focussed query such as
“mediterranean food,” the result set may stay the same over a significantly large area. This
makes it di cult to analyze the retrieval accuracy without incorporating information from
physical POI distributions. Therefore, our approach includes some observations derived
from real world POI categories and their densities.
8.4.1 Base match distribution
A top-K ranking function emphasizes both distance and prominence of a POI. As
a result, the top-K set corresponding to a location does not undergo abrupt changes in
neighboring locations. It can therefore be expected that, irrespective of the use of any
privacy mechanism, the top-K set relative to the user’s location will have matches with
the top-K set of nearby locations. The base match distribution attempts to capture this
similarity as a probability mass function.
Definition 8.5 (Base match distribution). The base match distribution wrad,K is the
probability distribution corresponding to the discrete random variable Rrad,K : C ◊ C æ
{ , 0, 1, · · · ,K} where
Rrad,K
Y__]__[
  , if d(c, cÕ) > rad
|topK(c) fl topK(cÕ)| , otherwise
.
150
Figure 8.4: Observed and fitted base match distribution (rad = 2 km, K = 10) for cafes
in Los Angeles, CA, USA. Inset figure shows probability of obtaining matches in the set
chosen by mechanism Mfgi.
The base match distribution wrad,K(m) provides the probability that any two locations
within a distance rad of each other will have m matches in their top-K sets. For example,
Figure 8.4 shows a histogram of the number of matches (top-10 “cafe” sets) seen in a sample
of 106 location pairs in Los Angeles, with locations in a pair being at a distance of at most
20 cells (2 km) from each other. We obtain an estimate of the base match distribution wˆ20,10
by fitting a beta-binomial distribution to this data. This estimate is useful in obtaining an
insight into the approximate scale of ‘ that needs to be chosen in Mfgi for the mechanism
to generate useful results. It is impractical to estimate a base match distribution for every
possible search keyword; therefore, we also validate the comparative e ectiveness of using
a simple binomial distribution, or even a uniform distribution.
8.4.2 Match probability
When the base match distribution is skewed towards higher matches, a uniform sam-
pling from the di erent top-K sets can itself lead to a majority of high matches. For example,
151
wˆ20,10 implies a match of 8 or more in approximately 60% of the cases. Mechanism Mfgi
further scales these probabilities to make the drawing of high match sets significantly more
likely.
Proposition 8.1. Mechanism Mfgi produces an output t for the user cell cu such that
Pr (|t fl topK(cu)| Ø m) =
qK
i=mwrad,K (i) exp
) ‘
2K i
*qK
j=0wrad,K (j) exp
) ‘
2K j
* ,
where wrad,K is the base match distribution for the top-K search.
Proof. For any output choice t that has i matches with topK(cu), we have s(t, cu) = i/K.
Since the expected number of top-K sets with i matches in a radius of rad is wrad,K (i), we
have
Pr (|t fl topK(cu)| = i) = wrad,K (i) exp
) ‘
2K i
*qK
j=0wrad,K (j) exp
) ‘
2K j
* .
Therefore,
Pr (|t fl topK(cu)| Ø m) = qKi=m Pr (|t fl topK(cu)| = i)
=
qK
i=m wrad,K(i) exp{ ‘2K i}qK
j=0 wrad,K(j) exp{ ‘2K j}
.
We can cluster the candidate top-K sets into equivalence classes based on the number
of matches they have with topK(cu). The base distribution then provides an estimate of
the percentage of sets with a given quality score. MechanismMfgi exponentially scales the
probability of choosing an output with higher quality score. The inset plot in Figure 8.4
shows the impact of this scaling when picking a top-10 cafe set in the example. The scaling
increased the probability of obtaining 8 or more matches to 98% with ‘ = 30. Figure 8.5
depicts the match frequencies in three di erent POI categories, having low, medium and
high occupancy across the query area. Mechanism Mfgi is used here with radI = 2 km,
‘ = 30, and – = 0.8 for top-10 ranking. For each category, the data points are generated by
performing queries from 1000 randomly chosen locations within the experiment area, with
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Figure 8.5: Observed match frequencies in three di erent POI categories. Top-10 sets
computed with – = 0.8 and radI = 2 km. Mfgi samples using ‘ = 30.
100 executions of Mfgi at each location. The match probabilities computed from using a
fitted base distribution reasonably captures the observed match frequencies. As expected,
sparse POIs (bookstore in this case) induce a higher retrieval accuracy.
8.4.3 Choosing ‘
The choice of ‘ directly influences the output probabilities of the sets, and in turn
impacts the retrieval accuracy. We can ensure thatMfgi provides a minimum of m matches
with confidence v by solving for ‘ in the following equation derived from Proposition 8.1.
v
m≠1ÿ
i=0
wrad,K (i) exp
;
‘
2K i
<
≠ (1≠ v)
Kÿ
i=m
wrad,K (i) exp
;
‘
2K i
<
= 0 (8.3)
We use a Newton-Raphson iterative solver in R to solve for ‘. Figure 8.6 illustrates
the minimum ‘ value necessary to guarantee at least m matches (x-axis) in the chosen set
with a confidence of 90%, 95% and 99%. While the use of the base match distribution
is preferable in determining ‘, it is not necessarily practical. The figure also presents the
‘ values obtained by using two other distributions in lieu of the base match distribution–
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Figure 8.6: Computed ‘ using various base distributions and confidence levels v = 0.99, 0.95
and 0.90.
a uniform distribution signifying no knowledge of the base distribution, and a binomial
distribution with parameters n = 10 and p = 0.7962. The parameters of the binomial
distribution are chosen such that approximately 23 of the probability mass is concentrated
in values greater than 7. This choice is made after analyzing the empirical base distribution
of 15 di erent POI categories, where the total probability mass in 8, 9 and 10 matches is
observed to be between 60-75%. The binomial distribution approximates the trends of the
three low, medium, and high occupancy POI categories better than the uniform distribution.
It overestimates ‘ when higher match counts are desired. Based on the binomial base
distribution, a value of ‘ = 32.67 gives us a 99% probability of obtaining 8 or more matches.
8.5 Parametric Evaluation
The performance of the proposed 2-roundtrip application is determined by a combina-
tion of three parameters, namely – : the weight given to distance in the ranking function,
radz : the obfuscation radius, and ‘ : the privacy parameter inMfgi. We provide compar-
ative results of their impact on the retrieval accuracy for the three example POI categories.
The default values are radz = 2 km and ‘ = 30, with top-10 ranking performed using
– = 0.8.
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Figure 8.7: Impact of radz on retrieval accuracy. radI = radz.
radz impact. Figure 8.7 depicts the percentage frequency when exactly m matches are
obtained between the actual top-K result set and that generated by Mfgi. The chances of
retrieving the exact set drops as the obfuscation area becomes larger, while that of retrieving
a set with one or two mismatches increases. The behavior is not surprising since larger radz
values, correspondingly a larger radI , imply that the potential set of outputs contains a
comparatively smaller fraction of samples with m = 10. As such, the base distribution has
a lower mass at that point. However, increasing radz also creates higher chances of covering
zones Z1 and Z2. The number of potential sets in Z1 and Z2 are combinatorially higher
than in Z0 (single top-K set); increasing radz creates avenues for inclusion of more of these
sets. As long as radz is not set so large that other low match sets get included in majority,
we can expect to retain the high retrieval accuracy. At radz = 5 km, we still obtain 8 or
more matches with probability greater than 90%, higher in some POI categories.
– impact. Figure 8.8 depicts the impact of – on the retrieval accuracy. – = 0 signifies
ranking based only on prominence, and hence there is a single top-K set corresponding
to all locations. – = 1 signifies a K-nearest-neighbor ranking; this case presents the least
favorable condition for mechanismMfgi. Between these two extreme conditions, di erences
in the retrieval accuracy is mostly observed for m = 9 and m = 10. The di erences are
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Figure 8.8: Impact of – on retrieval accuracy.
less prominent in the sparsely distributed POI as changes in the top-K set are unlikely for
small changes in the user location. With half the weight on the distance value, we obtain a
significantly high probability of obtaining 9 or more matches.
‘ impact. Figure 8.9 depicts the impact of ‘ on the retrieval accuracy. Lower values of ‘
reduce the influence of the exponential weights on the base match distribution. At ‘ = 0,
the mechanism samples proportional to the base distribution. High matches can be made
more likely by increasing its value. Observe that the di erences in match probability is
more prominent in cases such as m = 9 and m = 10. Even with a small value such as ‘ = 1,
we observe probabilities as high as 80% for 7 or 8 matches. We discussed in Section 8.4.3
how the parameter can be appropriately chosen when a given level of certainty is desired
in the number of matches.
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Figure 8.9: Impact of privacy parameter (‘) on retrieval accuracy.
8.6 An Android Implementation
We implemented the 2-roundtrip POI search architecture in Android using the Google
Places API to perform the queries. The application allows the user to input a search keyword
and reads the device GPS (or a simulated GPS) to obtain the user location. It then retrieves
POI locations for the search category using a radarsearch query. A radarsearch query
returns locations and unique identifiers for POIs within a specific radius (radR) of the
query point. The obfuscation area (radz) is a configurable parameter which we set to 2
km in the following; correspondingly radR = 2radz = 4 km. 10-nearest-neighbor ranking
is performed (– = 1), partly because prominence data is not yet available using the Places
API, and partly because K-nearest-neighbor search produces the worst case behavior as
per the parametric evaluation. Details are then retrieved (using the details endpoint and
identifiers of the POIs) for 10 POIs decided by the (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism
Mfgi with ‘ = 30. The application is run on a Nexus 5X smartphone over a 4GLTE
connection. All networking tasks are performed using a thread-pool with 4 threads.
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Figure 8.10: Android application screenshot.
We use a desktop application to perform 1000 radarsearch queries from random lo-
cations for each of the 15 chosen search keywords and in each of five chosen cities (Los
Angeles, New York, Paris, Vienna and Beijing), giving a total of 75000 queries. We also
run mechanism Mfgi to pick a set for details retrieval. This process allows us to compute
retrieval accuracy and analyze the ranks of missed POIs. For a subset of 100 queries (per
city per keyword), the Android application is executed on the smartphone and performance
results such as timing and bandwidth usage are gathered. We restrict the experiments on
the smartphone to a smaller subset since running all 75000 queries from the phone would
incur a large cumulative 4G bandwidth (¥ 7.6GB).
Figure 8.10 displays a screenshot of the application where a search for cafes is performed
at Hofburg Palace, Vienna, Austria. It shows the 10 POIs chosen by the mechanism, as
well as the user’s location and the POI that appears in the actual 10 nearest cafes, but
missed in the sampling process. The user’s location and missed POI are shown here for
demonstration only, and should not be communicated to a third party.
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Figure 8.11: Position of POIs in the true top-K set when missed by the application.
Rank of missed POIs. Figure 8.11 shows whisker plots of the position (1 = highest
rank, to 10 = lowest rank) of POIs that appear in the actual top-10 set but are missed
by the application. Results from the five cities are summarized across di erent categories.
The median position is approximately 8, with POIs in the top 6 positions being retrieved
at least 75% of the times. This highlights that changes appearing in the top-10 sets are
incremental and often starts in the lower ranked POIs.
Retrieval accuracy. Figure 8.12 summarizes the percentage number of times (empirical
probability) when at least a given number of matches are found. The key point we highlight
here is that the observations are very similar across the di erent cities (8.12a) and across
di erent keywords (8.12b). The observations are in accordance with the results seen in the
evaluation performed within the Los Angeles area alone.
Performance. Figure 8.13a shows the quartiles of the end-to-end time to execute one
complete query in the Android application. The end-to-end time consists of compute and
network time. Compute time includes the parsing of network data, computing top-K sets,
computing the probability mass function, sampling using the mechanism, and updating the
user interface with details of retrieved results. Network time includes connection time to
Google servers, issuing requests, and then bu ering of responses. As a result of the fast
top-K computation algorithm, the compute time is under half a second in all cases. The
network communication takes the most time, contributing a median of 2.5 seconds. Note
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Figure 8.13: Overall performance of the 2-roundtrip application.
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that the total time to execute a query in a typical search application (e.g. Google Maps
search for Android) averages around 2.5 seconds. Therefore, the overhead introduced in the
2-roundtrip application is negligible. Figure 8.13b shows the size of the responses (as JSON
files) received from performing a radarsearch and a POI detail query. A radarsearch
query returns an average size of 43.3 KB of data, a median of 26.1 KB, and sizes are
between 100 KB to 110 KB in 25% of the queries. Each query to retrieve details about one
POI returns an average of 6.3 KB, and a median of 5.4 KB. The 2-roundtrip application
performs one radarsearch query and retrieves details on K = 10 POIs, therefore incurring
a median cost of 78.8 KB and an average of 107 KB per query. A 1-roundtrip application
will have to retrieve details on all POIs inside the area of retrieval, which amounts to an
average size of 1.2 MB per query for 200 POIs found inside the area of retrieval.
8.7 Comparative Performance
For a given prior distribution   on locations, the expected estimation error of the ad-
versary measures the average distance between the true location of the user and the location
estimated by the adversary (4.8.1). Therefore, this computes the privacy level taking into
consideration the likelihood of the user being in locations favorable under Theorem 8.3,
as well as those that are not. If o is the output of a mechanism M , then the expected
estimation error is computed as
experrM =
ÿ
c,cÕœC;oœO
 (c)Pr(o|c)Pr(cÕ|o)d(c, cÕ). (8.4)
For a geo-indistinguishable mechanism, O = C. Following the methodology of Andres
et al. [6], we compute the minimum required value of ‘ such that the obfuscation area,
radZ = 1 km, is contained within an area of retrieval radR = 2 · radz = 2 km with
confidence v = 0.90—‘0.90 = 0.00389.
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For mechanism Mfgi, O = T and Pr(o|c) is computed as
Pr(o|c) = ÿ
czœC
Pr(cz|c)Pr(o|cz) (8.5)
since the output is generated by first selecting a location (cz) for retrieval and then choosing
an output from one of the top-K sets. Specifically, Pr(cz|c) = 0 if d(c, cz) > radz and is
1
firad2z
otherwise (cz is uniformly chosen for POI location retrieval).
Similarly, Pr(o|cz) is zero if o is not the top-K set of some location within a distance
of radz (radI = radz) from cz. For the prior distribution, we consider a uniform distri-
bution inside an area with 1km radius centered at Los Angeles downtown (34.0522o N,
118.2428o W). We consider the ‘ parameter in Mfgi under two accuracy requirements: 8
or more matches with 95% confidence, and 9 or more matches with 90% confidence. We
compute the parameter by solving Equation 8.3 using the empirical base match distribution
corresponding to the search keyword and a Bin(10, 0.7962) distribution as the base match
distributions.
For a mechanism that results in uniform probabilities for the terms in Equation 8.4,
the expected error in the given scenario is 908 m. Such a mechanism only reveals the
area of retrieval, and that the user is most likely somewhere inside it. Figure 8.14 shows
the expected error for a top-10 search with the keyword “cafe.” The ‘-geo-indistinguishable
mechanism provides an expected error of 691 m; comparatively, the use of mechanismMfgi
results in an expected error of 840 m when using the binomial base distribution (8 matches
at 95% confidence level). The di erence between the two approaches also appears in the
resulting bandwidth usage. There is an average of 117 cafes inside an area of retrieval
of radius 2 km. Using the average response sizes reported in Section 8.6, a query using
a geo-indistinguishable mechanism would result in the usage of 737.1 KB, compared to
approximately 85 KB with the (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishable mechanism.
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Figure 8.14: Expected estimation error of adversary.
8.8 Adopting Multiple Queries
As with geo-indistinguishability, the privacy assurances in (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability
also degrade if used to protect multiple locations. For the scenario where n queries are made
in sequence, the e ective ‘ value in both mechanisms is n‘ at the end of the queries. Clearly,
an inherent trade-o  can be achieved in the accuracy of query results and the corresponding
privacy guarantees. For example, if the value of the parameter is set to ‘ = ‘endn , the privacy
level begins at a higher level and degrades to that produced by setting the parameter to
‘ = ‘end in a single query scenario. If n is large, then ‘end æ 0. This however still provides
a bound on the accuracy level, as given by the base match distribution. Note that the
empirical privacy evaluation in Section 8.5 indicates that a reasonable level of privacy can
be expected with a value such as ‘ = 30. We also observe in the parametric evaluation
(Figure 8.9) that the accuracy levels of using ‘ = 1 and ‘ = 30 (or ‘ = 50) are not
significantly di erent. Therefore, it is possible to start with a lower ‘ value, and increase
up to to an e ective high ‘ value without inducing significant degradation in the utility.
163
8.9 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a di erential privacy based LPPM. Similar to the other
LPPMs proposed in this dissertation, this one natively fits our two-roundtrip architecture
proposed in Chapter 4. In contrast to the LPPMs proposed in the earlier chapters, the
enhanced feature of this LPPM is the rigorous mathematical basis for the privacy guarantee
that is proved in this chapter. We introduced a new concept of (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability
in which the di erential privacy is maintained for any arbitrary function f in contrast to
the classical ‘-geo-indistinguishability in which the di erential privacy is maintained with
respect to the distance between two locations. Since ‘-geo-indistinguishability is the state of
art, we compare our results against a recent ‘-geo-indistinguishability LPPM [6] and show
that our method can perform better. Finally, we implemented our LPPM as an Android
application and tested it. Our method on average adds one second delay compared to the
standard GooglMaps application for Android (which does not provide any privacy to the
user) thus maintaining the main theme of this dissertation.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarize the dissertation, enlist our contributions to the research
in mobile privacy protection, and finally present our thoughts on future direction for this
research e ort.
Location based services are proving to be very useful to the mobile users as more and
more people depend on it. They are of course very attractive to the service providers, as
they provide immense opportunities for monetizing knowledge of location of the users. As
the utilization of these services increase, so does the concern for user’s privacy. There are
considerable e orts from the research community to measure, analyze and mitigate this
threat. This work makes novel contributions and furthers the research in mobile location
privacy.
We started this e ort by introducing the concept of location privacy in the context of
location searches. We then discuss in detail, how location is considered private by most
of the users and the possible problems that could emerge if this privacy is violated. Since
having accurate user location information is considered an asset, many service providers
give away their service for free, with the intention of monetizing the location data obtained.
These service providers have published privacy policies that the user needs to agree to as a
condition of utilizing the service. Without technical privacy protection mechanisms, often,
the service provider is trusted to adhere to the privacy policy. Here we introduced the
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concept of a semi-trusted service provider who is curious to know the accurate location of
the user.
We then present a brief overview of the e ort that already is put in by the computer
science research community into location privacy. While doing this, we show an evolution
of privacy preserving techniques over several years. Then, we discuss how most of the
current techniques fall short of wide adaptation of the requirement of third parties. The
introduction of trusted third parties introduce several risks both in terms of privacy and
availability. Although some existing LPPMs successfully avoid the TPP requirement, they
rank the top-K results of the query based only on the distance from the query point. We
discussed this issue in Chapter 4 and showed that real local search applications rank the
query results based on both the distance and the prominence value of the retrieved POIs.
We justify our approach of TTP less protocol by discussing all these problems in detail, and
then clearly stating the problem we address in this research.
We then presented an architecture for a communication protocol that can be used
in a TTP less fashion. As part of this, we presented definitions and notation for the
di erent items that make discussions and analysis about our proposed techniques precise.
We proposed a two-round-trip architecture. In the first round, the client gets a list of points
of interest that pertain to a large region, thus not revealing her location accurately. She
then applies an LPPM to the result set to arrive at a narrowed down list of POIs whose
detailed information is requested in the second round trip. The LPPM or the encryption
applied ensures that the attacker cannot pin point the user’s location beyond an acceptable
coarse threshold area.
Before proposing our LPPM, we first took a serious look at existing techniques that
could be applied as a possible solution to the TTP less LPPM. We explored in detail a
mathematical technique called private information retrieval and gave it a serious consider-
ation. We not only discussed this technique in detail, but also implemented two algorithms
for this technique using standard hardware configurations and readily available open source
software libraries. The results we obtained show that they are still far away from practical-
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ity to solve our problem. By showing that PIR is still not e cient enough to be practical,
we motivate the need to come up with practical LPPMs.
Our solution is to come with LPPMs that eliminate the need for TTP by taking advan-
tage of the processing capabilities available in modern mobile devices. We proposed three
LPPMs, and implemented them on representative mobile devices to show that they perform
reasonably well, and analyzed them to show that privacy protection characteristics are up
to par. In the section below, we summaries the results obtained and discuss those results.
9.1 Results and Discussion
First LPPM we proposed deals with simple scenario where the user issues a single
local search and expect the attacker, who can be a semi-trusted service provider, to not
be able to place her in a large enough configurable area. Also, the search needs to work
with realistic ranking which considers prominence and other attributes of POIs, not just
the distance from her current location. We came up with privacy measurements that we use
to calculate achieved privacy and performance, and also to make valid comparisons against
other LPPMs. Another important result is that we demonstrated the feasibility of these
computations by running the algorithm on di erent sets of real world POI distributions
and realistic mobile hardware. Our timing experiments show that the average computation
overhead is less than 0.5 seconds which is a reasonable delay in response felt by the user for
the privacy achieved.
Next we extend this simple LPPM to accommodate the case of multiple queries scenario,
where the user is expected to launch a sequence of queries in succession as she moves around.
This scenario adds more challenges to our LPPM since the user now will repeatedly retrieve
POI data from a service provider which makes the LPPM more vulnerable to inference
analysis under a Bayesian adversary model. We first model this scenario to show how in a
multiple query scenario, the single query algorithm fails to achieve the expected privacy. We
propose our algorithm along with heuristics to retrieve only needed additional POIs. We
show through empirical analysis that our improved LPPM leaks little or no advantageous
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information to the attacker. The adversarial inferences are limited in a setting with real
world POI distributions.
The above approach can e ciently operate in a mobile device, and has minimal impact
on the communication bandwidth; empirical comparison of an LPPM implemented under
our architecture against other techniques shows that our architecture needs less amount of
data exchange between the client and the server. However, this approach does not provide a
theoretical guarantee on the privacy level. So in the next step of development, we suggested
a di erential privacy based LPPM to implement our proposed architecture in order to math-
ematically justify their privacy level guarantee. In contrast to ‘-geo-indistinguishability, we
introduced the (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability principle that a privacy mechanism can enforce
in order to limit the distinguishability between locations. In (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability,
locations that are evaluated as being similar under the f function enjoy the same level
of privacy under this principle. In the new LPPM, all locations whose top-K result sets
have the same number of mismatches relative to the top-K set of a query point become
equally indistinguishable. We theoretically characterized the conditions under which the
new mechanism provides stronger levels of privacy than a ‘-geo-indistinguishable mecha-
nism, and provided the framework necessary to tune the mechanism to guarantee a required
level of accuracy. The empirical evaluation that we performed drives us to the conclusion
that our LPPM can retain high similarity with the sought top-K set, irrespective of how
much contribution distance makes to the ranking, the density of the POIs in the search
area, or variations in the ‘ parameter. Of course we made sure that the mechanism can
execute on a mobile device without generating any noticeable delays or incurring excessive
bandwidth cost.
9.2 Further Directions
• We briefly discussed the multiple queries scenario for (f, ‘)-geo-indistinguishability in
Section 8.8. An in-depth exploration of this insight is left for future work.
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• The quality scoring function s for the LPPM Mfgi introduced in the Definition 8.4
consider the number of matching POIs between the top-K set result from any location
c and the top-K set of the true location of the use, cu, as the quality of the result
set. In Section 8.6 we analyze the rank of missed POIs in the output set produced
by the mechanism Mfgi. Even though empirical demonstration shows that there is a
75% chance to retrieve POIs in the top 6 positions of the actual set (the set that will
result from cu), further research is needed in this direction. Another LPPM with a
di erent scoring function that takes into account the rank of the top-K POIs can be
explored.
• Although there is a good amount of research that went into applying cryptographic
techniques for achieving location privacy, they all seem impractical in the real world
scenarios, some reasons being; (i) requirement of preprocessing/encryption of data
on the service provider, (ii) additional processing on the mobile devices, (iii) major
communication overhead, and (iv) lack of precision that comes inherently with trans-
formations such as Hilbert curves. In chapter 5, we took a closer look at one possible
cryptography protocol, namely PIR, and we saw that it can o er a high level of pri-
vacy protection in both single query and multiple query scenarios. Unfortunately, the
current available techniques are not su cient for the local search problem. Further re-
search and improvements in these techniques can significantly contribute in the design
of a LPPM.
• Throughout our discussion in this dissertation we consider the adversary who is in-
terested in finding the last destination of the user. Our privacy metrics focus on that
threat model and our proposed LPPMs try to protect the privacy from that perspec-
tive. Future research direction is recommended to consider a LPPM(s) under our
architecture that protects the user from an attacker that tries to draw traces for the
user and infer her movement behavior.
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9.3 Summary
Our goal has been to make the privacy enhancing mechanisms useful and practical. We
saw a problem where there are several privacy enhancing algorithms, but most confined to
laboratories, as their implementation requires huge resources and changes. We noticed the
presence and requirement of third parties as the major obstacle to practical implementation.
We studied few existing proposals that are already TTP less. We found an opportunity there
where we could eliminate a TTP by taking advantage of the considerable power modern
mobile devices have. We proposed and implemented three di erent algorithms that follow
the same messaging schema, but achieve configurable location privacy in three di erent
scenarios. We took care to do our simulations using real life data feeds and real mobile
devices. To achieve the goal of making the algorithms practical on mobile devices, we
implemented several heuristics and ideas borrowed from di erent fields to ensure that the
algorithms perform well enough, i.e., without causing noticeable delay in response times.
Some of our proposals have been accepted in peer reviewed platforms, vindicating that this
research advances the area of privacy in mobile local search.
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